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Executive summary 
The history of nuclear decommissioning and radioactive waste management 
in the UK is one of protracted delay until the last few years.  Until the setting 
up of the NDA in 2005 there had never been a concentrated national focus on 
the issue.  An important consequence of these delays has been that the 
overall cost of managing the legacy of nuclear liabilities is substantially higher 
than it would have been had earlier opportunities been taken by government 
or the nuclear industry to get to grips with the problem.   
 
Military decisions immediately after World War 2 led to an early civilian 
nuclear programme of gas-cooled reactors which were inherently more 
complex and expensive in terms of decommissioning and waste management 
than light water reactors.  While it was difficult to avoid these early decisions, 
commitment to a second generation of gas-cooled reactors (the Advanced 
Gas-Cooled Reactors or  AGRs) compounded the effects of earlier military-
derived decisions and could have been avoided.  Commitment to the 
reprocessing of spent fuel, which continued long after there was any evident 
rationale in economic terms, added substantially to the cost and complexity of 
managing the legacy.  
 
In the decades up to the 1970s no serious thought was given, in the design of 
either military or civilian facilities, either to decommissioning or to the 
management of the more highly radioactive wastes that the nuclear enterprise 
produced.  And when attention was given in the 1970s, it was focussed on 
commercial reactors, which had substantial remaining lives ahead of them - 
and the financial arrangements for their decommissioning were not supported 
by any cash provision.  Meanwhile, especially at Sellafield and to a lesser 
extent at other sites, substantial legacies of nuclear materials from early 
military and civilian activity were subject to poor management practice and 
neglect, and began to deteriorate.    
 
While there had been a strong recommendation to tackle long-term 
management of radioactive wastes in 1976, and some activity took place in 
the 1980s and 1990s, no serious progress was made.  A fundamental 
problem was the structure of incentives: BNFL was tasked with making money 
while the UKAEA was primarily an R&D agency.  Neither organisation 
therefore had an incentive to tackle a degenerating legacy.  
 
The prospect of electricity privatisation in the late 1980s focussed attention on 
the legacy, especially for the prospective owners of reactors.  There was to a 
degree focus as well on the facilities at Sellafield under BNFL management, 
but primary focus was on the liabilities for which BNFL’s commercial 
customers would be liable.  These processes led to a very large increase in 
the expected cost of managing the UK nuclear legacy, but no subsequent 
action. The financial provisions that were supposed to take care of reactor 
decommissioning were effectively lost and no new dedicated funding system 
took their place.  The reprocessing of spent fuel, an exercise both costly and 
producing an unwanted primary product (plutonium), meanwhile continued.   
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However events in the 1990s provided the seeds of the improved approach 
that the NDA now embodies.  The UKAEA, losing nearly all of its R&D 
function in the early 1990s, began to focus seriously on decommissioning its 
own estate, and developed a process of contracting out and competition that 
provided a model for later action.  And when British Energy was privatised in 
1996, a real fund to provide for liabilities was established, on a small scale, for 
the first time.  But Sellafield’s own liabilities, especially the so-called Legacy 
Ponds and Silos, were still neglected, and deteriorated further.  The second 
real fund, BNFL’s Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio, was not used to 
deal with these large and increasingly hazardous liabilities: instead it 
accumulated profits and made a financial return for the company.   
 
The turning point in this history of delay came with the publication of the 
Government  White Paper Managing the Nuclear Legacy in 2002, the primary 
consequence of which was the setting up of the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority (NDA) and the start of a concerted effort to manage the legacy. The 
commitment of Government to a voluntarist approach to finding a site for 
radioactive wastes in 2006 marked a further step in legacy management.  The 
2002 White Paper recognised that managing nuclear liabilities cost effectively 
required financial flexibility and competent long term planning and consulted 
on a segregated fund or statutory segregated account (with preference for the 
latter) as innovative options in order to underline Government commitment, 
give the NDA greater flexibility and encourage competition for cleanup by 
giving market confidence that funding would be available.  
 
A segregated route was not implemented and the NDA is subject to the 
standard public sector process of Spending Reviews and annual spending 
limits.  However, spending is ring-fenced within the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change’s budget, spending on decommissioning and waste 
management has increased significantly and spending on the highest 
priorities has been protected.  Nonetheless, the NDA faces continuing 
operational and financial challenges, and there are further areas where 
targeted additional spending could yield further value for money savings. The 
long-term neglect of legacy facilities at Sellafield means that a very high 
proportion of the NDA budget needs to be spent there, involving high levels of 
‘hotel’ costs as well as a systematic approach to tackling the legacy facilities.  
 
There are necessarily constraints on NDA’s desire to achieve greater flexibility 
and overcome problems of affordability.  These ambitions  have to be 
considered against the government’s wider fiscal plans ,and competing 
demands for public spending.  To meet its fiscal mandate, the Government 
must balance competing spending demands and manage expenditure through 
spending controls.  Constraints on  annual Government expenditure are 
therefore an important factor in determining the allocation of resources, and 
how much flexibility is possible. 
 
Finally it is clear that Government has learned important lessons from this 
history: both the Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) for British Energy liabilities and 
(especially) the proposed scheme to fund liabilities that will accompany any 
nuclear new build are much more robust than any previous funding scheme.      
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The main lessons that emerge from this study are as follows: 
 
Provisions for liabilities 
• Previous provisions for the cost of liabilities, although never adequate, 
were dissipated, and the funds and assets used for other purposes. 
Having a robust segregated fund to cover decommissioning costs aims 
to ensure that the funds are available when needed, and should build 
greater public trust. Government’s approach to any new nuclear 
stations embodies this approach.  
 
The level and flexibility of NDA funding 
• Managing the NDA estate is characterized by high ‘hotel costs’ – the 
costs of simply maintaining sites safely and securely. This means that a 
marginal pound – if available to spend on decommissioning - will 
produce around twice as much direct liability discharge as the average 
pound. This has the potential to speed up completing the overall task. 
Accelerating decommissioning would be beneficial in net present value 
terms, by enabling hotel costs to be eliminated earlier.  
• NDA also continue to face operational and financial challenges, both 
around the uncertainties inherent in such a large and technically difficult 
programme and in managing the volatility of their income from 
commercial activities. These challenges have a number of impacts, 
particularly on the efficient allocation of resources, and for how best to 
ensure contractors are given stronger incentives to innovate and 
provide value for money.  
• In addition to the value for money case for acceleration in tackling the 
legacy, there is also the ethical case for not leaving a large liability for 
future generations. A pragmatic case would be to assist in legitimizing 
new nuclear build. However, these are highly constrained times for 
public spending, and the case for further acceleration will need to be 
balanced against other competing demands. 
 
Reprocessing 
• The continued commitment to reprocessing spent fuel has led to much 
higher costs of spent fuel and waste management than would have 
been the case if spent fuel storage had been introduced when it 
became apparent that costs for storage would be much lower than for 
reprocessing.  Government’s published expectation that reprocessing 
will be uneconomic in any future new-build programme is right. 
However the issue of the desirability of developing a new MOX plant as 
an effective management option for already-separated plutonium is a 
separate issue.  
 
Effect of discounting 
• Discounting always provides an in-principle rationale for delaying the 
tackling of decommissioning, because – all else equal - the present 
value of the task falls continuously the further into the future that 
decommissioning is postponed. Whilst the effect of discounting has 
been seen to influence delays to the decommissioning of reactors, I do 
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not consider that overall it has been the primary driver – which has 
more often been affordability constraints in a situation where future 
expenditure yields no financial benefit. The high hazard facilities 
currently receive protected funding so discounting is not an issue where 
they are concerned, although discounting remains significant in 
assessing the business case for other projects. 
 
Setting out the nuclear liability 
• The NDA currently publish annual estimates of the discounted cost of 
future clean-up work. The most recent NDA annual report for the first 
time shows a range of possible values for the future liability..  Applying 
this approach to the undiscounted figures, as well as publishing them, 
would more clearly express the extent of the liability, and allow progress 
on decommissioning over time to be better demonstrated. Greater 
transparency might also help broaden public understanding of the scale 
of the legacy.  
 
The Nuclear Liabilities Fund and new nuclear 
• In addition to the arrangements for funding and tackling the existing 
legacy, the Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) is an important (but different) 
model which has been designed to cover the costs of decommissioning 
the current fleet of AGR and PWR reactors in the UK. In developing an 
approach to tackling the liabilities generated by any new nuclear 
stations, it will be important to exploit synergies wherever possible with 
the existing NDA and NLF systems, and to ensure that the incentive 
structure for the new operators supports this. This is in line with the 
Government’s current plans. 
• Current policy requires the NLF to invest almost wholly in the National 
Loans Fund, offering relatively low returns but at the same time 
reducing the Government’s overall debt in the short-term.  This 
approach has implications for the likelihood that the fund will be able to 
cover all relevant liabilities in the longer term.   
6 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 This study analyses the history of the decommissioning of nuclear 
facilities in the UK.  This includes the management of radioactive wastes that 
result from both the operation and decommissioning of those facilities. The 
primary focus is on the buildings and materials under public ownership or 
control, mostly now owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA).  It 
also briefly considers facilities under private ownership, mainly the nuclear 
power stations owned by British Energy (BE, which is now owned by Electricite 
de France, EDF).  It does not consider decommissioning and waste issues that 
will arise from any nuclear new-build power stations. 
Box 1.1 – Evaluation Terms of Reference 
MacKerron evaluation of UK approach to nuclear decommissioning and 
waste management. 
 
To undertake an evaluation of the history of the UK approach to nuclear 
decommissioning, waste management and clean-up.  
 
The evaluation will be led by Professor Gordon MacKerron.  He will be able to 
draw on advice from within DECC, NDA and Shareholder Executive and other 
parts of Government as necessary and will be supported by a small team of 
DECC officials.  
 
Professor MacKerron is asked to produce a report addressed to the Secretary of 
State by the end of August 2011. The report is intended for internal use but it 
should be written to allow the possibility of subsequent publication at some future 
date.  
 
The report will cover: 
• an historical account of decommissioning and clean-up activity in relation 
to the nuclear legacy sites for which the NDA is now responsible, including 
an account of the ownership and management structures relating to those 
sites;  
• an analysis of the factors which have influenced the steps taken on 
decommissioning, clean-up and waste management, and the impact this 
has had on overall costs and value for money; and  
• what lessons can be learned for the future of decommissioning, clean-up 
and waste management relating to the nuclear legacy for which the NDA is 
currently responsible. 
 
The evaluation will be primarily a paper-based exercise, making full use of the 
extensive material in the public domain including NAO reports, White Papers, and 
financial reports.  However, he will be able to draw on internal expertise and that 
of retired officials, and others as appropriate. 
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1.2 A variety of terms is used to describe the subject-matter of this study.  
The accounting term ‘liabilities’ is frequently used to describe the financial 
scope of the tasks required.  A liability is a cost, but one which is distinguished 
from a standard cost by the expectation that it will be met some time in the 
future – in the case of decommissioning and waste, often a long time in the 
future, when no obvious future income stream will be available to meet it.  The 
term ‘clean-up’ is used to encompass the activities involved in discharging 
the liabilities.  Finally, the notion of ‘legacy’ is also often invoked to capture 
the idea that there is a long history of the generation of nuclear materials to be 
managed, and that there is no choice about the need to find suitable 
management solutions.  The idea of legacy also distinguishes the subject 
matter from issues of decommissioning and waste that will arise if decisions 
are taken to build new nuclear power stations. 
 
1.3 The work undertaken for this report has mainly involved analysis of 
public domain documents.  However it has been usefully supplemented by a 
substantial number of valuable interviews with people engaged, now or in the 
past, with decommissioning and waste management.  These people have 
affiliations in Government, the nuclear industry and the regulatory community 
and my thanks are due to all of them for sharing their experiences and 
knowledge.  I have drawn on their ideas but have not quoted any of them. I 
have also had excellent co-operation in undertaking the work from civil 
servants in DECC and the Shareholder Executive of BIS and a steering 
Group, chaired by Craig Lester, set up to advise on the project’s progress.  
Special thanks go to Celia Frank of DECC and Roger Cotes of the 
Shareholder Executive for their extensive and highly effective work in 
assisting me in the analysis and preparation of the study.  However I am 
alone responsible for the contents of this report, and opinions expressed are 
therefore my own. 
 
1.4 The starting point is a chronological analysis of the emergence of 
decommissioning and waste issues, going back to the end of World War 2.  
Chapter 2 to 5 are of this type and the main interest in the history is to explain 
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how past decisions have led to the expensive and complex problems involved 
in contemporary liabilities management today. Chapter 6 gathers together 
information on the management of decommissioning funding over the period 
up to the break-up of BNFL.  Chapter 7 resumes the historical account in the 
present century.  Chapter 8 provides an analysis of the issues that emerge 
from these earlier chapters, while Chapter 9 summarises the main lessons 
that can be learned from the history.   Readers will find some repetition of 
material as between Chapters 4, and 6 to 8.  The context and level of detail 
where this repetition occurs are however different, and editing out all 
repetition would have led to incomplete narratives in each of these three 
chapters.     
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CHAPTER 2:   THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
BRITISH NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 1945-1970 
• The military drive for plutonium production, together with the drive for 
nuclear energy as a national priority, meant that the programme was 
pursued without being subject to justification in economic terms, and 
without the scrutiny applied to other public spending.  The resulting 
Magnox technology produced large amounts of waste and the reprocessing 
of spent fuel added to waste volumes and costs. 
• The adviser to Government on nuclear energy in the 1950s was the UK 
Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA).  This was established to promote a 
home-grown nuclear power industry via research and prototype 
development, and then contracting out building reactors. Reliance on an 
organisation with this mission meant Ministers’ advice on the relative merits 
of different variants of nuclear power and coal came primarily from an 
organisation with purely nuclear interests. Analysis of the first reactor 
programme costs was geared to favour nuclear over coal. 
• The UKAEA had a conflict of interest in assessing different reactor designs. 
The choice of reactor for the second nuclear power programme was 
ostensibly subject to competition, but in reality the choice was weighted in 
favour of the British Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) design. The 
1965 decision in favour of the AGR meant that the decommissioning and 
waste management burden was greater than if light water reactor 
technology had been chosen - and the continuing reprocessing 
commitment also led to poor value for money in terms of waste 
management.  
• These factors continued to exert an influence as the British nuclear power 
programme developed, and led to British nuclear power being more 
expensive, both in comparison to other energy sources, and relative to 
some international nuclear comparators. 
• The other, lesser, driver was energy security. Nuclear power, and the goal 
of a fast breeder reactor (FBR) were seen as the route to underpin 
economic revival. 
• There is no indication that decommissioning or radioactive waste 
management were considered at the time. Significant volumes of 
radioactive waste were stored in ponds and silos at Sellafield without 
consideration of future retrieval and disposal, resulting in the difficult and 
costly challenges seen today in dealing with what are now high hazard 
facilities.  
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Introduction 
2.1 In the immediate post war period, Britain aimed to be a global leader in 
the development of nuclear power. The first commercial nuclear power station 
in the world was opened by the Queen at Calder Hall in 1956, and in the 50s 
and early 60s the UK had a greater nuclear electrical generating capacity than 
any other country. In the early post-war years, spending by the UK 
Government on nuclear research rivalled that of the United States. However 
while the UK was first to establish commercial nuclear power, the power 
generated was significantly more expensive than that created elsewhere, 
particularly in the US.1.  Other countries did not adopt the gas-cooled 
technology developed in the UK.2
 
 For purposes of this study, it is particularly 
significant that throughout the period covered by this chapter, 
decommissioning and waste were not issues considered in taking decisions 
on nuclear power. Source materials consulted are notable for not mentioning 
the subject. This lack of consideration was symptomatic both of a shorter term 
and sometimes minimalist environmental perspective and of the priorities of 
decision makers being elsewhere. However, the decisions taken did have 
significant implications for the future costs of the decommissioning 
programme. 
The military origins of the British nuclear programme 
2.2 The perceived successes and failures of the UK nuclear power industry 
stemmed from the same cause. The initial development of nuclear power was 
driven by a military imperative to produce plutonium3. It was then pushed 
forward by what Duncan Burn has described as a ‘wave of nuclear euphoria’,4
                                                        
1 See Burn, Duncan, The Political Economy of Nuclear Energy, pp. 109-115 for comparison of 
the development of British and American systems. Williams, Roger , The Nuclear Power 
Decisions, charts the growing disillusionment of the CEGB with the AGR relative to Light 
Water Reactor designs, pp. 208-230 
2 Williams, Roger The Nuclear Power Decisions – p. 122 – 124. 
3 Hall, Tony, the Politics of Nuclear Power, p. 9 
4 Ibid. p.50. See also Williams p.17 
 
in which cheap nuclear power was seen to represent the future, and where it 
was thought Britain needed to be at the forefront. There was simultaneously 
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major concern that conventional sources of power, primarily coal, would prove 
insufficient to meet future energy needs.  
 
2.3 The priority of successive Governments was, therefore, to establish a 
home grown nuclear industry. The result was that in the early years of the UK 
nuclear power programme, nuclear power was a national strategic priority, 
pursued without being subject to the need to justify itself in economic terms, 
and without being scrutinised in the manner of other national expenditures5. 
The industry was driven by central planning. Speed, and the Government’s 
assessment of strategic necessity, took precedence over value for money 
considerations and competition.6
 
 
2.4 In 1946 the United States Congress passed the McMahon Act, 
forbidding cooperation with foreign powers in either civil or military nuclear 
power. This ended the period of joint working which had marked the 
Manhattan project.7 From this point the establishment of an independent 
British nuclear deterrent was a priority. Each of the subsequent steps taken in 
the UK in the late 40s and early 50s was designed to meet military 
requirements, with civil benefits in generating electricity seen as a useful by-
product.8 Christopher Hinton, one of the leading figures in nuclear energy at 
the time, wrote that ‘from 1946 to 1954 atomic energy was a defence industry, 
hence speed was vitally necessary and great risk of failure had to be 
accepted.’9 The Windscale Piles were established as the fastest way to 
develop plutonium for the UK’s military programme.10
                                                        
5 Hall, p .9. 
6 The analysis of how the structure of the UK nuclear industry shaped the decisions which 
were made, and led to poor cost-effectiveness is set out in Duncan Burn’s The Political 
Economy of Nuclear Energy, op. cit. 
7 Hall, p. 22. 
8 Hall, p. 42.  
9 Hall, p. 11. 
10Hinton described the Windscale Piles as ‘monuments to our initial ignorance.’ Hall, p.24.  
 The construction of the 
world’s first ‘commercial’ plant at Calder Hall was in fact entirely funded by the 
Ministry of Defence – despite the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) 
having initially expected to provide a contribution. The imperative to produce 
plutonium for the military programme dictated the choice of approach to 
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building the Calder Hall station – and the choice of the Magnox gas cooled, 
graphite moderated design, rather than a heavy or light water reactor.11
 
  The 
effect was that, for reasons justified in the context of the over-riding military 
objective, the early decisions in the development of nuclear power were not 
taken on the basis of achieving a cost-effective way of generating electricity. 
2.5 The military aspects of the nuclear project also resulted in a lack of 
financial scrutiny and challenge to the decisions taken in the early years of the 
programme. The Cabinet rarely discussed nuclear energy, and when it did it 
was more often in the context of controlling nuclear proliferation, rather than 
its implications for UK power generation. Nuclear power was taken outside of 
normal governance channels: the Prime Minister was advised on policy 
directly by a separate committee of officials who operated outside the Ministry 
of Supply. The costs were concealed within the Ministry’s budget. When 
Churchill returned to power in 1951 he discovered that over £100 million had 
been spent on the programme.12
 
 
The establishment of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, 
and its relationship with the Central Electricity 
Generating Board 
 
2.6 The establishment of the Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in 1954 
was critical to entrenching the special status that the development of nuclear 
power had acquired through its military origins. Lord Cherwell, Churchill’s 
adviser on nuclear power, considered that nuclear industry needed to be set 
loose from the risk of being ‘petrified’ under the control of the Civil Service: 
‘only men used to tackling large industrial development’ could handle such a 
programme.13
 
 
2.7 While the establishment of a separate authority resembled the 
approach taken to governing other nationalised industries, it is notable that 
                                                        
11 Hall, p. 42. 
12 Hall, p. 29. 
13 Hall, p. 44. 
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nuclear power was held separate from other sources of electrical generation – 
governed by the CEGB in England and two Scottish utilities. The UKAEA’s 
raison d’être was the promotion of a homegrown, nuclear power industry, and 
in the 1950s it was the primary adviser to Government on atomic energy. 
Ministers had no other authoritative source of independent advice to turn to. 
Writing in 1967, Burn argued ‘Ministers have on occasion identified 
themselves so closely with the policies and decisions of the UKAEA that they 
have seemed like its public relations officer.’14 Furthermore the UKAEA was 
not just an adviser to Government, it directly carried out the UK’s nuclear 
research and development.  In so doing, it developed the prototype reactors 
which it then contracted to British nuclear consortia to build. The result was 
that the UKAEA was not an even-handed judge between different 
technologies of nuclear power – it showed evidence of being institutionally 
committed to promoting the results of its own research programmes15
2.8 There was on occasion tension between the UKAEA, which controlled 
the nuclear power technology, and the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) as the main purchaser. In 1955 the latter had been reluctant to order 
new Magnox plants until the first at Calder Hall had been proven. However, in 
the early years of the nuclear programme, it was the UKAEA that had the 
political upper hand. It was not until 1960 that the CEGB was able to exercise 
a decisive influence, succeeding in scaling back the target for nuclear 
generation capacity from 5,000 MW to 3,000MW.
. 
16
                                                        
14 Burn, p. 114. 
15 See Burn,op. cit.. p.13 and G.MacKerron, H Rush and A J Surrey ‘The Advanced Gas-
Cooled Reactor:  a case study in reactor choice’, Energy Policy, June 1977 for more detailed 
evidence.  In the assessment of designs for the Dungeness B station only UKAEA staff 
assessed the reactor core; and the AEA made a new design of an apparently cheaper fuel 
rod cluster available to the consortium (APC) which won the competition. 
16 Hall, p.55. The CEGB found the UKAEA staff ‘arrogant and unwilling… to accept advice on 
even the more conventional electrical side of nuclear power station design’. 
 While in retrospect, 
tension between the two organisations might be seen as a constructive check 
and balance on the development of the power programme, at the time 
politicians saw it as a matter of concern. By the mid 1960s, the pressure was 
for the two organisations to work closer together, with joint membership of 
their boards.  
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Visions of the future 
2.9 While the immediate imperative for the nuclear programme was to 
produce plutonium for military purposes, successive Governments also saw 
nuclear power as representing a route to ultimately producing cheap power to 
sustain British economic prospects and help UK exports. The fast breeder 
reactor (FBR) was the ultimate objective, as it would drastically reduce 
uranium use and in principle produce more fuel than went in to it – one 
estimate suggested that with a FBR, the entirety of the UK’s electricity needs 
could be catered for by as little as 10 tons of uranium per year17
 
.  
2.10 Almost as important as the positive vision however, was the threat that 
existing sources of power would be insufficient, and that nuclear power would 
be the only solution. The experience of power cuts during cold winters, with 
concomitant damage to British industry, prompted a sense of urgency about 
the need for energy security. Further, it was projected that the production of 
coal in the UK could not keep up with the demand for electricity. Nuclear 
power represented a home-grown route to achieving energy security. 
Unchecked enthusiasm was not universal. While the Advisory Committee on 
Scientific Policy reported that the cost of electricity generated by nuclear 
means would be just under two thirds the cost of coal, several members 
voiced concern that this estimate might be significantly over-optimistic.18
 
 
The development route selected makes British 
nuclear power more expensive 
2.11 The rapid pace of the UK nuclear power programme after the war 
contrasted with that in the United States. In the US in the 1950s, the Atomic 
Energy Committee initiated a five year programme to test 5 types of reactor 
which it saw as ‘giving promise for civilian power application.19
                                                        
17 Hall, p. 34 
18 Hall, p. 33. 
19 Hall, p. 17. 
 Each of these 
was initially tested using small prototypes, rather than full scale plants. In 
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1955 it moved on to larger prototypes, with several different systems. In 
Britain, the approach was very different. Calder Hall, the first nuclear power 
station to be connected to a mains electricity grid was initiated in 1952 – 
based on a prototype, graphite moderated plant at the research facility at 
Harwell. In 1955 – a year before Calder Hall was completed - it was decided 
to expand the programme to build a further 12 power stations by 1965, with 
the initial reactors following the Calder Hall Magnox design.  
 
2.12 In making the case for the first reactor programme, the analysis was 
conducted in ways that systematically led to the conclusion that the cost of 
nuclear power appeared competitive with more conventional sources like coal. 
It was decided that nuclear power plants would be assessed on the basis of 
their providing the base load of electricity, running continuously, while coal 
was evaluated on the basis of plants being turned on and off20. Secondly 
Government accepted that an allowance should be made – in practice a 
substantial allowance - for the value of plutonium generated through the 
power programme, which could be used in future FBRs. Even on the basis of 
assessments available at that time, FBRs were still some way from being 
developed. Subsequently the FBR programme was abandoned,21 and 
Government consulted in February 2011 on approaches for managing the 
plutonium generated.22
 
 
2.13 The manner in which the 1955 White Paper A Programme of Nuclear 
Power tilted the balance in favour of the Magnox programme was 
symptomatic of two factors. The first was the extent to which the UK 
Government saw nuclear power as being a long term strategic priority for the 
UK. Secondly, there was the strength of the position of the UKAEA in advising 
Government while also having a major stake both in the expansion of the UK 
nuclear industry and in the technology which it had developed. 
 
                                                        20 Hall., p. 53 
21 Hall, op.cit. p. 54. 
22 DECC, Consultation on the Management of the UK’s Plutonium Stocks, February 2011.  
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/plutonium/plutonium.aspx 
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2.14 In 1957 it was decided to triple the total generating capacity of the 
programme to 5,000 – 6,000 MW, all of it from Magnox reactors. However, the 
first Magnox plants were more expensive to build than anticipated. At the 
same time the comparative cost of coal power fell significantly. Christopher 
Hinton, who led the UKAEA’s production division, but who by then was chair 
of the CEGB, told a House of Commons Select Committee that nuclear power 
was 40% more expensive than a conventional equivalent23
 
. This led in 1960 
to the nuclear power programme being scaled back to 3000 MW (see para. 
2.8), of varying levels of installed capacity and different detailed designs. It 
was also acknowledged that the Magnox power programme was never likely 
to be competitive with conventional power stations. 
2.15 The UKAEA responded by developing its prototype for a new, gas 
cooled reactor, the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (AGR), which reached full 
power in 1963. Government was initially expected simply to endorse a new 
nuclear power programme, based on the AGR. However, in the early 1960s 
the American Boiling Water Reactor was developing rapidly and GE claimed 
to be able to build plants capable of competing with conventionally generated 
energy. In April 1963 a White Paper announced the intention to seek bids for 
a second generation of nuclear power stations, allowing competition between 
AGRs and ‘proven designs of water moderated reactors’ of US types. 
However, while this appeared to show a readiness to test UK reactor designs 
against those overseas, the assessment panel consisted of a team of 
engineers and scientists from the Central Electricity Generating Board, and 
from the UKAEA – which had designed the AGR system. No experts with 
knowledge of the American alternative were included. The cost of the versions 
of American plant considered in the tender were 80% higher than the cost of a 
plant then being constructed at Oyster Creek in the US – in part due to the 
exacting specifications set out by the UKAEA. There were subsequently 
complaints from the other tenderers that the winning consortium – APC, which 
had submitted the AGR bid - had been allowed to modify their tender, while in 
                                                        
23 Hall, p.70 
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effect those consortia submitting American designs had been required to 
propose models which were out of date.24
                                                        
24 Williams, pp. 138-141 and MacKerron et al. op. cit.  See also footnote 10 above . 
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Box 2.1 – Decommissioning nuclear reactors and other facilities 
 
Decommissioning is the process of returning nuclear sites to unrestricted or 
brownfield alternative uses. Following IAEA definitions, there are three stages 
to decommissioning a nuclear reactor:  
 
Stage 1  Removal of spent fuel from the reactor core, after shutdown 
(storage with surveillance); 
Stage 2 Some dismantling followed by care and maintenance (restricted 
site release)  
Stage 3 Dismantling of the reactor core and clearance of the site 
(unrestricted site release).  
 
The second and third stages can in principle be carried out at any time after 
Stage 1, subject to operator practice and safety considerations. The UK 
strategy since the 1980s has been to delay the final stage by approximately a 
century, officially to gain benefits from the decay of radioactivity.  
 
There is a range of other nuclear facilities, including sites for fuel 
production, reprocessing, and waste disposal. The site at Sellafield, for 
example, comprises the various stages of the fuel cycle (as well as two 
reactors). Generally, their decommissioning will involve post-operational clean 
out (removing fuel and other radioactive materials or hazards); initial 
decommissioning (removal of easily dismantled contaminated parts); care and 
maintenance (allow radioactive materials to decay); waste characterisation 
(defining waste materials and their disposal route); decommissioning and 
dismantling (removal of all process plant and equipment); demolition of the 
structure; and remediation of land and water to meet an agreed end-state for 
future use. 
 
Decommissioning always produces radioactive wastes of various types and 
an important part of the decommissioning ‘cycle’ is the packaging and 
emplacement of these materials in suitable long-term waste management 
facilities. 
 
Decommissioning - not a consideration 
2.16 Throughout this period decommissioning was not an issue visibly 
considered by decision makers, and no provision was made for its future 
costs or for those of wastes more generally. So, for example, while the first 
generation Magnox power stations were initially projected to have a lifespan 
of 20 years, apparently no thought was given to what would be done with the 
facilities once they ceased operation. Primary sources from the whole of this 
period do not discuss decommissioning.  
 
19 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
2.17 During this early period significant volumes of spent fuel and nuclear 
waste were stored in ponds and silos at Sellafield, without consideration of 
how the material might be permanently disposed. One of the impacts of 
decommissioning not being a priority has been that radioactive materials have 
sat in ponds for so long that they have formed sludges, making the task of 
clean-up hugely more complex and expensive than if it had been addressed 
at the time. These legacy storage ponds and silos are now regarded as a high 
hazard as a result of long neglect and deterioration both in the materials and 
in their containing buildings. Making them safe, removing the material and 
decommissioning the facilities is now considered a national priority.25
 
 The 
Sellafield site licence company is working on a series of bespoke projects to 
extract radioactive material from these ponds and silos. These projects are 
needed either because the storage facilities were not designed with a view to 
extraction, or because the facilities to remove the stored material were left to 
fall into disrepair. In retrospect this clearly represents a significant failing in the 
thinking of the period. In the context of the time, it is also worth remembering 
that environmental and safety standards were much lower, in common both 
with other industries and other countries. 
2.18  The scale of the nuclear liability faced by the UK is to a large degree 
shaped by this period, and the extent to which it is larger than other countries 
may to some degree be due to the UK having been a nuclear pioneer – and 
having developed a programme before better standards of design and waste 
storage became standard. The lesson is that in considering the development 
of a nuclear programme it is critical to plan for the long term, and to design 
facilities with a view to their decommissioning as well as their operation.  
 
                                                        
25 Spending on these facilities was protected in the 2010 Spending Review Settlement – HM 
Treasury, Spending Review 2010, p. 62. 
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BOX 2.2  -  International comparisons  
 
The scale of the decommissioning challenge facing the UK relative to other 
countries with a nuclear history is largely the product of two factors: (1) the 
decision, stemming from the military origins of the programme, to follow the 
developments of the UKAEA’s research programme to adopt gas cooled 
reactors, rather than water cooled; and (2) the poor standard of storage 
facilities – primarily in what are now described as the Legacy Ponds and Silos 
at Sellafield as well as a shaft at Dounreay. While the Legacy Ponds and Silos 
are now by some distance the highest cost element of the nuclear legacy, the 
scale of the problems has also been influenced by the volume of radioactive 
waste generated (which would have been significantly lower had water-cooled 
reactors been used), by the susceptibility of Magnox spent fuel to corrosion 
when stored in water, and by a continued commitment to reprocessing AGR 
fuel beyond the time when it was economic. 
 
A study by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD in 2003 compared 
international decommissioning strategies and costs.26 This showed that gas-
cooled Magnox reactors (based on examples from the UK, Italy and Japan) 
were expected to produce around 100 tonnes of radioactive waste in the 
course of the decommissioning process per MW of generating capacity. This 
compared to 10 tonnes or less for most water cooled reactors. The greater 
volume of waste is the result of both Magnox reactors’ greater physical size, 
and the need to dispose of large amounts of graphite. The result is that 
Magnox reactors are very much more expensive to decommission than any 
comparator – on the NEA study basis, the cost of decommissioning a Magnox 
reactor was estimated at more than $2,500 per kW of generating capacity, in 
comparison to less than $500 for any other design of reactor (a PWR was 
estimated at an average decommissioning cost of $320 per kW of capacity). 
The high cost of decommissioning Magnox reactors extends to the two 
reactors exported by the UKAEA; the estimated cost of decommissioning the 
Italian Latina reactor is $3,248 per KW of capacity, while the figure for the 
Tokai reactor in Japan is $4,470.27
The design of Magnox reactors also illustrates how planning for 
decommissioning is critical to cost control. Light-water reactor pressure 
vessels, in addition to being much more compact than Magnox vessels, are 
designed so that the top can be removed, giving direct access to the full 
diameter of the reactor, which enables all of the fuel to be removed in a short 
period. This has meant that defueling at the end of a reactor’s life becomes 
routine. In contrast Magnox reactors are not only of much larger size, but also 
have a non-removable top, with only limited access designed into the reactor 
vessels for fuelling and defuelling purposes through small diameter 
penetrations requiring defueling machines which are not always available for 
 
 
                                                        
26 Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, OECD 2003 (2001 figures). 
27 Definitions of what constitutes decommissioning activity vary – for example in Japan it is 
accepted that the end state of the site can be one which is suitable for new nuclear 
construction, whereas in the UK and Italy the requirement is that the site should be suitable 
for unrestricted use. However these variations appear not to affect the broad thrust of the 
evidence on cost comparisons. 
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100% of the time. The result is that the defuelling process in practice takes a 
number of years – which is particularly significant as the period over which the 
fuel remains in the reactor has the highest ‘hotel’ costs. 
 
The NEA study also shows that the UK intends to defer decommissioning of 
its reactors for substantially longer than is commonly the case overseas.  It 
reports that the average time from reactor shut down to complete 
decommissioning of a UK gas-cooled reactor is expected to be in the region 
of 100 years, which compares to an average internationally of around 20 
years for a PWR. The rationale for the delay in addition to the affordability 
constraint implied by the high cost of decommissioning is officially that 
radiation levels within Magnox reactors are predicted to reduce to levels which 
allow direct human access within 70 to 90 years of shutdown, whereas in light 
water reactors the delay would need to be significantly longer to allow direct 
contact and here instead the intention is to decommission using remote 
equipment. However this contrasts with the approach to the Italian Latina 
Magnox plant, where Government policy is that decommissioning should be 
complete by 2024. However it is a deadline that has already slipped (from 
2020) and final decommissioning is contingent on the availability of a 
repository. All of these figures represent targets or ambitions rather than 
achieved results – so the timescale in all the countries cited, apart from the 
UK, may well reflect a degree of optimism bias. 
 
Conclusion 
2.19 A number of criticisms can and have been made of the UK nuclear 
power industry in the 1950s and 60s.28
                                                        
28 See Burn, p. 100. 
 First, the UKAEA had dual and 
conflicting roles as simultaneously technology developer and main 
Government adviser on nuclear power.  This, together with the lack of scrutiny 
applied to it, meant that Ministers did not have access to balanced advice on 
the relative merits of different types of nuclear power and of alternative power 
generating options. Second, because the UKAEA was itself responsible for 
researching and developing models of nuclear reactor, it had a vested interest 
in their success, and was not a balanced judge of whether they should be 
adopted. While there was apparent technology competition to build a second 
nuclear programme, leading to the decision in favour of AGRs, the restrictions 
placed upon the competition produced a very expensive outcome. Third, and 
as a result of these factors, research in the UK (almost entirely led by the 
UKAEA) pursued a narrow course, following a route initially prescribed by the 
requirements of the defence industry, rather than proceeding to test a variety 
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of reactor systems. This can be understood in the context of the need to 
develop a source of plutonium rapidly but in the long term, continuation of this 
approach meant that British nuclear development followed the narrow course 
of the UKAEA’s research, and new UK designs were not thoroughly tested 
against potential alternatives.  This narrow approach was to have major 
consequences for the cost and complexity of the subsequent task of 
decommissioning and waste management.  
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CHAPTER 3 – THE UK ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY 
AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS LIMITED: 
CONFLICTING MISSIONS 
 
• In early-mid 1970s, AEA’s and BNFL’s primary missions were not focussed 
on managing liabilities. 
• AEA was a civilian nuclear R&D agency in thermal, fast breeder and fusion 
systems. BNFL was a publicly owned plc focussed on commercial activities 
associated with the fuel cycle (mainly reprocessing spent fuel). 
• In the late 1980s, both were required, because of increasing general 
environmental concern and deterioration in some early plants, to take on 
some responsibility for liabilities management, but were not given the 
incentive structure to do this effectively, especially in the case of BNFL. 
• There were also specific issues: for BNFL over discharge levels leading to 
international pressure and for AEA around the rundown of its non-fusion 
activities and making early R&D facilities safe.  
• The Government’s objective for BNFL was to maximise over time the return 
to its shareholding, with quantitative performance targets set by the 
Department of Energy. No targets were set for decommissioning or waste 
management.  
• BNFL remained largely conflicted between making money and carrying out 
clean-up. In contrast, the ending of virtually all AEA research funding by 
1994 reduced conflict and meant it became a liability management agency, 
developing useful ideas for managing liabilities via competition and 
contracting out. 
Introduction 
3.1 In 1971 the Atomic Energy Authority was split up.  It had previously 
taken primary responsibility for UK nuclear research (including military 
applications), reactor design, fuel production and reprocessing, alongside the 
operation of two Magnox power stations.  The MoD took over military 
functions and British Nuclear Fuels was established as a public corporation 
responsible for commercially exploiting the full range of fuel cycle processes, 
including fuel manufacture, and reprocessing. BNFL also took responsibility 
for two Magnox power stations – Calder Hall at Sellafield, and Chapelcross in 
Dumfries and Galloway, and the management of the legacy facilities at 
Sellafield. The UKAEA was tasked with driving forward the UK nuclear sector 
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through research and development, acting in support of commercial partners.  
The motivation was a desire to split off military from civilian activities and to 
separate out activities that were in principle profit-making from ongoing R&D.   
The objectives set for BNFL and for UKAEA 
3.2 BNFL’s focus was unambiguous. Its primary mission was to make a 
profit, and there was an expectation – even in an era when nationalised 
industries were standard – that a significant proportion of it might be sold to 
private investors. Secondly it was to be a national champion of nuclear power, 
one of the few companies that could claim to be capable of offering a service 
to cover every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. The ambition was not just to run 
an efficient UK business, but to succeed where the UKAEA and its 
predecessors had failed, by developing a worldwide business, providing fuel 
cycle technology and services  to overseas customers. 
3.3 The company’s first annual report acknowledged, however, that a 
major export business would not be established immediately and ‘that 
[BNFL’s] main dependence for some years to come will be on the home 
market.’ In fact at the time of its creation 60% of the company’s turnover was 
in ‘the fuel cycle business with two customers, the Central Electricity 
Generating Board and the South of Scotland Electricity Board;’ while 30% 
consisted of ‘sales and services to the UKAEA and electricity sales’.29
3.4 In the early 1970s the UKAEA continued to see itself as the overall 
guardian of the UK’s nuclear mission, having ‘stewardship on behalf of 
Government, in atomic energy affairs generally.’
 
30
                                                        
29 UKAEA, Annual Report and Accounts, 1973, p.7. 
30 UKAEA, p.7. 
 Despite the creation of 
BNFL, it retained ‘the preponderant share of the country’s resources, both 
human and material which are devoted to the development of atomic energy 
for peaceful uses.’ In fulfilling this role, the UKAEA had two more specific 
functions, supervising ‘research and development on aspects of nuclear 
power which are of concern to the community generally’, and ‘providing 
continuous research and development support for the British nuclear industry.’ 
The first of these two roles indicated a greater concern than had previously 
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been emphasised with ‘safety and environmental matters’. The second 
included both technical support for improving the efficiency of existing UK 
reactors, and, of particular significance in terms of the Authority’s ambitions, 
developing new reactor systems. Among these latter, the main objective 
continued to be the development of the FBR, which it envisaged would 
become available commercially in the 1980s, and would ‘supply a major part 
of the UK’s electrical power by the end of the century.’31
The growing acknowledgement of the significance of 
liabilities management 
 
3.5 In the 1970s neither BNFL nor the UKAEA made more than a passing 
reference to liabilities management in their accounts, and they did not make 
any explicit provisions for decommissioning. BNFL did make a provision for 
costs which it could foresee arising in the medium term as part of the fuel 
cycle – £13 million in March 1977 to cover the cost of the vitrification of waste 
products created since the incorporation of the company in 1971. However it 
explicitly set out that ‘provision [would not] be made for the ultimate disposal 
of wastes until appropriate routes approved by the Regulatory Boards have 
been established’.32 BNFL’s claim in relation to decommissioning was broadly 
that the liabilities fell on its customers but in 1978 it acknowledged that not all 
of the costs could be passed on in this way.  In particular, it admitted that it 
would be financially responsible for the decommissioning of the two Magnox 
stations it owned at Calder Hall and at Chapelcross.33
3.6 BNFL’s approach was not to make any provision until an assessment 
of the costs could be established, and this was not attempted until 1978-9. 
The first provision for the cost of decommissioning was subsequently made in 
1980, with £35.3 million marked up in BNFL’s accounts for addressing its two 
Magnox power stations. This figure steadily rose throughout the 1980s – 
reaching £72.2 million in 1986. However, while this represented an 
acknowledgement of a liability, we have not seen any evidence of systematic 
analysis or planning of how it would be discharged, or when the actual work 
 
                                                        
31 UKAEA, op. cit. 
32 BNFL Annual Report, 1984-5. 
33 BNFL Annual report, 1978-9, p.15. 
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would be carried out. BNFL’s focus was on extending the life of its two 
Magnox stations, and prior to the late 1980s it does not seem to have given 
thought to the timeline that would apply to decommissioning the plants after 
they had ceased operation. The figure marked up in the accounts up until the 
late 80s was therefore only a rough estimate at current cost.   
3.7  In 1987 BNFL carried out a more substantive evaluation of liability 
costs. This went beyond the two Magnox stations to consider the full range of 
facilities at Sellafield, covering ‘plants still at the design stage and under 
construction as well as existing plants nearing the end of their useful life’. The 
review also included assessments of low level and intermediate level waste 
arising during the decommissioning operations.’ BNFL also for the first time 
set out a timescale, albeit one which was still very generic and tentative, for 
performing the decommissioning works. The initial stage of the work involving 
‘decontamination of the plant and immobilisation of residual radioactivity’ 
would be carried out ‘as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the 
plant’s useful life’ while the decommissioning work would be completed within 
50 years for ‘process plants’ and 100 years for reactors.   It seems likely that 
the start of this more comprehensive approach to estimating liabilities was 
largely due to the approaching attempt to privatise the CEGB and SSEB.   
3.8 This assessment would have had significant consequences for BNFL’s 
provision for decommissioning costs in its accounts. However, in practice the 
effect was much less significant than it might have been as for the first time 
the provision was made on a discounted basis. While the figure set out in 
1987 increased from £72 million undiscounted to £135 million discounted, it in 
fact represented much more than a doubling in the scope of work 
anticipated.34
3.9 For the UKAEA the late eighties also marked the point at which it 
started to pay more serious attention to decommissioning.  The area was not 
discussed at all in its annual reports prior to 1986, and no provision was made 
for meeting any costs. In that year the issue was brought to a head when the 
  This figure was still modest in relation to later estimates. 
                                                        
34 It is not possible to assess the full extent of the cost without knowledge of (a) the discount 
rate, and (b) the profile over which the spend was intended to take place. 
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Authority was made a Trading Fund, and was expected to operate on a more 
commercial basis. To coincide with its establishment as a fund it secured an 
undertaking from the Secretary of State (SoS) for Energy, accepting 
responsibility for the cost of treating and disposing of wastes and 
decommissioning plants established prior to that year. However, its 
understanding of what this liability might correspond to remained vague - in 
1987 the Authority estimated that Government would need to provide ‘£20-30 
million per annum for the foreseeable future’ to meet the SoS commitment, in 
addition to a liability owed to BNFL, which in 1988 was estimated at £40 
million. At this stage, the Authority was having its first practical experience of 
decommissioning – taking down the Windscale Piles, and starting to 
decommission the prototype AGR reactor at Sellafield.35
Governance structures and incentives  
 
3.10 Prior to 1981 the Government’s shareholding was owned through the 
UKAEA, and subsequently it was held by the Department for Energy. After the 
Department took over the shareholding, the main governance structure was 
through the requirement for the Government to approve the Corporate Plan 
and major capital projects. Through the approval of the Corporate Plan, the 
Department was able to set performance targets for the company.  
3.11 Initially targets were based on volume of sales and profits per 
employee; the company then argued that as the majority of its business was 
undertaken on cost plus terms, the main performance aim should be to 
improve efficiency and reduce costs. From 1983 to 1986 the target was that 
BNFL should reduce specified costs in real terms by two per cent per annum, 
and overall controllable costs by one per cent in 1985-6.36
                                                        
35 UKAEA Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 41 
36 Ibid, p. 16. 
 In addition to these 
overall objectives, specific targets were set for individual capital projects. In 
1989 a report for the National Audit Office on the governance of BNFL found 
that these targets represented ‘a major step forward in introducing quantitative 
performance aims, and noted with satisfaction that during the previous two 
years the targets had been met’. From 1985 BNFL’s targets were supported 
by a bonus scheme for board members, based on the Company meeting (a) 
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the medium–term financial target; (b) the production requirements of the 
home generating boards; (c) manpower below budget; and (d) relevant capital 
investment milestones.  A review of BNFL’s annual reports supports the view 
that current financial performance was therefore the main driver for the 
company. Chairmen and Chief Executives concentrated on explaining 
profitability and the level of dividend paid to shareholders - it was very rare for 
future liabilities to receive a mention. 
3.12 In the 1980s BNFL therefore saw decommissioning as a future 
challenge, and one which was seen to apply primarily to the two Magnox 
power stations when they ceased operations – a date it hoped to postpone for 
as long as feasible. Similarly, other BNFL plants (especially the Magnox 
reprocessing plant) were largely still performing the functions for which they 
had been designed. While it is therefore not surprising that no targets were 
set for decommissioning, the risk was that without such targets there was no 
impetus for the company either to seriously think through and analyse the 
future decommissioning challenge, or to consider how future costs could be 
limited by steps taken in the current period.  
3.13 BNFL did not appear to pay much attention to remediating the Legacy 
Ponds and Silos.  Financially these were the responsibility of the MoD, and 
the CEGB and SSEB.  BNFL saw their own role as to work on remediating 
these facilities only to the extent that these two other bodies were willing to 
finance such work and their experience was that these organisations were 
only willing to pay enough to allow the facilities to ‘tread water’.37
 
 
 
  For these 
large and, as it turns out, troublesome liabilities, BNFL seemed unwilling to 
take any further initiatives. 
                                                        
37 Interview evidence. 
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Increasing environmental and safety concerns  
3.14 BNFL did have broader environmental concerns through, firstly, 
political pressure partly driven by international demands to limit emissions 
from Sellafield to the sea and, secondly, a general concern to promote the UK 
nuclear industry, which was threatened by public perception of safety risks 
following rising discharge levels.  
3.15 A series of events, mostly external to BNFL, forced some increased 
interest in managing liabilities though the 1980s.  The accidents at Three Mile 
Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) raised public perceptions of the risks 
associated with nuclear power and resulted in increased pressure on BNFL to 
be more aware of operational risks.  Between these two accidents there was 
the Sellafield beach incident in 1983, where discharges to the Irish Sea led to 
the prosecution of the company.  Through the 1980s BNFL spent substantial 
sums to reduce liquid discharges into the Irish Sea, for example on the SIXEP 
plant. 
After the closure of its research programmes the 
UKAEA develops a greater focus on 
decommissioning, and contracts out delivery 
3.16 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, funding for the UKAEA’s research 
programmes was severely curtailed. As late as 1989, the inside cover of the 
UKAEA’s annual report was a picture of Dounreay at night, with the caption 
‘fast reactors, tomorrow’s power today’.  A breakdown of the Authority’s 
expenditure in that year makes no reference to decommissioning, with by far 
the largest proportion of its budget (27%) going to the fast reactor programme. 
The rest of the budget was divided in chunks of no more than 8% between 
different elements of the UK reactor programme and underlying research. By 
1994 funding for the FBR programme was ended and the prototype FBR at 
Dounreay had been shut down. With the exception of continuing funding for 
nuclear fusion research, the UKAEA’s raison d’etre effectively came to an 
end. The obvious new focus for the organisation was the management of the 
liabilities that its previous work had generated.  
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3.17 By 1997, when Arthur D Little (ADL) was commissioned to review the 
UKAEA’s performance in managing its liabilities, the effect of this shift in focus 
was evident. The Authority adopted a contracting model in which it planned 
and controlled works carried out on its sites, but did not itself carry out 
decommissioning work, or provide associated support services. ADL were 
impressed with the organisation’s contracting ability, reporting that it was 
‘ahead of the rest of the public sector in its approach… and compares 
favourably with the private sector’.38 This improved performance was driven 
by senior management. However it took time for the more junior levels of the 
organisation to adjust to the new role and for new skills to be brought in, and 
the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) took the view that the UKAEA did 
not always have the technical skills to perform site licence functions to full 
effect, culminating in a temporary shutdown at Dounreay in 1998 after a 
contractor cut though the main electrical cable to the site.39
BNFL’s focus remains on commercial activities 
 
3.18 For BNFL, decommissioning and waste management did not become a 
driving issue for the company as a whole until a much later stage. In the late 
1980s and early 90s, the predominant reputational issue for the company was 
bringing the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) into operation.  This 
was its biggest capital project, and a major driver of the bottom line. The 
company failed to hit its profit targets for two years due to delays to the 
project.40
3.19 In the 1980s none of the company’s divisions was focussed on 
decommissioning.  BNFL was divided into four groups: Fuel Manufacture; 
Enrichment; Reprocessing Operations; and Reprocessing Engineering. Even 
by the mid 1990s, there was no group focussed on discharging BNFL’s 
liabilities. Although BNFL did have a division focussed on Waste Management 
and Decommissioning by then, its primary focus was not the company’s major 
liabilities at Sellafield or even in the UK, but BNFL’s American 
decommissioning business BNFL Inc. Decommissioning at Sellafield was the 
  
                                                        
38 Quinquennial review of the UKAEA, p.34. 
39 History of the NII, 2006 p. 21.  
40 BNFL Annual Report 1992-3 p. 6 and BNFL Annual Report 1993-4, p 3. 
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responsibility of ‘Spent Fuel Management Division’, the main focus of which 
was THORP, and the Sellafield MOX plant. Unlike UKAEA, BNFL did not seek 
to compete the management of its decommissioning tasks among outside 
contractors. While it did contract out construction work, the design and project 
management remained in house.41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This may have contributed to a lack of 
focus on the cost of these activities and how they could be driven down, or 
more innovative approaches employed.  
                                                        
41 Interview evidence. 
32 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
CHAPTER 4: THE UTILITIES - DECOMMISSIONING 
LIABILITIES  
• There was limited planning or financial provision by the public electricity 
utilities (CEGB and SSEB) for decommissioning their nuclear generating 
stations until the late 1980s.  
• Sharp rises in cost estimates and provisions resulted from scrutiny ahead 
of electricity privatisation in 1989, from BNFL’s reassessment of its costs to 
its utility customers and early experience of decommissioning Berkeley 
station.  
• The scale and uncertainty of emerging estimates of the liabilities for the 
Magnox fleet led to their withdrawal from privatisation in July 1989, with 
AGR and PWR stations following in November 1989 
• Cost estimates were subject to periodic escalation because of complexity, 
project appraisal optimism and risk of game changing events, e.g. rises in 
regulatory standards during the long time periods chosen in 
decommissioning strategies. 
• The Deferred Safestore Decommissioning Strategy adopted in 1995 
extended the period to final stage decommissioning and reduced 
discounted liabilities significantly. This strategy was developed in the 
context of Government pressure on Nuclear Electric (which took over 
CEGB’s reactors after electricity privatisation) to reduce costs. Counter-
arguments from regulators and environmental stakeholders in favour of 
dealing with liabilities earlier had no evident effect.  
• The Government decided that a segregated fund, managed externally, 
would provide greater assurance for funding of British Energy’s liabilities.   
• Radioactive waste disposal was not seriously considered until the mid-
1970s.  Attempts by Nirex after 1982 to find and construct a disposal site 
for low and intermediate level wastes came to nothing and by 1997 there 
was an impasse in the development of policy in this area.   
Introduction  
4.1 This chapter explains the way in which the utilities (Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB), South of Scotland Generating Board (SSEB) and 
later Nuclear Electric (NE), Scottish Nuclear (SN) and Magnox Electric (ME)) 
developed policies for decommissioning their nuclear power stations.  These 
policies in general emphasised delay to the most expensive elements (reactor 
dismantling) for up to 135 years.  There was also significant interplay between 
their approach to decommissioning and wider government policies, in 
particular privatisation of the electricity supply industries. The chapter outlines 
the provisions made to fund decommissioning through unsegregated internal 
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funding from 1976 until the 1990s. It explains the reasons for the different 
route – a segregated fund - specified for British Energy when it was privatised 
in 1996. Further, it outlines the history of the attempt by NIREX to implement 
a repository for intermediate level waste.  
4.2 The main theme of the chapter is the conflict between Government 
pressure on the utilities to make money (which was intense in the 1980s) and 
the ‘drain’ on their cash or accounts that expenditure or provisions for 
decommissioning would inevitably bring. The deferred decommissioning 
strategy adopted was publicly justified by the idea that delayed 
decommissioning would be cheaper due to radioactive decay but there was 
also a financial motivation. The application of even a low discount rate (2% 
real) meant that the required accounting provisions – given deferral for a 
century - were very small. 
4.3 Decommissioning, defined narrowly, is the process of returning nuclear 
sites to unrestricted or brownfield alternative uses (see Box 2.1).   The costs 
of disposing of the large quantities of waste created in decommissioning are 
included, conventionally, in the cost of decommissioning. The utilities also 
made some provisions for the decommissioning of BNFL fuel cycle plant used 
for Magnox and AGR operations.  
4.4 The utilities’ strategies on the timing and scope of the later stages 
changed over time. The CEGB and SSEB were responsible, between 1976 
and 1990, for developing policy and funding for decommissioning their own 
reactors.  They owned nine Magnox power stations and seven AGR stations. 
The responsibility then passed to Nuclear Electric plc (England and Wales) 
and Scottish Nuclear Limited (Scotland) up to 1996 for AGRs/Sizewell B, 
while Magnox Electric in the public sector continued with responsibility for all 
Magnoxes (six operating stations and three that had already shut down).  
From 1996 British Energy (BE) took responsibility for all AGRs/Sizewell in the 
private sector, while Magnox Electric (ME),formed in the same year, became 
a subsidiary of BNFL from 1997.  
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Decommissioning provisions and strategy from the 
late 1970s to 1990 
4.5 As Chapter 2 noted, there was no visible thought given to the 
decommissioning of nuclear facilities or associated funding before the mid-
1970s. CEGB, which owned most of the nuclear power stations in England 
and Wales as well as the transmission system and other types of power 
station, made provision for the first time for long-term liabilities in its 1976-77 
accounts. However, while these provisions corresponded to real additional 
charges on consumers, these were ‘internal unsegregated’ funds, invested in 
the business.  They were effectively a form of cheap capital, and there was no 
cash set aside. 
4.6 Provisions for decommissioning costs of the CEGB’s stations rose from 
£10 million in 1977 to £110 million (on a revised, current cost accounting 
basis) in 1981, when provision (£9 million) also started to be made for 
decommissioning of the BNFL-owned plants at Sellafield which would be used 
(£345 million for reprocessing spent fuel and waste storage and disposal)42.  
The annual provision was adjusted to allow for inflation, changes in expected 
plant lifetimes, for the estimated incidence of expenditure and the 
commissioning of new nuclear stations.  The early estimates were based on 
mechanistic assumptions – that decommissioning might cost between 10% 
and 15% of the initial construction cost – and it was not until 1982 that the 
results of  a three year study into the decommissioning costs of Dungeness A 
became available.43
4.7 Decommissioning Magnox was a unique task.  The 1982 study set out 
the considerable technical uncertainties involved when no large commercial 
nuclear power station had been decommissioned together with the risks from 
future changes in regulatory conditions. However, despite these uncertainties, 
it provided quite precise estimates of constituent costs to the nearest £10,000.  
The 1982 study was used as the basis for all Magnox 
and AGR cost estimates up to early 1989. 
                                                        
42 CEGB, Annual Reports and Accounts, 1976-77 to 1989-90  
43 Decommissioning and Waste Management Topic Group report to the Nuclear Utilities 
Chairmen’s Group (representing Nuclear Electric, Scottish Nuclear, BNFL and UKAEA) 1992   
35 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
4.8 The estimated cost of decommissioning each station (at March 1982 
prices) of Stage 1 was £20.7 million (over 5 – 7 years), Stage 2 £35.7 million 
and Stage 3 £212 million, if carried out 15-20 years from shutdown, giving an 
overall cost of nearly £270 million. The timing of Stages 1 and 2 expenditure 
was dictated essentially by the shutdown dates of the Magnox stations but 
there was a choice of short or long timescale for Stage 3. From the 
engineering point of view it was argued the task might be undertaken anytime 
from 10 to 100 years from shutdown and should be easier the longer it was 
deferred, reflecting the reduction in cost related to radioactive decay, greater 
experience and development of engineering methods. 
4.9 Estimates of the costs of decommissioning the UK nuclear power 
stations increased significantly through the 1980s as a result of closer scrutiny 
during preparations for electricity privatisation in the late 1980s and technical 
experience from starting to decommission the Berkeley Magnox power 
station. The effect was to raise significantly the accounting provisions across 
the fleet of nuclear stations. There was therefore a strong incentive both to 
firm up and if possible slim down the estimates and thus the provisions made. 
CEGB and SSEB annual reports in the period up to 1990 said little on the 
strategies that lay beneath the accounting provisions, or on what detailed 
assumptions went into the funding numbers. 
4.10 By 1988, the total provision had risen to £3.3 billion. During 1989, a 
number of further reviews of decommissioning costs were carried out and 
results from the more detailed study of Berkeley decommissioning became 
available. With this new technical information and under the scrutiny brought 
on by preparations for electricity privatisation the total provision increased 
sharply to £8.5 billion in 1989.The requirements for the flotation entailed the 
release of much fuller information and analysis than had previously been 
available so that potential investors could have a realistic view of the balance 
of assets and liabilities. The scale of the expected liabilities bill had become 
large in relation to the value of the generating assets in National Power which 
were intended to support them.  This, and the rapid escalation in these liability 
estimates exacerbated uncertainty around whether these much higher costs 
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were robust. This led to “cold feet” in the City, the electricity industry and in 
Government. 
4.11 Among the most important components of the large increases in 
liabilities discovered in the run-up to privatisation were as follows: first, the 
anticipated costs of decommissioning an average Magnox station 
approximately doubled from £312 million to £600 million (undiscounted), 
mainly because of uncertainties attaching to a process that had yet to be  
commercially established; and second, once BNFL calculated the cost of their 
own decommissioning to the point of returning their sites to green field status, 
the total undiscounted bill escalated approximately eleven-fold, from £438 
million to £4.6 billion (and BNFL’s cost-plus contracts meant it could pass 
through almost all this increase).44
4.12 There is a view that the uncertainty revealed by these cost escalations 
during preparations for electricity privatisation meant that the estimates could 
be influenced by the players’ interests in presenting ‘the facts’ to their benefit. 
For example, National Power, which was originally due to take on the nuclear 
power stations, had a clear financial interest in talking up these numbers, as 
they were the basis of the prices at which National Power argued that it would 
be willing to take on ownership of both nuclear assets and liabilities.
 
45
4.13 In July 1989, the rapid escalation in the estimates of Magnox liabilities  
led to their withdrawal from electricity privatization.
 
46 In November 1989, the 
Government announced that the remaining AGR and PWR stations would 
also be withdrawn for similar reasons.47
                                                        
44 G MacKerron in J. Surrey (ed.), The British Electricity Experiment: Privatization: the record, 
the issues, the lessons, 1996, pp. 145-6 
45 Dieter Helm, Energy, the State, and the Market, 2003, p. 190 
46 Hansard, 24 July 1989, columns 746-8 
47 Hansard, 9 November 1989, columns 1175-83   
 All nuclear power stations owned by 
the CEGB and SSEB would be vested into new companies (Nuclear Electric 
plc and Scottish Nuclear Ltd) which would not be floated with the rest of the 
electricity supply industry. At the same time, Government announced a 
moratorium on new build (subsequent to Sizewell B) for 5 years, and a review 
of nuclear policy by 1995. 
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Fossil Fuel Levy and the Non-fossil Fuel Obligation  
4.14 The size of nuclear liabilities had driven the design of the structure of 
the new power generators – to bear the cost of the nuclear fleet and back-end 
liabilities would need considerable financial strength. So, despite the objective 
of increasing competition, generating stations were divided into only two 
companies in England and Wales, with the larger, National Power, taking 70% 
of the assets including all the civil nuclear reactors. When the nuclear stations 
were subsequently withdrawn from the privatisation, it was considered too late 
to restructure the generators to increase competition.48
4.15 For the internal unsegregated funding route to have any chance of 
working, the investments made with the provisions set aside since 1976 (in 
non-nuclear generation as well as transmission) should have gone to the 
nuclear companies. However, Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear only 
inherited the nuclear part of the investments and these were, initially at least, 
loss-making. These losses meant that a new source of guaranteed income 
was necessary to keep Nuclear Electric ‘cash-positive’ and this took the form 
of the Fossil Fuel Levy (FFL).  As an addition to NE’s cash stream, this Levy 
also could help to pay for liabilities, but this was not its main purpose.
 
49
4.16 The FFL was accompanied by a Non-fossil fuel Obligation (NFFO) on 
the regional electricity companies (RECs). They were obliged to buy all the 
electricity that NE made available.  They collected the Levy from consumers, 
but paid only the standard wholesale price for nuclear electricity. The Levy 
varied annually but amounted on average to 10% on retail bills. Although 
renewable energy also benefited from the levy, the overwhelming bulk of the 
revenue went to nuclear, leading some to view it as a ‘nuclear tax’. This 
‘nuclear tax’ was not strictly new – customers had been paying for it under the 
old charging arrangements. In order to ensure the levy did not distort 
competition and to meet state aid rules, the measure was time-limited. It was 
due to expire in 1998, with the arrival of retail electricity competition.  
 
                                                        
48 G. MacKerron ‘Nuclear power under review’ in J. Surrey (ed.), op. cit. pp. 146-148  
49 G. MacKerron op. cit. pp. 148-151    
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4.17 Separate arrangements were made for Scotland, where no Magnox 
reactors were still running and the two AGRs had relatively good operating 
performance.  No levy was needed but the two Scottish utilities were required 
to buy all SN output at a price that was initially at a premium level but 
designed to fall by 1998 to the average English price established in a 
competitive market. 
4.18 The FFL produced an average of about £1.2 billion annually for NE 
until privatisation of the AGRs and PWR as British Energy took place in 1996. 
To the extent that the Levy did fund liabilities, they represented the costs of 
reprocessing rather than decommissioning (all NE reactors were operational), 
and this absorbed just over 50% of the Levy proceeds to 1995.50
Development of Deferred Safestore Strategy which 
postponed final dismantling and reduced discounted 
costs  
 Because NE 
succeeded in radically improving the operating performance of its AGRs, 
nearly £2.6 billion of surplus cash had accumulated in its books by 1996 and 
this was transferred to Magnox Electric.  
4.19 As part of the preparations for the 1995 nuclear review, DTI asked NE 
to review the efficiency of its operations.  The NAO51
4.20 Following the review of alternative decommissioning strategies, 
Nuclear Electric proposed adopting a new strategy in 1991. This new 
 reported on the extent of 
potential Government liabilities for nuclear decommissioning, on how this was 
to be financed and the possible implications for the taxpayer.  They argued 
that a primary objective of the Department should be to ensure that the 
companies minimise their decommissioning and other liabilities as well as the 
extent to which the Government might be called upon to meet them. Both 
Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear were set the objective of reducing their 
decommissioning costs.  
                                                        
50 Analysis based on numbers from NE Annual Reports and Accounts, and analysed in 
MacKerron op. cit. p. 151-154. 
51 NAO The cost of decommissioning nuclear facilities’, May 1993, p. 2 
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‘Deferred Safestore Strategy’ was put forward for Government approval.52
Stage 1 Removal of the final spent fuel from the reactor core 
Stage 2 Dismantling the non-radioactive parts of the stations (outside the 
biological shield) and the construction of a “safe store” over the 
full plant, after approximately 30 years  
Stage 3 Dismantling of the reactor core and clearance of the site, 
approximately a century later. 
 
The stages were: 
4.21 This would extend the delay in dismantling from about 100 to 135 
years, and assumed that, once cocooned in the ‘Safestore’, the site could be 
left unmanned until the final stage. It did not appear to be critical whether the  
Safestore was constructed early or following a delay of 35 years, but cash 
flow considerations led to a strong preference for deferring (deferral was 
argued to be beneficial at discount rates above a relatively low rate of about 
1.5%). Although the review suggested that this would be an attractive 
strategy, the alternative of in-situ decommissioning (‘entombment’) would be 
easily the cheapest if the safety case could be made and environmental and 
planning authorities satisfied, but it was never pursued. There was also later 
criticism that the option of early decommissioning was excluded.  
4.22 The review resulted in reducing the estimates of the cost of 
decommissioning, even using the existing Reference Strategy, from £3.5 
billion (discounted in 1991 prices) to £2.9 billion. The Deferred Safestore 
Strategy would further reduce the discounted liability to about £2.1 billion. The 
net effect on NE’s profit and loss accounts would be an annual saving in 
provisions of around £90 million, £50 million of which was directly due to the 
strategy change. The current balance of (discounted) decommissioning 
provisions in the accounts could also be reduced by about £800 million to 
around £1.2 billion.  
                                                        
52 F Passant, Power station decommissioning – UK Strategy, Nuclear Electric, (undated, 
probably 1993)  
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4.23 The NAO noted the uncertainties (eg surveillance costs might be 
higher) and risks of long delay to Stage 3, including the possibility of 
increased regulatory requirements in the dormant period.53
4.24 The NAO concluded overall that, given there was no guarantee that the 
provisions would be sufficient for future liabilities, it was appropriate for 
Departments to try and ensure that the industry was improving its efficiency 
and facing up to the costs of decommissioning. They also advised that the 
Department should ensure that discount rates used were reasonable and 
realistic, having previously observed that DTI was effectively hands-off on 
choice of discount rate.  
 But it also noted 
that when the AEA had reviewed CEGB’s cost estimates, it found that if 
decommissioning was carried out 10 years after shutdown, average 
undiscounted costs would increase by about 50 per cent for Magnox reactors 
-  though only by 5 per cent for AGRs. 
The Segregated Fund for British Energy Liabilities 
4.25 British Energy inherited the AGR and PWR liabilities, valued officially at 
£14 billion (undiscounted) later reduced to £12.9 billion, and BE had legal 
responsibility for their discharge.54
4.26 The BE fund was to consist of relatively liquid assets, kept separate 
from the utility’s other assets and held externally, by a trust. It had three 
 Following consultation as part of the 
nuclear review, the Government decided that a segregated fund, managed 
externally to the company would offer greater assurance than allowing BE to 
make its own provisioning arrangements. The choice of funding route was 
influenced by the flaws of the internal unsegregated approach, which could 
only work if the assets that the fund invests in are profitable - and these profits 
are in turn large enough and are available to the body responsible for 
discharging the liabilities.  These conditions could not be met in the case of 
the utilities’ earlier ‘funds’: the nuclear investments made over the life of the 
funds were unprofitable and other investments made by the utilities were lost 
to the liability discharge task because they went into non-nuclear companies. 
                                                        
53 NAO op. cit. pp. 14-15 
54 British Energy Annual Report and Accounts 1996/7 
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sources of income: an initial endowment of £228 million from the taxpayer; an 
annual contribution from BE, declining as its stations close plus the proceeds 
from its investment portfolio, which consisted of equities, property and cash 
deposits.  The fund was originally only designed to cover Stages 2 and 3 of 
decommissioning: Stage 1 was expected to be covered from operating 
income.55The Fund did not cover spent fuel and other waste liabilities. British 
Energy re-negotiated its spent fuel contracts with BNFL in the later 1990s and 
was contractually committed to paying for all future spent fuel management.  
While many of these commitments would be operating costs and paid for as 
fuel was delivered to BNFL, there remained a substantial level of future 
liability, especially for wastes, for which there was no provision.  British 
Energy announced in its Prospectus that it would make future investments to 
cover these liabilities arising after all reactors were closed down.56  As the 
Select Committee on Trade and Industry argued in 1997, this did not 
represent sufficient assurance that the company would meet all future 
liabilities.57
Quinquennial reviews of decommissioning strategy  
 (See Chapter 8, paras 8.17 – 8.20, for further developments and 
discussion.)  
4.27 The Government effectively accepted the change to the Deferred 
Safestore Strategy in the White Paper on radioactive waste management 
policy, one of the 1995 White Papers  that came out of the nuclear review.58
                                                        
55 See M. Sadnicki and G. MacKerron Managing UK Nuclear Liabilities STEEP Special 
Report no. 7, SPRU, Sussex, October 1997, p.p. 26-29 for a fuller analysis.   
56  Prospectus, British Energy Share Offer, 26 June 1996, p. 73 
57 Trade and Industry Committee, Nuclear Privatisation, 2nd Report, HC43-1, Session 1995-
96, 14 /February 1996, para. 55  
58  Review of Radioactive Waste Management Policy, Cm 2919, 1995, paras 121-131 
 
However, Government  noted that decommissioning had to meet HSE’s 
licence conditions and it specified that all nuclear operators should draw up 
decommissioning strategies which would be reviewed quinquennially by HSE. 
consulting the Environment Agencies, to ensure they remained sound. 
Government also stated its belief that, in general, the process of 
decommissioning nuclear plants should be undertaken as soon as it is 
reasonably practicable to do so.   
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4.28 Following the first quinquennial review in 1996, Magnox Electric – 
which took over almost all of the Magnox fleet when British Energy was 
privatized – conducted a further review and modified its decommissioning 
strategy in two ways: only the dismantling of the reactor buildings was to be 
deferred for the whole period, and there would be a sequenced programme of 
reactor dismantling to spread resource and allow learning from experience.  
The trustees of the BE  fund (then known as the Nuclear Generation 
Decommissioning Fund, later re-named the Nuclear Liabilities Fund) carried 
out a QQR in 2001 of the private sector funding arrangements and  concluded 
that there was inadequate funding to meet all BE liabilities 
4.29 In the second NII quinquennial review in 2002, existing strategies were 
found to be appropriate and the provisioning for dismantling after 85 years 
reasonable. But NII expressed a number of reservations including questioning 
why a shorter timescale was not reasonably practicable and highlighting the 
potential impact of regulatory tightening in future on this timescale.  The NII 
pressed for further clarification of the underlying assumptions used, and noted 
that should ME be required to bring forward its stations’ dismantling 
programme to significantly less than 70 years from end of generation, 
additional financing would be required unless predicted costs could be 
reduced proportionately.  Despite these regulatory pressures to bring forward 
final dismantling (and independent commentators’ views to the same effect)59 
the timetable for dismantling remained lengthy, and financial pressures – a 
desire to minimise the level of current provisioning - seem to have been the 
primary driver.60
Waste management and Nirex 
 
4.30 The mid-1970s was also the time when serious thought first was given 
to the long-term management of radioactive wastes.  In 1976 the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) published the landmark 
‘Flowers report’, which stressed the urgency of establishing a credible                                                         
59 These date back to the 1990s.  See for example G. MacKerron, J. Surrey and S. Thomas 
UK Nuclear Decommissioning Policy: Time for Decision , SPRU, Sussex, January 1994 
60  HSE, UKAEA’s strategy for the decommissioning of its nuclear licensed sites: 
A review by HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, October 2002 
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management route for radioactive wastes classified as being at intermediate 
and high levels.61
4.31 In the course of its existence from 1982 until March 2007, Nirex spent 
over £600 million on the waste disposal programme. A large proportion of this 
spend was related to undertaking surface based investigations at the 
Sellafield site (i.e. drilling boreholes and interpreting the information that was 
gained). The techniques and methodologies developed in the Nirex 
programme have been further developed internationally. If the current UK site 
selection process progresses it will benefit from some of the developments 
that have taken place internationally since 1997, which in some cases build 
on early Nirex work. The value of the site-specific work will depend on which 
communities take a decision to participate and which areas are investigated 
further.  
  The original plans for dealing with operational and 
decommissioning wastes from the power stations were based on sea disposal 
- and some waste was disposed to sea. The political decision to end sea 
disposal after 1982 had a significant impact on costs. A new industry-owned 
body, Nirex, was set up.  After the 1982 postponement of any attempt to look 
for disposal routes for high-level (heat generating) waste for 50 years, it 
focused on seeking underground disposal sites for low and intermediate level 
wastes.  Its early attempts met with stiff resistance from local communities, 
and sites were consequently abandoned.  In the mid-1990s it made what 
turned out to be a final attempt to get planning approval for a rock 
characterization facility near Sellafield to implement a programme of 
underground investigations to determine whether the site was suitable for 
hosting a repository. This application was refused in 1997 after a major 
planning inquiry and appeal to the Secretary of State.  This signalled the end 
of the so-called ‘Decide-Announce-Defend’ approach to radioactive waste 
policy-making and a new approach was taken in the early 2000s, as Chapter 
7 describes. 
                                                        
61 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution  Nuclear Power and the Environment  6th 
report, Cm 6618, September 1976  
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CHAPTER 5 – REPROCESSING AND SPENT FUEL 
MANAGEMENT 
• Spent fuel has been treated in the UK as a potential resource (through the 
separation through reprocessing of uranium and plutonium) rather than 
waste.  
• The UK’s civil stockpile of separated plutonium is currently treated as a 
‘zero-valued asset’ in line with existing Government policy (indefinite 
storage) pending an ongoing policy review  The evidence is that plutonium 
is a liability, because reprocessing is costly, plutonium has no commercial 
value and the costs of managing reprocessing products are high. 
• The costs of transforming plutonium into fuel, using it in reactors, and then 
managing the resulting spent Mixed Oxide(MOX) fuel, are higher than the 
cost of uranium–only fuel.  The extent of this excess cost – should the 
existing stockpile of plutonium be used in MOX – is not yet clear. Dealing 
with the plutonium stockpile is now primarily a security/non-proliferation 
issue and all feasible management routes will lead to net costs, not 
benefits. 
• For Magnox, the military imperative and the almost universal belief in fast 
breeders, means reprocessing was originally the only feasible path. More 
recently, the failure to establish robust long-term storage technology for 
Magnox fuel has meant that reprocessing has necessarily continued. 
• The position is different for the AGRs.  The excess economic cost of 
reprocessing spent AGR fuel was clear long before THORP was 
completed.  And in 1994, Scottish Nuclear (SN) expected to halve the cost 
of spent fuel management by building a dry store instead of reprocessing. 
• Spent fuel reprocessing was funded in the Magnox case mostly out of 
current revenue by the relevant utilities (i.e. by consumers), but funding 
was not set aside to address the clean-up of the Magnox reprocessing 
facility and reprocessing wastes.  All are now the responsibility of the NDA. 
• For AGRs, almost all spent fuel management costs have been treated as 
future liabilities, though the utilities have already paid for some of the costs 
of reprocessing via their contractual arrangements with Sellafield 
• The waste management argument in favour of reprocessing is threadbare, 
because any (limited) savings in high level waste management costs and 
uranium use are overwhelmed by the extra costs of reprocessing itself and 
the need to manage greater volumes of other wastes produced by 
reprocessing.   
• The value for money of the UK’s commitment to reprocessing spent fuel 
has been poor.  The costs of spent fuel management would have been 
much lower had spent fuel been stored rather than reprocessed.  The 
economics of any new reprocessing plant would be exceptionally poor, in 
view of the costs involved and the lack of any significant market for 
plutonium-based fuel.   
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Introduction 
5.1 UK policy towards the nuclear fuel cycle was based, until recent years, 
on a conviction that reprocessing was essential - meaning that plutonium and 
unfissioned uranium should be extracted from spent fuel. This was expected 
to be vastly superior to the apparently wasteful notion of storing the spent fuel, 
treating it as a waste product and disposing of it directly.   However, the most 
important conclusion of this chapter is that in the management of future spent 
fuel, a commitment to long-term spent fuel storage will provide much better 
value for money than reprocessing - as it would have done for many years in 
the past. 
The case for reprocessing Magnox spent fuel 
5.2 There are two main origins of the idea that reprocessing was 
worthwhile.  The first was that early UK efforts in nuclear technology were 
devoted to securing an effective and rapid route to indigenous production of 
nuclear weapons.  The UK chose a route to nuclear weaponry through the 
production of plutonium because this was seen as the most ‘efficient’ route.  
The chosen technology, Magnox, worked by irradiating uranium ‘fuel’ to 
produce large amounts of plutonium which could then be separated via 
reprocessing and used for bomb-making.  When attention began to be given, 
in the early 1950s, to the potential of nuclear fission for power production, 
stimulated in part by shortages of domestic coal, the logical choice was to use 
the heat generated in the nuclear reaction in Magnox designs to drive a 
turbine generator.  Thus Calder Hall, commissioned in 1956, was primarily a 
plutonium producer for weapons use, but also had a significant electrical 
output.  Chapelcross was similarly a weapons-based facility that also 
produced power. For Calder Hall and Chapelcross to function as military 
facilities, there needed to be a reprocessing plant available to separate the  
plutonium from the spent fuel.  Thus reprocessing was an integral part of early 
Magnox development.62
                                                        
62 See Chapter 2. 
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Box 5.1 - Reprocessing vs. spent fuel management 
 
When spent fuel is taken out of nuclear reactors, it is stored under water for a 
period of around a year to allow it to cool.  There are then two alternatives: 
continued storage, either with or without a decision to treat the fuel as waste; 
or the ‘reprocessing’ of the fuel in order to recover plutonium and unfissioned 
uranium. 
 
Storage Worldwide, most spent fuel is stored rather than reprocessed and 
several countries have taken the decision that the stored fuel will be treated 
as a waste.  After the period of cooling under water, the spent fuel will then 
often enter a period of dry storage, after which it can be encapsulated ready 
for final disposal. Both wet and dry storage involve simple, relatively 
inexpensive and well-developed technology.  Spent fuel encapsulation is also 
relatively straightforward.  Encapsulated fuel is treated as high level waste.  
This is known as the ‘open fuel cycle’. 
 
Reprocessing  Commercial scale facilities for reprocessing exist currently in 
the UK, France and (more recently) Japan.  In these facilities – large 
mechanical/chemical engineering industrial plants - the spent fuel is chopped 
into pieces and then dissolved in boiling nitric acid, involving substantial 
radiological shielding and limited human access.  The products are plutonium, 
unfissioned uranium and a variety of waste products.  Besides Highly Active 
Liquors (HAL) which are then subject to evaporation and then vitrification 
(making into glass blocks) as stable high level waste forms, further waste 
streams are created during the reprocessing operation itself, some classified 
as low level and others at intermediate level.  The technologies involved here 
are also well-developed.  Overall, reprocessing is part of the ‘closed fuel 
cycle’ where recovered plutonium and uranium can be re-used in reactors. 
 
Reprocessing is inherently much more complex and expensive than storage.  
From an economic perspective, it is therefore only worth considering if the 
value of its main products – reprocessed uranium and plutonium – are large 
enough to overcome the large cost penalty of the reprocessing operation 
itself.  In practice reprocessed uranium and plutonium have had at best zero 
value (there has been no commercially-derived demand for them) and 
plutonium storage incurs significant costs, especially for security reasons.   As 
the Royal Society recently reported ‘all [studies across the world] conclude 
that the open fuel cycle currently has cost advantages over the closed fuel 
cycle’.63
 
 
5.3 As the need for military plutonium reduced and more and larger 
Magnox stations were commissioned, a second justification for reprocessing 
became prominent.64
                                                        63 Royal Society  Fuel cycle stewardship in a nuclear renaissance October 2011, p.16  
64 See F. Berkhout and W. Walker THORP and the Economics of Reprocessing SPRU, 
Sussex, November 1990, pp. 3-5 for more detail on these rationales  
 This was the idea that plutonium would become an 
essential fuel input for civilian nuclear power. Uranium was thought to be 
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inherently scarce and as world demand for uranium grew, it would inevitably 
therefore become very expensive.  As thermal reactors of the Magnox and 
similar types could only convert around 1% of the uranium in the fuel to useful 
power, and the FBR might in principle extract up to 50 or 60 times more 
energy from a given quantity of initial uranium than a thermal reactor, it was 
regarded as inevitable that FBRs would, within a quite short timespan, 
become the dominant reactor type. But breeder reactors needed a large 
starting inventory of plutonium and so it seemed axiomatic that reprocessing 
was a crucial step towards fulfilling the long-term vision of a nuclear power 
future.  The fast breeder was in principle able to ‘breed’ more fuel than it 
originally contained.  This would be achieved by placing a blanket of U-238 
round the core of the reactor, which in turn would capture a neutron to make 
large further quantities of Pu-239.  In this highly attractive vision, once there 
were sufficient start-up quantities of Pu-239 (for fuel) and U-238 (for the 
blanket) the fast breeder would produce ever-expanding quantities of future 
fuel, and thus liberate power systems from further dependence on natural 
resources.   
5.4 When it became clear in the 1950s that early Magnox reactors were 
unable to compete with coal-fired power in financial terms, the gap was more 
than filled by the notion of a ‘plutonium credit’ – the imputed value of the 
separated plutonium as a future fuel input to FBRs.65  When doubts began to 
emerge about the size or even legitimacy of this plutonium credit, leading in 
turn to doubts about the economic value of Magnox generation overall, a 
further argument in favour of continued reprocessing was used.  This was that 
when Magnox spent fuel was wet-stored (the universal early practice until the 
last Magnox was built at Wylfa) it would corrode dangerously if left too long 
under water, and the only remedy was to extract the fuel and reprocess it.  
This meant that after all the Magnoxes were built, reprocessing continued, 
even though it was expensive and even if – as became increasingly apparent 
during the 1980s66
                                                        
65 Hall, Nuclear Politics, p.53. 
 – there was no easily foreseeable possibility of re-using 
66 As early as 1980, independent work on uranium suggested that the large reserves of world 
uranium meant that fast breeders were not necessary and might prove very expensive.  See 
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the plutonium in FBR.67
5.5 What the nuclear industry was however unwilling to recognize until too 
late was that it had always been possible in principle to dry-store Magnox 
spent fuel, thus avoiding the corrosion problem and apparent need to 
reprocess.  In fact, spent Magnox fuel at Wylfa is dry-stored for limited 
periods, though primarily as a buffer against the risk that Sellafield cannot 
handle the full volumes of fuel discharged from reactors.  Further technical 
development would have been needed to guarantee the safety of long-term 
dry storage.  NDA is in fact currently investigating potentially robust routes to 
Magnox fuel storage, but current expectations are that all Magnox fuel will be 
reprocessed. 
  Thus, spent Magnox fuel is reprocessed to this day in 
the old and often-refurbished Magnox reprocessing facility at Sellafield. 
Reprocessing AGR spent fuel 
5.6 When the second generation of UK reactors was approved in 1965, the 
conviction that reprocessing was a critical part of the overall nuclear project 
was still strong. It was therefore expected that spent AGR fuel would be 
reprocessed, though delays in the AGR programme meant that no spent fuel 
from AGRs was available until the late 1970s.  Meanwhile events in the early 
1970s, most notably the first oil crisis of 1973/4, gave impetus to the 
FBR/plutonium vision. Several European countries including the UK launched 
ambitious plans for nuclear expansion.   Partly as a consequence of these  
new plans for nuclear power but also partly because exporting spent fuel to 
other countries was politically attractive, there was an emerging international 
demand for reprocessing services, with several countries - most notably 
Japan, but also Germany, Switzerland and Sweden - showing interest in 
having spent fuel reprocessed, initially in France but also potentially in the UK.  
5.7 Initially BNFL hoped that the original Magnox reprocessing facility 
could be modified to take the enriched uranium oxide fuel that both AGRs and 
overseas PWR/BWR reactors would use.  When such modification was                                                                                                                                                               
C. Buckley, G. MacKerron and J. Surrey ‘The international uranium market’, Energy Policy 
June 1980, pp. 84-104.    
67 R&D work on fast breeders at Dounreay began to be run down from 1990 and ceased 
completely by 1994. 
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attempted to the head end part of the plant in 1973 it was unsuccessful and 
BNFL decided that a new oxide fuel reprocessing plant was needed.  This 
proposed plant, THORP, was subject to public inquiry (the ‘Windscale inquiry’) 
in 1977 and approval for construction was given after a favourable Inspector’s 
report which emphasised the importance of export business especially from 
Japan.68
5.8 In 1989 money, the cost of constructing THORP, its ancillary plant and 
decommissioning was £2.9 billion,
  The dominant expectation remained that the plutonium separated in 
reprocessing would eventually be used for FBRs, though it was recognised 
that plutonium could be used in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for conventional 
reactors. 
69 in addition to which it had very significant 
operating costs, employing over 2000 people and producing a variety of new 
waste streams in addition to high level waste, uranium and plutonium. 
However, the commercial terms under which THORP was built were highly 
favourable to the UK. Overseas customers, especially Japanese utilities, paid 
for a large proportion of the construction costs and were in principle liable to 
pay on a cost-plus basis for operations.  Nevertheless, there was international 
evidence that for oxide fuel storage was cheaper than reprocessing.70
 The reprocessing prices charged to CEGB and SSEB were lower than 
for overseas spent fuel, meaning that the cost penalty for reprocessing 
was smaller than if full costs had been charged; 
  Indeed 
some 75% of all the world’s spent fuel was destined for long-term storage 
rather than reprocessing, including all US fuel after the Carter administration 
banned reprocessing in 1977. There now is no serious doubt that the interim 
storage of spent fuel would have been substantially less expensive than 
reprocessing for the UK utilities. The question that arises is why the utilities 
chose to sign up to reprocessing contracts.   There are three main probable 
explanations: 
                                                        
68 The Windscale Inquiry  Report by the Hon. Mr. Justice Parker, HMSO, 1978 
69 BNFL  The Economic and Commercial justification for THORP Risley, July 1993, p. 18. 
70 A good example is the report from the Nuclear Energy Agency in 1985 (OECD/NEA The 
Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Paris), which showed that even on assumptions 
favourable to reprocessing (for example allowing the idea of a monetary credit for the value of 
separated uranium and plutonium) the reprocessing cycle was significantly more expensive 
than a storage cycle (pp. 75-76)  
50 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
 As cost-plus monopolists, the utilities passed on all incurred costs to 
consumers, and so had limited incentives to minimize costs; 
 Despite these mitigations, the CEGB and SSEB were still resistant to 
the pressure to continue reprocessing in the 1980s.  They developed a 
joint plan to construct a dry store for AGR fuel, which would have 
enabled them to avoid reprocessing contracts, but this came to 
nothing, and in 1986 they signed new contracts with BNFL.71
5.9 One additional argument sometimes used in the attempt to justify 
reprocessing - in the absence of any foreseeable military or market demand 
for plutonium - is that it makes the overall process of waste management 
easier and cheaper.  Reprocessing produces, by volume, around 3% of high 
level waste products, plus about 1% plutonium and 96% uranium.  The 
volume of HLW is therefore much smaller under a reprocessing regime than 
under direct spent fuel disposal, where all the fuel is treated as HLW.  
However this argument does not translate into a need for much lower volumes 
of waste to be disposed in a repository if reprocessing is chosen, or much 
smaller repository space needed.  This is because: 
  It was 
therefore not clear that the utilities had the power to act independently 
and refuse reprocessing contracts. As nationalised industries they were 
subject to direct political pressure (the argument was heard at the time 
that selling reprocessing services to overseas customers would be 
harder if home customers were not signing up).  And it was certainly 
the case that AGRs were built - unlike the later Sizewell B PWR - 
without significant on-site spent fuel storage capacity.  This meant that 
spent fuel had to be shipped to Sellafield, and BNFL were not at that 
time offering storage contracts, only reprocessing services. 
 The space needed in a repository for HLW is not directly proportional to 
its  volume but also related to its heat-generating characteristics.  This 
means that the saving in space for HLW in a repository under 
reprocessing scenarios is smaller than the difference in volumes 
compared to spent fuel disposal suggests;                                                         
71  F. Berkhout Radioactive Waste – Politics and Technology Routledge 1991, p. 180.   
51 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
 Reprocessing substantially increases the overall volume of wastes to 
be managed, as new liquid waste streams (many classified as 
Intermediate Level Waste) are produced during reprocessing and also 
need to be disposed in a geological repository; 
 Over a longer time frame, the MOX fuel that is produced from 
plutonium after reprocessing is not, in current or immediately 
foreseeable conditions, expected to be reprocessed.  This is because 
the economics of reprocessing MOX are even worse than of uranium-
only fuel and so it is expected that MOX will be disposed directly.  MOX 
fuel is hotter and more difficult to handle than uranium-only fuel and the 
consequence is that it will probably cost more to dispose in a 
repository. Any advantage that reprocessing might offer for waste 
management is therefore nullified over the medium term when spent 
MOX fuel has to be disposed directly. 
For these reasons, there is no clear advantage to reprocessing as a means of 
minimizing waste management costs, and in any case there is the high cost of 
reprocessing relative to spent fuel encapsulation to set against any marginal 
waste management argument in favour of reprocessing. 
5.10 Strong further evidence that storage would have been a cheaper option 
despite the relatively lower prices offered for reprocessing to the home utilities 
came from Scottish Nuclear in the early 1990s. It revived the idea of a dry 
store originally considered in the mid-1980s, arguing that they could save £45 
million annually by moving to storage rather than reprocessing for AGR fuel.72  
This would cut spent fuel management costs in half.  A detailed design was 
worked up and a public inquiry ending in 1993 concluded that the proposed 
dry storage represented ‘ a sound engineering solution’ 73
                                                        
72 Scottish Nuclear, Securing our Energy Future, Submission to the Government’s Review of 
Nuclear power, July 1994, para. 51 p. 14 
73 Scottish Nuclear, op. cit. para. 52, p. 14 
.   Again, however, 
SN eventually signed new reprocessing contracts with BNFL and the storage 
idea was abandoned.   
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5.11 By the time that the AGRs were privatized in 1996, the electricity 
market had also been liberalized, so that British Energy had cost-saving 
imperatives and relative political freedom to choose what to do with spent fuel.  
In addition the UK fast reactor programme had been abandoned in the early 
1990s and there was no longer any foreseeable prospect of using plutonium 
in fast reactors.  Reprocessing had therefore become an expensive operation 
to produce a primary output for which there was no prospect of any demand.  
It was true that the plutonium was potentially useable in mixed oxide fuel 
(MOX) for conventional reactors, but this was a more expensive way to fuel 
reactors than uranium-only fuel.  Nevertheless foreign customers of THORP 
in some cases wished to receive their plutonium back in the form of MOX, and 
so BNFL built the markedly unsuccessful Sellafield MOX Plant, the closure of 
which was announced in August 2011, to try to meet this overseas demand  
5.12 On acquiring the AGRs in 1996, British Energy became increasingly 
vocal in declaring that it wanted to re-negotiate lower prices for the fuel that 
already been contracted for reprocessing, and in addition did not sign 
reprocessing contracts for that part of future spent AGR fuel which was at the 
time still uncontracted.  Instead it signed ‘management’ contracts for BNFL to 
manage this residual AGR fuel, without commitment to reprocess, at 
substantially lower prices.74  Questioned by Select Committees about the 
economic and financial viability about reprocessing in 2001,75 BE declared 
unequivocally that reprocessing was a highly expensive and unwanted option 
relative to interim storage and that ‘our contracts, which currently provide for 
ongoing reprocessing, should …cease and be converted into storage 
contracts’.76
5.13 The evidence internationally about the relative costs of reprocessing 
and interim storage overwhelmingly point to interim storage as the 
substantially cheaper option.  This is true even in France – the country that 
has led the way in reprocessing and achieved admirably good performance in 
 
                                                        
74 British Energy Annual Report and Accounts 1997/98, p. 4  
75 Following its Memorandum submitted by British Energy Select Committee on Environment 
Food and Rural Affairs, November 2001 
76  House of Commons Environment Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 
26 November 2001 
53 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
the technology - where a sophisticated and authoritative study sponsored by 
the then Prime Minister in 200077
Conclusion 
 showed convincingly that fuel cycle costs 
would have only around half as high if reprocessing had never taken place, 
and that it would be profitable to stop reprocessing at the earliest feasible 
moment.  This analysis therefore showed that in French conditions, it would 
be cheaper to stop reprocessing even after counting all the costs of building 
reprocessing facilities as sunk.   
5.14 It is clear that while reprocessing was inevitable in the early years of 
the UK nuclear programme, it became a genuine choice after the AGR 
programme was adopted in 1965.  Commitment to reprocessing spent fuel 
however remained firm until the 1990s (with contractual commitments 
stretching well into the present century). The consequence is that the process 
of managing liabilities has been much more complex and expensive than if 
decisions has been taken after the late 1970s,  in keeping with those made in 
most other nuclear-using countries like the USA - to abandon reprocessing in 
favour of spent fuel storage.   
5.15 There are important questions about the economics of refurbishing 
THORP with a view to running it to 2040 rather than, as currently planned, 
closing it when existing contracts are completed.  A recent analysis78 
suggests that refurbishment of THORP might make sense in economic terms, 
but only if there was a ‘strategic rationale for overseas and/or UK new-build 
utilities to contract for reprocessing services’.79
                                                        
77  Charpin, J-M  Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power Option (translated from the 
French original) Report to the Prime Minister, 2000. 
78 Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment A Low-Carbon Nuclear Future: Economic 
assessment of nuclear materials and spent nuclear fuels management in the UK, University 
of Oxford, March 2011 
79 Smith School, op. cit. p. 7.   
  It is difficult to see what this 
‘strategic rationale’ might be and in its absence the same report concludes 
that there is no case for extending THORP’s lifetime.  This seems an entirely 
sensible view, as future international demand for MOX fuel, if separated 
plutonium does not already exist, is at best minimal. The NDA has recently 
announced that THORP its intention to close THORP when current contracts 
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are fulfilled around 2018.80
 
 
  There can be no doubt that, in the absence of any 
military or significant market demand for separated plutonium, there is no 
conceivable economic case for building a new reprocessing plant in the UK.   
                                                        80 NDA  Oxide Fuels: credible options, November 2011 
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CHAPTER 6 – WHERE DID THE MONEY GO? 
 
• Funds collected from consumers for back end liabilities between 1976 and 
1988 were ‘lost’ to the nuclear industry at the time of electricity 
privatisation because the assets in which the funds were invested either 
went to non-nuclear companies or were unprofitable.  
• The Fossil Fuel Levy (1990-1996) raised over £6 billion for Nuclear 
Electric and this helped BE to generate surplus cash of £2.6 billion which 
was earmarked for liability discharge by a transfer to Magnox Electric and 
thereafter to BNFL’s Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio (NLIP). 
• BNFL spent relatively little on decommissioning and waste management 
between 1996 and 2005, and after BNFL was wound up (at which point 
the Government committed to funding the clean up programme from public 
funds), the NLIP, valued at over £4 billion, primarily went into the 
Consolidated Fund.   
• From 2004 – 2010, BNFL returned £8.2 billion to taxpayers in dividends 
and transfers (adjusted £9 billion). This included principally the receipts 
from the sale of Westinghouse (£3 billion), the NLIP (£4.3 billion), and 
Springfields (£151 million).In 2008 BNFL transferred its share in URENCO 
to the Government, which is currently estimated at £2-3 billion. 
• Since 2005 Government has provided grants of £9 billion to the NDA to 
carry out decommissioning activity (to 2010-11). This will rise to £17.6 
billion by the end of the current Spending Review settlement in 2014-15. 
• Government contributed £228 million to the initial Nuclear 
Decommissioning Fund which British Energy was required to set up to 
meet the costs of decommissioning its AGRs and PWR. In the early 
2000s, British Energy got into financial difficulties. Government put 
together a restructuring package valued at a cost of around £3 billion to 
the taxpayer. As part of the rescue package, the Government accepted 
responsibility for underwriting the Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) should its 
funds prove insufficient in meeting all liabilities. 
• In 2009 EDF purchased the restructured company for £12.5 billion. The 
Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) received £4.4 billion at the time for its 36% 
stake. The NLF’s assets are  currently worth around £8.6 billion.  
• It is important that the NLF will be capable of fully meeting all outstanding 
liabilities for the AGR / PWR fleet. Achieving this outcome is dependent on 
a number of variables, including the level of base UK interest rates (which 
dictate the returns available for the bulk of the fund), the eventual lifetimes 
of the fleet, and the effectiveness of plans for decommissioning and their 
execution. 
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6.1 The 1976 ‘Flowers report’81
6.2 However in 1976 both utilities started to collect payments for back end 
liabilities from customers, where liabilities were first defined in terms of 
decommissioning their own nuclear stations plus reprocessing costs, but from 
1981/2 both utilities included their share of decommissioning BNFL facilities
  was a catalyst for the nuclear industry to 
think about back end liability problems for the first time.  In the case of the 
utilities (CEGB and SSEB) the practical task of decommissioning their own 
reactors would not take place until some years in the future and it was not 
necessarily evident that reprocessing of spent fuel should constitute a long-
term liability rather than an operating cost of spent fuel management.  In 
addition, the utilities were probably unaware that they would be expected to 
pay for their share of the costs of decommissioning BNFL facilities – mainly 
Magnox fuel manufacture at Springfields and Magnox reprocessing at 
Sellafield - which were built for their exclusive use.  And neither utility had 
ever conducted any serious study of decommissioning costs. 
82 
(see Chapter 4 ).  These moneys were ‘held’ in an ‘internal unsegregated’ 
fund, meaning that while the accounts showed an accumulating sum, the 
money entered into the general cash flows of the utilities and represented 
cheap finance.  It was therefore not possible to access these funds for 
liabilities management because they were used to fund general investment.  
By 1988 these ‘funds’ had reached over £3 billion but on privatisation of the 
non-nuclear parts of the electricity supply industry in 1989-90, the bulk of the 
assets in which the ‘funds’ had been invested did not go to Nuclear Electric 
(NE) or Scottish Nuclear.83
                                                        81 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, op. cit.  
82 National Audit Office  The cost of decommissioning nuclear facilities  Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HMSO, London, June1993, Appendix D, p. 34.   
83 Because of the hasty and unusual accounting arrangements that were made in 1988/89 in 
an ultimately vain attempt to privatise nuclear power, the ‘provisions’ (ostensibly ‘funds’) shot 
up in 1989 to over £8 bn.  However this very rapid rise did not reflect extra revenue raised 
from consumers.  
   This was because most CEGB/SSEB investment 
during the period of the decommissioning funds’ existence went into non-
nuclear assets that went to other companies at privatisation, and where 
limited nuclear investments took place (mainly into the completion of AGRs) 
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these proved uneconomic investments and hence were unable to generate 
surpluses that might have been used to pay for liabilities.  
6.3 The period from 1976 to 1988 was therefore the first time that 
consumers were apparently paying for decommissioning and waste 
management, but the ‘funds’ so collected were not used for their intended 
purpose. The Consolidated Fund benefited through the increased value it 
recouped from utility privatisation. However, the apparent priority that had 
been given to funding decommissioning had been at best severely diluted 
(though Governments of the day would have felt the need to balance this 
against other priorities).  As Chapter 4 also spells out (4.13 - 4.17), Nuclear 
Electric benefitted from 1990 to 1996 from the proceeds of another consumer 
charge, the Fossil Fuel Levy, some 97% of which went to the company, a total 
of over £6 billion. The money was primarily designed to ensure that Nuclear 
Electric was ‘cash-positive’ and could trade legally.  It was not intended to pay 
primarily for liabilities. 
6.4 Because NE was able greatly to improve the operating performance of 
the AGRs and hence its income, the £6 billion of Levy proceeds, added to its 
operating income, turned out to be more than it needed.  As the proceeds of 
the FFL went into a general company revenue stream, it is impossible to 
attribute specific expenditures to the Levy, though as paragraph 4.17 
explains, some 50% of the value of the Levy was spent on reprocessing spent 
fuel.  
6.5 By 1996, Nuclear Electric had a £2.6 billion cash surplus and this was 
transferred to the new Magnox-only company, Magnox Electric (ME), which in 
1997 became a wholly-owned subsidiary of BNFL.   The donation of £2.6 
billion to Magnox Electric was designed to help ensure its ability to trade 
legally, given that it had very large liabilities (£18.5 billion undiscounted, or 
£8.9 billion discounted)84
                                                        
84 Magnox Electric  Directors’ Report and Accounts year ended March 1997, p. 8.   
 by 1996.  Government attempted to show in 1995 
that there would be ways that ME could meet its liabilities, suggesting that 
£2.4 billion would be available from future net income and further FFL 
proceeds, £2.0 billion would come from cash in the company balance sheet, 
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£1.4 billion from back end savings, including implementing the Safestore 
decommissioning strategy (see 4.17-4.22) and £2.6 billion from the sale 
proceeds from BE.85
6.6 These Government expectations proved to be substantially optimistic, 
and even the £2.6 billion in cash was insufficient for ME’s balance sheet to 
avoid showing an excess of liabilities over assets.  Government also therefore 
had to give the ‘Magnox Undertaking’ – a commitment that it would help meet 
ME liabilities as they fell due if the company was unable to find the cash itself.  
This Magnox Undertaking was valued at £3.8 billion, starting in 2008 and in 
principle extending to 2116, and carrying a real interest rate of 4.5% per 
annum.
 
86
6.7 UKAEA was responsible for the decommissioning and waste 
management costs of facilities on its own R&D sites, primarily Harwell, 
Winfrith, Dounreay, Culham and parts of Sellafield.  However there was never 
any attempt to set up a long-term fund of any kind for the UKAEA: instead 
Government funded actual liability management expenditures on an annual 
basis.  In the 1990s, following the cessation of almost all UKAEA R&D work, 
the UKAEA conducted significant amounts of decommissioning activity, which 
was directly funded by taxpayers at an average annual rate of just over £100 
million annually in the mid 1990s.
  This however was a means to ensure that ME could trade legally, 
and it was extinguished as BNFL was broken up in the later 2000s.  However 
the £2.6 billion was a real cash sum and was intended explicitly to help pay 
for liabilities. 
87
6.8 The £2.6 billion surplus FFL proceeds, following the transfer of 
ownership of ME to BNFL in 1997, became part of - indeed the major 
contributor to – a Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio, which BNFL set up 
to meet long-term liabilities.  The NLIP was a real ‘fund’ managed externally to 
the company and placed in a mixture of equities and gilts.  It was however not 
 
                                                        
85 DTI  ‘Magnox Liabilities’  Annex to Press notice The Prospects for Nuclear Power in the UK 
P/95/310, May 1995 
86  T. Eggar, Hansard, 10 May 1996, col. 296.   
87 D. Pooley  ‘A radical approach to decommissioning and nuclear liabilities management’ 
Nuclear Energy, 35:2, April 1996, p. 125.   
59 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
a segregated fund or run by an independent trust: it was internal to the 
company and therefore not guaranteed to be available for its stated purpose.  
Together with other ME cash and some of BNFL’s own cash surpluses the 
NLIP reached a value of over £4 billion by 2002 .  While this was a substantial 
sum, it is also worth noting that  in the same year, BNFL’s total liabilities, 
undiscounted, amounted to some £40.5 billion with a discounted value of over 
£21 billion88
6.9 The Government consulted on funding options in the 2002 White Paper 
‘Managing the Nuclear Legacy’.  This set out its strategy to establish a new 
Liabilities Management Authority to own and be responsible for clean-up of all 
BNFL and UKAEA sites (see Chapter 7).The White Paper invited views on 
two innovative approaches being considered: a fully segregated fund for 
liabilities or – the preferred option - a Treasury-held segregated account.
 (and these numbers would continue to rise subsequently ).  
89
British Energy liabilities 
  
This was not subsequently implemented (see Chapter 7), but if it had been, 
there would have been one further opportunity to find a convenient 
endowment for such a funding system.   This would have been to devote 
some or all of the proceeds of selling the various parts of BNFL to the NDA. 
Between 2004 and 2010, BNFL returned over £10 billion to the Consolidated 
Fund at today’s prices – principally from the sale of Westinghouse (£2.9 
billion), and the NLIP (£4.3 billion)). These funds were instead earmarked for 
general public expenditure, and were no longer available to fund 
decommissioning activity. In 2007 the UK’s one third shareholding in 
URENCO was transferred from BNFL to Government. It is currently valued at 
between £2 billion and £3 billion. 
6.10 A different approach has been adopted to managing private sector  
liabilities.  The political commitment at BE privatisation in 1996 (incorporating 
all the AGRs plus the Sizewell B PWR) was that ‘liabilities would follow 
assets’ into the private sector.90                                                        88 THE NLIP and the liability figures are from DTI  Managing the Nuclear Legacy Cm 5552. July 2002, Chapter 2.  
89 DTI Managing the Nuclear Legacy, chapter 6.   
90 Prospects for Nuclear power in the UK: Conclusions of the Government’s Nuclear Review, 
Cm 2860, May 1995, especially para. 7.29 
  In pursuit of this goal, BE was required to set 
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up a segregated external fund for liabilities, managed by an independent trust, 
so that money from the fund could not be used by the company for any other 
purpose than discharging liabilities.  The fund was also independent of 
Government and though it entered into an agreed investment policy with 
Government.  Government contributed £228 million to kick-start this 
segregated fund and the company had to make an annual contribution of £16 
million into the fund.91 The fund was called the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Fund (NDF) at the time because in practice the NDF was only required to fund 
Stages 2 and 3 of decommissioning.92 Other long-term liabilities including all 
spent fuel management costs and Stage 1 decommissioning costs (£5.3 
billion out of the undiscounted £12.9 billion value of undiscounted BE 
liabilities) were excluded from the Fund,93
6.11 Government restructured BE in 2004 at an estimated cost of c.£3 
billion to the taxpayer at the time
 on the assumptions that earlier 
costs would be met from operating income and later costs would be met from 
further BE investments that would yield income after reactor closedowns.  In 
the event, BE got into severe financial difficulties in 2001 and had to be 
financially rescued by Government.   
94, in an arrangement whereby existing 
shareholders retained only 2% of the equity, with the remainder taken by 
creditors and Government. Under the terms of the agreement put in place as 
part of the restructuring/rescue package, BE was committed to paying in to 
the re-constituted segregated fund for liabilities, now known as the Nuclear 
Liabilities Fund (NLF) whenever it put fuel into its reactors in addition to the 
pre-specified cash payments from BE. The NLF also had entitlement to carry 
out a ‘cash sweep’ of 65% of BE’s annual free cash flow and place it in the 
Fund95
                                                        
91 Nuclear Liabilities Fund  ‘Purpose and history’  
.  As part of the restructuring, Government agreed to underwrite the 
NLF – so should its funds prove insufficient, the remaining decommissioning 
costs would be met out of the Consolidated Fund.  
www.nlf.uk.html, retrieved 8 January 2012. 
92 Watson Wyatt Investment Consulting  Nuclear Decommissioning Fund Limited Report to 
DTI, June 1996, Appendix A.   
93 British Energy Annual report and Accounts 1996/7, and Watson Wyatt, op, cit. Appendix A 
94 NAO The Restructuring of British Energy (see appendix 2) 
95 The NLF, under direction by Government, could exercise its right to convert the BE 
payments to convertible ordinary shares in British Energy leading to a maximum 65% stake in 
the Company. 
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6.12 In 2008 British Energy was sold to EDF for £12.5 billion, and the NLF 
received £4.4bn for its 36% interest in the company at the time. This sum, 
together with £2.34 billion raised from the sale in May 2007 of some 28% of 
the Fund’s interest in BE, has been invested by the NLF to fund the long term 
decommissioning costs of BE’s existing stations, plus certain other contracted 
and uncontracted nuclear liabilities of BE as they arise. The NLF assets are 
currently around £8.6 billion.96
6.13 While the NLF has a degree of independence as a segregated fund 
under the legal framework as a Scottish public trust, it is classified as a public 
body, and Government has ultimate control of its investment policy. One of 
the central challenges of managing the fund for both the NLF and the 
Government is to decide between the competing drivers of either maximising 
returns (increasing the chances that the fund will cover the liability in full and 
there will be no extra cost to the taxpayer) or retaining the funds in the public 
sector to help support current finances and reduce the national debt (and 
accepting lower returns).  
  
6.14 Government policy is use the NLF to reduce borrowing. The fund is 
reviewed every five years – the next one due in 2015 - to assess its prospect 
of fully funding the AGR and PWR liabilities under a range of scenarios. The 
current estimate of BE liabilities, discounted at 3%, is around £4 billion – or 
approximately £12bn undiscounted. Under some of those scenarios taxpayers 
might have to pay for some BE liabilities after mid-century, especially if 
returns on the fund remain at very low real levels. The NLF is discussed in 
more detail in Chapters 8 and 9. 
6.15 The main distinction in practice between the method for funding the 
British Energy liabilities, and that used for those currently under the auspices 
of the NDA therefore lies not in the ability of the trustees to manage the fund, 
but rather in their ability to sanction expenditure from the fund without going 
through the Spending Review Process. This enables contracts to be let on a 
multi-year basis through the NLF without requiring annual Treasury approvals.  
                                                        
96  NLF Annual Rpeorts 
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The NDA however has a central role in scrutinising proposals from EDF for 
expenditure from the fund  
6.16 One difficulty in the new arrangements for managing BE liabilities is 
that as Government has agreed to underwrite the fund and any liability 
expenditures for the foreseeable future will come from the NLF, there is no 
financial incentive for EDF to seek to minimise the liabilities. There is arguably 
a reputational incentive for them to do so (which could have financial 
consequences), and the NLF and NDA have received cooperation from the 
company in seeking to reduce costs – for example by exploiting synergies 
with the Magnox decommissioning programme. In addition, the NLF and NDA 
are considering, with EDF, how incentives to EDF can be improved. 
Government payments for decommissioning 
6.17 The converse of the transfer of funds from BNFL and the nuclear 
industry to the Consolidated Fund is that Government has assumed 
responsibility for the cost of public sector decommissioning. In the short run, 
decommissioning is also supported by revenues from the NDA’s commercial 
activities. 
6.18 Since 2005-06, Government has provided direct funding to the NDA of 
£9.01 billion, and under the terms of the 2010 spending review settlement this 
will rise to £17.65 billion by the end of the current SR settlement in 2015. The 
current assessment is that the UK’s total liability for decommissioning the 
NDA sites amounts to £49.2 billion, discounted at 2.2%.97
Conclusions 
 
6.19 There was a series of attempts from the 1970s onwards to set aside 
funds for tackling future nuclear liabilities. Those funds, which were initially 
collected from consumers, were not put in a segregated account, but rather 
invested in other assets which were either lost to the owners of nuclear 
liabilities, or ultimately returned to the Consolidated Fund. 
                                                        
97 NDA Annual Report and Accounts 2010/11 p. 23  
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6.20 It is not the purpose of this report to produce a full account of the net 
return or cost of the British nuclear industry to the public accounts over its 
history – and the transfers set out here are neither exclusive nor all directly 
comparable. However, in my view it is evident that from the 1980s onward, 
Government received significant receipts from nuclear power, without making 
an explicit provision for meeting nuclear liabilities, instead leaving the onus on 
future tax payers to meet the obligation. This is a lesson which seems to have 
been learnt – both in the establishment of the NFL, and in current plans for 
new nuclear. 
6.21 In managing the NLF, Government has prioritised debt reduction over a 
guarantee that future liabilities will be met. There are arguments in favour and 
against this approach – which are discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL AND FUNDING STRUCTURES AFTER 
2000 IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR  
• BNFL remained focused in the 1990s and early 2000s on commercial 
activity and getting the company fit for privatisation, not on cleaning up 
Sellafield. Pressure to deal with its liabilities came from the drive to 
privatisation: review in 1999-2000 showed they were a major barrier. 
• Institutional changes. Following a review of the UKAEA, a new approach to 
liabilities management was detailed in the White Paper Managing the 
Nuclear Legacy in July 2002: a single new Liabilities Management 
Authority should take the form of a contracting organisation with financial 
responsibility for all UK civil nuclear liabilities, as well as BNFL’s 
commercial activity.  
• Government’s decision to break up BNFL, selling off assets and winding up 
its British Nuclear Group, demonstrated that tackling the nuclear liability 
now took precedence over the existence of a national champion, or even, 
arguably, extracting maximum value from the company. 
• The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) was created in 2005 to 
bring renewed focus on decommissioning, using competitions for the 
ownership and management in Parent Body Organisations of the Site 
Licensed Companies, which under contract to the NDA are responsible for 
the delivery of site programmes. 
• It proved difficult to incentivise contractors effectively, and move away from 
cost-plus contracts, given the difficulty of establishing the baseline of work 
to be done at each site. 
• Funding. The 2002 White Paper consulted on alternative mechanisms to 
fund liabilities work; a segregated fund or statutory segregated account to 
secure flexibility and a long-term funding framework. Although the NDA’s 
budget was ultimately set through the normal Spending Review process, 
spending on the highest priorities has been protected. and some long term 
contracts signed 
 
The UKAEA develops a new focus on liabilities 
management 
7.1 The emergence of a new approach to liabilities management evolved 
out of the practices of the UKAEA in the 1990s. As seen in previous chapters, 
the UKAEA had become primarily a liabilities management organization, with 
the end of the UK Fast Reactor programme, and the severe curtailment of its 
other research work. Furthermore, rather than itself seeking to address its 
liabilities and developing in house the capacity to undertake 
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decommissioning, the UKAEA had sought instead to outsource the 
programmes – by 2002 70% of its budget was contracted out. The policy was 
‘to involve the private sector to the maximum extent allowed by regulatory 
requirements on the basis that this drives down costs and encourages the 
injection of technical and management skills, new ideas and best practice 
from elsewhere.’98The NII had quite serious reservations about the capability 
within the UKAEA to be an effective site licence-holder under these 
circumstances,99 but the model proved attractive to Government as the 
decade wore on. 100
7.2 By turn of the century, this approach was seen to have achieved 
significant successes; the undiscounted cost of its liabilities had been reduced 
from £9.8 billion in 1994/95 to £7.9 billion.
 
101 The management team, which 
had been brought in since the transition from an organization focused on 
research to one focused on liabilities, was seen to have made headway in 
implementing the new approach. The Quinquennial Review’s (QQR) survey of 
the UKAEA’s contractors found that it was ‘well ahead of the rest of the public 
sector in its approach to contracting and compares favourably with the private 
sector’, and was ‘committed to continuous improvement’.102The review 
concluded that ‘the new management team has brought relevant commercial 
experience and the sort of commercial operating culture which seems to us an 
essential requirement for any organisation whose core skills necessarily 
include programme management, procurement and the development of 
customized innovative contracting strategies’.103
BNFL remains focussed on its role as a national 
champion, and looks to privatisation 
 
7.3 By contrast, the focus of BNFL in the 1990s had been resolutely on 
commercial success. After 1996, BNFL introduced a strategy focused on                                                         
98 Quinquennial Review of the UKAEA,  (QQR), p. 29 
99 Interview evidence 
100 The UKAEA model was endorsed  by the 2001 Quinquennial review, and then taken 
forward as the basis for the Liabilities Management Authority in the 2002 White Paper, 
Managing the Nuclear Legacy. 
101 QQR, p. 29. 
102 QQR p. 34. 
103 QQR, p.30. 
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international expansion, seeking to cut costs and compete on cost efficiency. 
Even by the late 1990s, BNFL had not seen liabilities management or clean 
up as a core activity; one senior manager noted that during this period ‘there 
wasn’t really an organisation that was…. focusing on actually cleaning up 
BNFL’s liabilities at Sellafield’.104 The overall objective for the organization at 
this time was to move towards privatization. The pressure to address the 
liability issue was ultimately given traction by BNFL’s primary driver – 
privatization. As commercial advisors assessed the likely value of BNFL, the 
impact of the liabilities had to be taken into account. A major review of all 
nuclear liabilities undertaken in 1999-2000 resulted in raising the estimate of 
the total undiscounted cost of addressing all the liabilities over the next 150 
years to £34.2 billion – an increase of £7.1 billion (26%) over the previous 
year. Separately, a study conducted by Bain and Co, who had been appointed 
by BNFL to assess the liabilities from the point of view of establishing a Public 
Private Partnership concluded that it would be difficult to put any concrete 
value on the liabilities.105
Government reviews the strategy and tackling the 
legacy becomes the overriding priority 
 This was a major barrier to any form of privatization 
which included the liabilities.  
7.4 The renewed focus on liabilities was instrumental in the Government’s 
setting of the terms of reference for the UKAEA Quinquennial Review, 
commissioned in 2000.  This was tasked to look not only at ‘the way in which 
UKAEA manages its own liabilities’ but also at ‘arrangements for the 
management of public sector nuclear liabilities as a whole – i.e. including 
those liabilities owned, managed and funded by BNFL.’  The result was that 
the review conclusions were much more wide ranging, the main outcome 
being the proposal that ‘public sector civil nuclear liabilities, including liabilities 
at civil sites for which MoD has financial responsibility, should be managed by 
a single, specialist body, directly responsible to Government.’ This 
organization was seen as building on the approach taken by the UKAEA 
(thereby contrasting sharply with that taken by BNFL), which provided a                                                         
104 T. Morris and N. Malhotra  BNFL and the Restructuring of the Nuclear Industry, Oxford 
Centre for Corporate Reputation, 2011, p. 15. 
105 Ibid. p. 32. 
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‘possible starting point’.106
‘Set up the [a] Liabilities Management Authority responsible for 
Government’s interest in the discharge of public sector civil nuclear 
liabilities, both BNFL’s and the UKAEA’s. The LMA will work in 
partnership with site licensees – at the outset the UKAEA and BNFL…. 
to enable the LMA to exercise its role across the whole public sector 
civil nuclear liabilities portfolio, the Government now propose to take on 
responsibility for most of BNFL’s nuclear liabilities and associated 
assets. The most significant of those will be the Sellafield and Magnox 
sites. Responsibilities for the assets and liabilities associated with 
BNFL’s commercial fuel, reactor services and international clean up 
businesses will remain with the company.’
 However this ‘Liabilities Management Authority’ 
would be a ‘different organization, focused entirely on liabilities management, 
with enhanced management skills and a commercial operating culture.’ This 
was the approach set out by Patricia Hewitt as Secretary of State for DTI in a 
statement to the House of Commons on 28 November 2001: 
107
7.5 In July 2002 DTI’s proposals were set out in more detail by the 
Managing the Nuclear Legacy White Paper. This broadly followed the 
template set out by the Quinquennial Review of the UKAEA – proposing that 
the LMA should take the form of a contracting organization, with financial 
responsibility for all the UK’s civil liabilities. In exchange for taking on BNFL’s 
liabilities, the Government would acquire the funds earmarked for legacy 
clean-up in BNFL’s Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio (NLIP). The White 
Paper also indicated that while THORP and the Sellafield MOX Plant were 
commercial activities, they should also be passed to the new organization, as 
they were dependent on the other facilities at Sellafield and could only be 
managed as part of an integrated site. The effect was that the new LMA would 
take responsibility for BNFL’s main UK assets – both at Sellafield, and the 
Magnox power stations.  
 
 
                                                        
106QQR, p.9 107 House of Commons Debates, 28 November 2001 (375), colums 990-1005 
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The rationale for creating the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority (NDA) 
7.6 The rationale for the creation of the NDA (as the LMA was re-named) 
was that it would provide a dedicated focus to tackling decommissioning. This 
applied particularly to BNFL, which had been focussed on commercial activity, 
but there was also a sense that the clean-up work undertaken by the UKAEA 
had not received sufficient attention within Government. The view was that the 
creation of a single contracting organisation would create a competitive 
market, stimulating innovation, develop supply chains and capture the 
maximum improvement in performance for the delivery of the clean up 
programme. This contrasted to the approach taken by BNFL, which had been 
to develop solutions for tackling the legacy in house (contractors were brought 
in to deliver a significant proportion of the projects at Sellafield, but the 
distinction was that the solution was developed by BNFL, and could not be the 
result of innovation by the contractor).108  BNFL’s approach could be seen to 
have echoes of the original failures of the UK nuclear power programme in 
pursuing its own in house technology, rather than adopting the most cost 
effective approach.  Instead Managing the Nuclear Legacy adopted the 
approach taken by the UKAEA.  Similarly we have heard from nuclear 
regulators that it was while examining the work of the UKAEA at Dounreay 
that they came to the conclusion that the real priority was an integrated 
decommissioning plan for Sellafield.109
7.7 The rejection of the BNFL model for managing liabilities was probably 
influenced by the company’s own problems at this time.  There were two 
relevant issues.  First, its US arm BNFL Inc, which had been competing for 
US clean-up contracts, sustained heavy losses on fixed price contracts
 
110and, 
second, it had falsified some of the inspection data on MOX fuel sent to Japan 
from its prototype MOX plant.111
                                                        
108 Interview evidence 
109 A short history of the NII, p.27. 
110 Morris and Malhotra, p.28..  
111 Ibid, p. 19.  
 Both of these events caused substantial 
financial and some reputational harm to BNFL at a critical time for the 
company. 
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The NDA contracting model 
7.8 The aim of the NDA model was to establish a strategic body, 
accountable to Government, focused on delivering decommissioning and 
waste management in a robust way. As an arms length Non Departmental 
Public Body, the NDA has commercial skills and experience not normally held 
by Government departments, along with a degree of separation from political 
pressures.  The basis of the model was to allow the competitive tendering of 
contracts to manage and deliver decommissioning of the legacy sites owned 
by the NDA in the most cost-effective way.  This would allow scope for 
innovation, within the constraints of regulatory requirements for safety and 
security.  
7.9 The vast majority of the existing BNFL and UKAEA staff at each site 
was separated off into permanent ‘Site Licensed Companies' (SLCs), which 
operate the sites on behalf of the NDA, employing a combined workforce of 
18,000. This ensured that existing skills and corporate knowledge were 
retained, and met an HSE requirement that the Site Licensee should be the 
‘controlling mind’, with direct responsibility for taking the critical decisions. As 
we have seen, this requirement had been a source of tension between 
regulators and the UKAEA, when it sought to contract out decommissioning 
work (whilst itself retaining the site licences) in the 1990s. The NDA competes 
contracts for ‘Parent Body Organisations’ (PBOs) which own the shares in the 
SLC for the period of their contract, with break points which the NDA can 
exercise. The NDA continues to own the assets, and the liabilities. The PBO 
contracts create incentives for the parent body to improve the performance of 
the SLCs against their lifetime plans through seconding in senior managers to 
improve delivery and innovation.  
7.10 The Site Licensed Companies can, where they consider it would be 
cost-effective, sub-contract work to other companies to complete specific 
pieces of work. The NDA holds the SLCs / PBOs responsible for delivery 
against the lifetime plans, and therefore the SLCs are incentivised to 
negotiate effective incentivised contracts for lower tier contractors. 
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The breakup of BNFL and British Nuclear Group 
(BNG) 
7.11 The ultimate fate of BNFL illustrated the extent to which the new 
institutional structure ensured that tackling liabilities would now take 
precedence over the success of BNFL as a national champion in the nuclear 
sector. At the time of her statement to the House, Patricia Hewitt had made 
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clear that the option of BNFL becoming a Public Private Partnership could ‘in 
the right circumstances, be right for BNFL’s business and improve the 
management of liabilities at Sellafield’.112However, the onus was now on the 
most effective way of managing the liabilities, not on extracting the greatest 
possible value from the company. The Government carried out a strategic 
review of BNFL in 2003, and against the strong opposition of the company’s 
board,113 came to the view that a public flotation was ‘unlikely to be a realistic 
option or in the best interests of the taxpayers, as it would reduce the NDA’s 
flexibility to compete the management of those sites it intended to inherit’.114
7.12 The break up and wind down of British Nuclear Group (BNG), the 
element of BNFL responsible for managing the British nuclear sites, also 
illustrated the extent to which the new structure prioritised effectiveness in 
tackling the liabilities as the primary objective. The initial preference of the 
BNFL board was that BNG should be sold as a unit. The fledgling NDA was 
opposed to this course, as it had concerns that installing a new incumbent in 
place of BNFL would undermine its plans to introduce competition for the 
management of the SLCs. The preference of the safety regulator – the NII – 
was to maintain stability at Sellafield – if necessary through the sale of BNG. 
In effect the value of BNG was now in the NDA contracts that it held, so a sale 
of BNG would be equivalent to competing ownership of the contracts. 
Furthermore the NDA was reluctant to extend its contract with BNG for 
 
The possibility of trying to retain a strong British nuclear champion was 
therefore rejected in favour of a more open competition to run UK 
decommissioning programmes, on the basis that the latter route was the best 
course to minimise the liabilities and manage them effectively. BNFL’s 
standing as a national champion had in any case been seriously damaged 
both by the large losses in BNFL Inc and by the data falsification incident. The 
Government now instructed the BNFL board to wind down the company piece 
by piece – extracting significant value, particularly from the sale of 
Westinghouse (as has been detailed in Chapter 6).  
                                                        
112 Morris and Malhotra, op. cit., p. 37. 
113 Ibid. The study, based on the evidence of anonymous interviews with senior BNFL 
executives describes a meeting in June 2003 where ‘the  apocryphal ‘full and frank’ exchange 
of views between the parties took place.’ p. 49. 
114 Ibid, p. 52. 
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Sellafield (due to expire in 2010) to allow a new owner a longer period before 
facing a competition. 
7.13 BNFL carried out market testing to assess the interest in purchasing 
BNG. However, the main feedback was that potential bidders would mostly be 
consortia and that they were interested in breaking the group into its individual 
parts. BNFL subsequently decided that they would extract the greatest value 
from BNG if they were to sell the parts individually. However, while there was 
interest in purchasing the Magnox and research elements of BNG, it was the 
view of the BNFL Board that there would be little interest from potential 
bidders for the Sellafield division (BNG Sellafield). This most likely reflects a 
number of issues, including the uncertainty around the task at the site (Legacy 
Ponds and Silos had not then been characterised and costed), regulatory 
concerns about the site and the poor reputation of the Sellafield management. 
Market concerns would have been particularly exacerbated by the fact that 
the NDA took the view that it could not offer an extended contract to a new 
owner of BNG Sellafield without compromising its own mission and possibly 
breaching EU procurement rules. We have been told that there were tensions 
within BNFL as the decision to split up BNG and wind-down BNG Sellafield 
was reached. We have not made a detailed study of the process, but the wind 
down of the company appears understandably to have been a traumatic 
process for the management. It seems likely that this will have contributed to 
a lack of confidence from Government and regulators in the continued ability 
of BNFL to serve as an effective PBO at NDA sites. 
7.14  As the BNFL disposal strategy developed towards a piecemeal sale, 
but with a policy of "hold and fold" for BNG Sellafield, the regulators became 
concerned  that the existing management would no longer  have a stake in 
the group’s ongoing performance.  With the expectation that another company 
would take over the management in 2014, the ablest people might leave. This 
led to the NDA agreeing to move forward the start of the Sellafield competition 
to 2007, though this would require a cost-plus, rather than a fixed price 
contract to be adopted (see discussion in paras 7.17-7.18 below). 
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7.15 The Government’s approach had changed from a position where in the 
1980s and 90s it might have prioritised the value of BNFL as a company to 
the taxpayer, or in the 1950s and 60s – where the priority had been to support 
the military programme, and subsequently to have a lead in the global nuclear 
industry – to instead making effective management of the UK’s liabilities the 
primary objective. 
The challenge in establishing a baseline for 
competitive tendering 
7.16 An essential feature of the new contracting process was to establish a 
clear baseline for the work necessary to decommission the liabilities. BNFL 
had included provision for these costs on its balance sheets, and a number of 
assessments of the value of the liabilities had been carried out. However, 
there were no detailed lifetime plans for the necessary work which could serve 
as a baseline for tendering the role of PBO, for managing an SLC for a period 
of years, or enabling the winning contractor to be paid by performance. The 
NDA’s first annual report noted that ‘one of the biggest issues we face is the 
limited information we have for a number of the legacy facilities. The 
challenge is often not how to tackle a particular task but rather deciding what 
exactly has to be done. For instance, some facilities have neither detailed 
inventories of waste nor records of how the site was used. Some do not have 
reliable design drawings that can guide the decommissioning process.’115This 
therefore shaped the first priority set out in the NDA’s first strategy document 
in 2006, to ‘create robust, costed and funded plans to clean up sites based on 
a comprehensive understanding of the liabilities.’116
7.17 Moving the Sellafield competition forwards was not ideal from the 
NDA’s perspective, as the lack of characterisation of the work needed – 
particularly on the high hazard Legacy Ponds and Silos- meant that it did not 
have a robust lifetime plan against which to measure a contractor’s 
performance. In this case, potential best value for money in a more effective 
competition was sacrificed to the necessity of putting effective management 
rapidly in place to address the high hazard facilities. The significance of 
 
                                                        
115 NDA Annual Report, 2004-05, p. 6.  
116 NDA Strategy 2006, p. 7.  
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addressing the Legacy Ponds and Silos at Sellafield was similarly to be 
emphasised in the NDA’s 2010 Spending Review Settlement, where it was 
stated that work on the high hazard facilities was ‘protected’ in other words, 
Government would provide the funding to decommission the facilities as 
quickly as could be achieved.117
Approach to funding - a proposed new method of 
financing the liabilities 
 
7.18 The arrangements to provide for the cost of BNFL’s liabilities had been 
a combination of a portfolio of investments fund that was managed externally 
(the Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio) and a Government commitment 
to help meet Magnox liabilities (the Magnox Undertaking - see Chapter 6 for 
details).  By contrast, funding UKAEA liabilities had been undertaken as part 
of normal Government expenditure through the Spending Review cycle. 
Expenditure on UKAEA liabilities in the year to 31 March 2002 totalled £277 
million.118
7.19 Managing the Nuclear Legacy included discussion and consultation on 
possible funding options for the LMA
 
119
 to underline Government commitment to clean-up and build public 
confidence in the new management arrangements; 
 and set out three aims for the future 
funding of liabilities: 
 to give the new Authority the greater flexibility required to drive forward 
the clean-up process effectively; and  
 to encourage competition for contracts by giving companies, and 
particularly potential new entrants to the market, confidence that 
funding would be available to support substantial work programmes 
over a period of years120
                                                        
117 HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010, p. 62. 
118 Managing the Nuclear Legacy, p. 53 119 Managing the Nuclear Legacy, Chapter 6 120 Ibid para. 6.8  
.  
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7.20 The White Paper recognised that managing nuclear liabilities cost 
effectively required financial flexibility and competent long term planning. It 
noted that there was ‘some flexibility within the budgetary settlements agreed 
with funding departments as part of the Spending Review process, but three 
year settlements [were], almost always, shorter than the timescale for major 
decommissioning projects’. It also noted that, in the past, nuclear clean up 
had been seen as a low priority for funding purposes relative to other 
programmes. The UKAEA experience had been that ‘settlements [had] tended 
to be the minimum necessary to address safety and environmental needs. 
Limited funding has been available for other projects’121
7.21 It was argued that there was some scope to meet these objectives 
within the spending review framework – the LMA could be allowed to enter 
into long term contracts in the expectation of steady state funding beyond the 
current settlement, or ‘the impact of variations in annual liabilities spend on 
departments budgets could be smoothed out in some way.’ 
. 
122
7.22 The paper went on to state that the Government was considering two 
‘innovative approaches’ to financing nuclear clean up: a ‘segregated fund’, or 
a ‘statutory segregated account’ 
 
123
7.23 The White Paper explained that a segregated fund would be akin to a 
pension fund which holds investments, and could either operate directly under 
the control of the LMA, or as a separate body with its own board of trustees 
(that is, along the lines of the Nuclear Liabilities Fund established to meet the 
liabilities of British Energy described in Chapter 6).The assets of the NLIP 
would provide the initial endowment, when BNFL was restructured, 
augmented by surpluses from commercial operations and ‘annual payments 
by Government voted by Parliament’ through the normal supply process 
which ‘would be set at levels which ensured that the fund was maintained 
within defined limits reflecting the LMA’s future spending projections. The 
LMA would… then be able to plan its operations with the confidence that 
. 
                                                        
121 Ibid para 6.7 122 Ibid para 6.10 123 Ibid paras 6.11, 6.27 
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funding was available’. The proposal would therefore have provided a 
guarantee that funding would be available for decommissioning projects – 
and, for example, that work would not need to be cut back should commercial 
income fall short of expectations. Managing the Nuclear Legacy did not 
discuss the implications for value for money of different timescales for 
carrying out decommissioning work, or the required level of payments from 
the Consolidated Fund which would be required. 
7.24 The alternative of a ‘statutory segregated account’ would be a ‘savings 
account’ kept by the Treasury at the Bank of England, and could only be 
spent on clean up.. It would similarly have been credited with the value of the 
assets in the NLIP, and would be topped up by credits to maintain the fund at 
a level to meet the LMA’s projected schedule of decommissioning work.124
7.25 In the end, neither the segregated account nor the segregated fund 
was implemented.  Given the size of the liabilities, any fund or account would 
have needed to rely on being ‘topped up’ through Spending Review Rounds. 
Therefore the LMA would not have been allowed complete independence in 
determining the pace of decommissioning work. However, the ability to draw 
on a financial reserve in this way would have allowed medium term flexibility 
to accelerate work where effective, and manage fluctuations in income, 
although the benefits of increased flexibility need to be considered against the 
Government’s wider fiscal plans . 
 
The effect would again be that decommissioning work would have a degree of 
independence from fluctuations in commercial income, and from Spending 
Review settlements. 
Government opts to control NDA budget through the 
Spending Review, rather than through a segregated 
fund or account 
 
7.26 The option of establishing a segregated funding system appeared to 
have been taken forward in the Energy Act 2004, which set up the ‘Nuclear 
                                                        124 Ibid paras 6.19-6.22 
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Decommissioning Funding Account (NDFA)’.125
7.27 Instead, the approach taken was that the most appropriate funding 
mechanism for NDA was to provide ring-fenced funding from within the 
budget of the (then) Department for Trade and Industry’s (currently through 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change’s budget).The NDA was 
therefore required to abide by budgets set through the normal Spending 
Review process.  
 However, the ‘account’ did 
not materialise in the form anticipated by the White Paper, and never came 
into effective operation. The nominal Nuclear Decommissioning Financing 
Account (NDFA) set up in the Energy Act contains no cash.  It therefore does 
not have the effect of enabling the NDA to smooth out fluctuations in 
commercial income, or the ability to alter the pace of decommissioning to 
enhance value for money, which would offer a degree of independence from 
the SR settlement.  
7.28 Prior to the 2010 Spending Review settlement, the Treasury allowed 
Departments to smooth out fluctuations in their spending under ‘End Year 
Flexibility’ (EYF).  This in principle allowed limited funding which had not been 
spent in one financial year to be rolled over into the next. The NDA 
accumulated a reserve under EYF of around £1 billion.– largely due to 
commercial income exceeding expectations. This in principle gave the NDA a 
degree of flexibility, though it appears that very little of it was used and the 
cumulative total was lost at the demise of the EYF system after the 2010 
review.  
7.29 Under the new rules, government departments and agencies have a 
small amount of flexibility to move funds between years. In the NDA’s case, 
this would be the main route to seek to mitigate the effects of future financial 
volatility over periods too short to be addressed by internal reprioritisation 
within the NDA or DECC’s budget. Exceptionally a department may seek 
support from the Reserve. Such claims would remain subject to Treasury 
approval and are limited to genuinely unforeseen contingencies which 
departments cannot absorb within their Spending Review allocations.                                                           
125 Energy Act 2004, pp. 29-30. 
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7.30 One consequence of the current system is that it encourages 
conservatism in financial planning as Chapter 8 argues in more detail. The 
penalties for exceeding a funding allocation are much more severe than those 
for under-spending. For the NDA, with such a large programme of expenditure 
on a range of difficult and unpredictable projects, this is an ongoing challenge.  
7.31 SR2010 - Agreement on priorities and funding126
 
 
CSR07 SR10 
In £ millions 2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-
15 
Income 
forecasts 
assumed at the 
time of the SR 
1,128 1,228 1,120 867 697 784 873 
Direct 
Government 
funding (DEL) 
1,765 1,629 1,705 2,022 2,249 2,215 2,146 
Total planned 
expenditure 
2,893 2,857 2,825 2,889 2,946 2,999 3,019 
 
7.32 The 2010 Spending Review followed a review process of options by all 
the main stakeholders – including DECC, NDA and Treasury – looking at the 
value for money and affordability of different levels of expenditure. The 2006 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) had provided Direct Grant Funding 
of £1.765 billion in 2008-09, £1.629 billion in 2009-10, and £1.705 billion in 
2010-11. The 2010 Spending Review took place under severe fiscal pressure 
as the Government sought to tackle the budget deficit – with most 
Departments’ budgets being cut by 20–30% over the CSR period. However 
the NDA was in a peculiar position, due to its dependence on commercial 
income, forecast to decline from £1.120 billion in 2010-11 to £0.867 billion in 
2011-12, and £0.697 billion in 2012-13.                                                          
126 Figures provided by the Government’s Shareholder Executive 
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7.33 The process of examining options also led to a conclusion that the 
work on the highest hazard facilities at Sellafield was a sufficiently high priority 
that it should be prioritised and protected.127
7.34  The outcome of the settlement aimed to ensure that the highest 
hazard facilities at Sellafield received whatever funding was needed, while 
also providing sufficient funds to stage competitions for decommissioning 
Dounreay and the Magnox sites. However, affordability constraints meant that 
some lower priority work (such as in moving the former UKAEA research sites 
towards site closure) had to be progressed more slowly. The implications of 
affordability constraints are discussed in Chapter 8. 
  The result was that the 
Spending Review process led to a rise in the direct Government (DEL) Grant 
to the NDA, which will reach a peak of £2.249 billion in 2012-13. Taking 
forecast commercial income into account, the NDA’s overall budget will 
increase year on year over the Spending Review period, from £2.825 billion in 
2010-11 to £3.019 billion in 2014-15. 
Radioactive waste management plans for a Deep 
Geological Disposal Facility 
7.35 The demise of the Nirex proposal for a site near Sellafield (see para. 
4.39) in 1997 led to a period of reflection in public radioactive waste policy. .  
In 1999 a House of Lords Select Committee produced a report128
“the future policy for nuclear waste management will require public 
acceptance. Central to this is the need for widespread public 
consultation before a policy is settled by Government and presented to 
Parliament for endorsement.”  
 on 
radioactive waste management, which called on Government to develop a 
clear strategy and timetable for implementation. It emphasized that policy 
development needed to involve stakeholders: 
                                                        127  Spending on these facilities was protected in the 2010 Spending Review Settlement – 
HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010, p. 62. 
128 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (1999) Third Report: 
Management of Nuclear Waste, Session 1998-1999, HL Paper 41. London: HMSO. 
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7.36 This was followed by the launch of the Managing Radioactive Waste 
Safely programme in 2001.129 The first consultation asked stakeholders how 
they wanted to be involved in the policy development programme, what they 
thought the policy should cover (i.e. the scope of the issues) and how they 
thought Government should develop the policy, including what institutional 
structures should be put in place. The Government responded by setting up 
an independent committee (the Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management, or CoRWM) to look at radioactive waste management options 
and recommend to Government which one(s) should be implemented in the 
UK.  After it reported in 2006, Government quickly endorsed its main 
recommendations for legacy waste: that it should be emplaced in a deep 
geological repository; that robust storage should precede this; and that the 
only feasible route to getting political consent was to invite partnership and 
voluntarism on the part of local communities.130
7.37 The Scottish Government has taken a different view from that in 
England and Wales on the subject of long-term management and disposal of 
wastes at intermediate and high levels.  Para. 8.24 analyses this further.   
 Government is now actively 
seeking to engage with relevant local communities – only those close to 
Sellafield have yet expressed any potential interest – and hope to have a 
repository ready for use by 2040, allowing for both political and engineering 
processes to take as long as may be needed.  
7.38 We heard the view expressed several times during our interviews that 
an additional reason for the long delays proposed for several 
decommissioning activities (besides radioactive decay and the desire to put 
off expenditure not currently necessary) was the observation that the timing of 
the availability of a repository was uncertain and at best several decades 
away.  This was suggested particularly in relation to reactors.  When the 100 
and 135 year delay periods were first suggested this was not a justification                                                         
129 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Department of the 
Environment Northern Ireland, The National Assembly of Wales, and the Scottish Executive 
(2001) Managing Radioactive Waste Safely: Proposals for developing a policy for managing 
solid radioactive waste in the UK, London: HMSO. 
130 CoRWM recommended geological disposal for legacy wastes only.  Government has 
subsequently endorsed this idea for new-build wastes as well 
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offered.  However, over time continuing delay in the date when a repository 
might become available has meant that this has become a more serious 
argument in relation to reactor dismantling, on the grounds that the costs of 
managing the reactor liabilities would be greater if cores were dismantled 
before a repository was available and needed interim storage before disposal.  
By contrast, where wastes are potentially more mobile and less stable, there 
has since 1995 been a policy driver to immobilising wastes and packaging 
them in ways that should be compatible with any feasible future management 
route.  
Conclusions 
7.39 It was not until the turn of the century that a real focus on clean-up 
emerged at the policy level.  However by the time of the 2002 White Paper it 
was clear that a systematic and unified approach to managing the nuclear 
legacy had become a major Government objective.  Two factors helped this 
process: the evident success of the UKAEA’s contractor and competition 
model, and the damage done to BNFL’s ambitions to be a commercial nuclear 
champion by its losses in the USA and the MOX data falsification. 
7.40 The 2002 White Paper recognised the particular problems that would 
be encountered in developing a major clean-up programme and introduced a 
coherent institutional structure centred on the NDA, created in 2005.  Options 
for a flexible and segregated form of funding were not followed through. The 
NDA became subject to standard Spending Review processes with ring-
fenced funding from its sponsor Department’s budget.  The new institution 
was supported by a significant increase in direct Government funding for 
decommissioning, with spending on the highest hazards protected. 
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CHAPTER 8 - ANALYSIS 
• Technology choices for reactors and handling Magnox spent fuel, and 
delays in starting a systematic programme of decommissioning at 
Sellafield in the 1990s, significantly increased the complexity and cost of 
decommissioning today.  Contributory factors include deterioration of the 
radioactive wastes and the structure of the facilities containing them so 
that the Sellafield Legacy Ponds and Silos now need much higher 
expenditure than would have been necessary if earlier action had been 
taken.  
• The effect of discounting has been seen to influence delays to 
decommissioning of reactors. However, we do not consider that overall it 
has been the primary driver – which has more often been affordability 
constraints in a situation where future expenditure yields no financial 
benefit. Funding on high hazard facilities is currently protected, so 
discounting is not an issue there, although it remains a significant factor in 
assessing the business case for other projects. 
• There are two different funding mechanisms for legacy liabilities: the NDA 
model through DECC’s Spending Review settlement; and an independent 
segregated fund, the Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) for British Energy, 
which is managed by trustees.  
• We were told that there has been a change in regulatory approach, with a 
move to allow larger short term risks in order to reduce risk overall. This 
should facilitate more rapid decommissioning and enhanced value for 
money, relative to previous practices. We saw evidence that this change 
has started to have an effect.  
• NDA’s funding settlements since 2005 are a substantial increase in 
funding for decommissioning, and work on the highest hazards is 
protected. Nevertheless, affordability (in comparison with other calls on 
Government spending) and flexibility (between years) affect what can be 
achieved. The condition of the NDA estate means that around 50% of its 
budget is spent on fixed costs which do not directly advance 
decommissioning. So a marginal pound – if it could be found - would 
produce nearly twice as much direct liability discharge as the average 
pound currently spent. 
• There are examples of sites or projects where good value for money could 
be obtained from earlier decommissioning, if funding could be found. 
Bringing forward closure of Harwell and Winfrith, for example, would save 
money in the long term. In such cases, acceleration would need to be 
signalled and managed carefully so that the supply chain could gear up.  
• The NDA oversees a complex programme with very difficult objectives, 
high levels of uncertainty and often with long time scales, carried out by 
tiers of contractors. A constant tension is to meet precise spending targets, 
balancing potential under and over spends. In the past there have been 
instances of “stop/start” on projects, some of which have been the result of 
needing to keep within these precise spending totals. This concern may 
deter some contractors from applying for decommissioning work. The 
83 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
penalties for overshooting target expenditure are greater than those for 
undershooting it, leading to a conservative approach throughout the supply 
chain. To deal with this, the NDA is currently trialling a new approach of 
‘over-pressuring’, on the basis it is easier to cut back than to start up 
projects. Although a rational response, there will still be some damage to 
value for money.   
• The success of the NDA/PBO/contractor model in bringing efficiencies and 
innovation relies on a healthy supply chain. The predictability of funding 
may affect willingness to compete, but there are other factors, including 
competition from other industries for people, and the sheer difficulty of 
working at the complex and remote site at Sellafield.  NDA has consulted 
on these issues, and introduced a new strategy.  
• In my view, there is a strong case for regarding decommissioning and 
waste management as a special case within public spending.  Reasons 
are: the task is huge and long-lasting, but finite; projects are unique and 
one-off and many face major uncertainties that are difficult to resolve; 
commercial income is inherently unstable; every extra pound spent could 
achieve almost twice as much direct decommissioning as the average 
pound, because of high fixed costs; and there is evidence that extra 
spending would offer good value for money.  
 
8.1 When decommissioning first began to be discussed in the 1970s, 
attention focused on what would be the cost and timescales to decommission 
reactors.  While the need to manage the subsequent wastes was also 
recognized, no serious attention was paid to issues arising from spent fuel or 
fuel cycle sites, especially Sellafield.  Most reactors continued to operate in 
the 1990s and it only began to be clear, especially after 2000, that the most 
urgent, expensive and difficult decommissioning and waste management 
tasks would be at Sellafield, the site where spent fuel from the commercial 
gas-cooled reactors was always sent.  This concentration on Sellafield was in 
part the result of the fact that reprocessing spent fuel led to the need to 
manage several new waste streams, but – most important – that the wastes 
from the early military reactors and early Magnoxes had been poorly 
managed and neglected, storing up very large and expensive technical 
problems. 
 
8.2 Since the establishment of the NDA in 2005 there has been, for the 
first time, a clear and unified focus on the decommissioning issue across the 
board.  This has been accompanied by a level of funding that has both been 
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higher and more consistent than in any previous period, though challenges 
remain.  This chapter brings together analysis derived from the foregoing 
chapters, starting with some historical questions and then moving on to 
contemporary issues 
Earlier periods 
8.3 There were opportunities to tackle the most difficult decommissioning 
issues systematically well before 2005 - and these were missed.  The 
technical task was always going to be formidable and its associated costs 
high for a variety of reasons, set out below.  In addition, and partly because of 
the reaction to these difficulties, decisions were taken which meant that the 
task was postponed.  This in turn made the task even more difficult, with large 
cost consequences. 
8.4 Box 8.1 shows the main decisions that affected the scale and cost of 
the decommissioning task.  The late 1940s decision to give priority to 
developing nuclear weapons capability meant in practice a concentration on 
gas-cooled reactors fuelled by natural uranium, as these would provide high 
plutonium yields once fuel was reprocessed.  It seems improbable that – 
given the military objective – other decisions could have been made, though 
these technologies inevitably meant that there would be complexities in 
decommissioning as well as high volumes of waste to manage. This early 
concentration on gas-cooling for reactors was continued into the later 1970s.  
There were opportunities to choose different reactor technology with lower 
back end costs, well before this time, and by the 1970s the UK was alone 
internationally in continuing to build waste-intensive gas-cooled reactors.  The 
commitment to reprocessing of domestic fuel was maintained into the 1990s 
and 2000s when it had already become clear to the utilities in the early 1980s 
that it was no longer economic.  This directly raised the costs of managing 
spent fuel well above necessary levels.  It also became evident, though not 
officially acknowledged, that the most important product of reprocessing – 
plutonium – was a liability, not an asset, as soon as work on FBRs was 
abandoned in the early 1990s.  This would therefore add further to the costs 
and complexity of managing the legacy.   Most other nuclear-using countries 
abandoned reprocessing after the 1970s and so for both reactor choice and 
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spent fuel management it is therefore plausible to argue that these decisions 
could have been different. 
Box 8.1:Key decisions and processes that have affected back end costs 
(Adverse effects that might have been avoided in bold) 
1946–1950s  Commitment to develop independent UK atomic weapons 
meant the early nuclear programme, and technology choices, were driven by 
the need to produce plutonium for military use. 
1950s–1990s  Spent fuel and wastes were stored in inadequate facilities, 
without proper inventories or protocols. There was failure to plan long term 
management of the waste, or ultimate disposal. This could be understood in 
the context of the 1950s military programme, but became progressively less 
defensible with each successive decade. 
1965 Commitment to AGRs as the second generation nuclear 
programme substantially influenced liabilities as gas-cooled reactors 
were inherently more waste-intensive than the light water reactors that 
were in direct competition. 
1971  BNFL was founded as an explicitly commercial organisation, 
giving it incentives to ignore Sellafield clean-up when several legacy 
facilities were already abandoned. 
Mid 1980s  This was the period when decisions were taken to continue 
reprocessing spent fuel, when it was becoming uneconomic to do so, 
and no military need existed. 
1990   Decisions associated with electricity privatisation had the largest 
single influence in making the extent of liability costs clear.  But at the 
moment when the scale of liability costs was revealed in the failed 
attempt to privatise nuclear power  – so that the issue was at last visible 
– the previous funding system for liabilities was terminated without 
replacement, and BNFL continued to pay little attention to the legacy 
facilities that have subsequently deteriorated with huge cost 
implications. 
1995-1997  The Nuclear Review was an opportunity to have taken a grip 
on the legacy issue by creating an NDA-like body in the late 1990s.  
KPMG considered the case, based on UKAEA experience, BNFL 
opposed it, and the idea was shelved for several years. 
1996 The AGRs and Sizewell B PWR were privatised as British Energy and 
a segregated fund established. BE was rescued from insolvency in 2002 after 
the electricity price fell.  
2002 Managing the Nuclear Legacy White Paper set out new organisational 
and funding model to deal with decommissioning. 
2005  The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority was set up.  
2008 British Energy was restructured and sold to EDF, with most of the 
proceeds used to endow a re-structured a much enlarged segregated 
account, the Nuclear Liabilities Fund, with investment policy subject to 
Government controls 
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8.5 There was a real opportunity to minimize both the complexity and 
cost of liabilities management in 1990 and over the next few years.  It was in 
the process of privatizing electricity in 1988-90 that it became clear that the 
cost of dealing with nuclear liabilities would be much higher than had 
previously been officially acknowledged and that the burden would be 
especially heavy at Sellafield.  And from this time the regulator began to put 
pressure on BNFL to tackle the most problematic legacy facilities at the 
Sellafield site.  However no serious action followed for several years, and the 
proposal to set up an NDA-type body in 1997 on the basis of UKAEA 
experience was put on hold.  The explanations for this continuing but 
avoidable lack of effective action seem to be that: 
 
• BNFL was focused on commercial expansion into a wide range of fuel 
cycle services internationally, and spending on legacy facilities would 
have in some cases impacted directly on its profitability and in other 
cases required other parties (e.g. MoD) to be willing to pay more than 
hotel costs for liabilities that it owned at the site; 
• Government was pressuring BNFL to maximize its return to taxpayers 
and had a long-term plan to privatise the company.  It also did not have 
knowledge of quite how expensive and difficult it would be to remediate 
Sellafield; 
• Government policy up to 1995 was to avoid treating and packaging 
wastes until a geological disposal facility was going to be available. 
This was partially modified in a 1995 White Paper on waste, after which 
a new system encouraged the immobilization and packaging of some 
wastes; 
• Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear Ltd were under pressure to 
reduce costs.  In reviews of decommissioning strategy, NE proposed 
lengthening the period before final decommissioning, which reduced 
the size of provisions in their accounts, but was questioned by the NII 
in their Quinquennial Review. 
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8.6 Among the influences on the management of spent fuel and wastes at 
Sellafield, we heard the view that the miners’ strike in the mid-1980s 
contributed substantially to the problems now evident at the Legacy Ponds 
and Silos.  This was apparently due to the need to receive spent fuel from 
Magnox reactors at a faster rate than previously planned, resulting in 
unavoidable complications in the storage process.  However, while this 
episode may have made the immediate management problem more difficult, 
there seems no evidence that it was responsible in any significant way for the 
problems now encountered, given the long-term neglect of Legacy Ponds and 
Silos both before the strike and for a long period thereafter.   
 
8.7 There was one exception to this story of continuing inactivity. The 
UKAEA, from 1994 became (with the exception of its nuclear fusion 
programme) a dedicated decommissioning agency rather than an R&D 
organisation. It started a programme of systematic decommissioning at sites 
such as Harwell, Winfrith and Dounreay. In implementing this approach, the 
UKAEA adopted a contractor and competition model which later strongly 
influenced the process of setting up the NDA. NII were at the time critical of 
the UKAEA’s implementation of this programme, on the basis that as the site 
licensee, they were not maintaining sufficient control over sites, though there 
were clear efficiency benefits available in the new model. 
 
8.8 Over the last twenty years it has become evident that the most 
pressing issue in dealing with the UK nuclear legacy is at the large and 
complex fuel cycle site at Sellafield.  There are many other sites which need 
remediation, including the Magnox reactors, nearly all of which are now shut 
down.  But the cost and complexity of managing Sellafield has, bit by bit, 
become increasingly dominant, so that in the recent Annual Report from the 
NDA, the estimate of the discounted cost of Sellafield has now reached £32.7 
billion, or almost exactly two-thirds of the total cost of remediating the whole 
NDA estate.   
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An attempted counterfactual 
8.9 It is clear that the costs of remediating the Sellafield site – particularly 
the Legacy Ponds and Silos - are now higher than they would have been had 
serious action been taken starting in 1990.  The question then is: how much 
higher?  There are several components that might be expected to lead to 
higher costs now (at the prices of any one year i.e. ignoring general inflation).  
These components are: 
 
• Deterioration in the condition of the radioactive materials contained in 
the Legacy Ponds and Silos, for example the formation of sludges in 
pools, which complicates the removal and packaging of wastes; 
• Deterioration in the structures containing the wastes; 
• The large ‘hotel costs’ incurred in the intervening 20 years or so - that 
is the costs required to keep the materials and their structures safe and 
secure; 
• Regulatory standards have become somewhat more stringent in the 
area of radiation exposure. 
 
8.10 It is not possible to quantify the extent of the increases in costs 
consequent on these four factors. This is both because there is no reliable 
estimate of what the cost would have been if serious work had started in 1990 
and because the complexity of the Sellafield site means that it is not possible 
fully to disentangle hotel costs131
                                                        
131 Hotel costs are those costs necessarily incurred to maintain facilities in a steady state i.e. 
to avoid further deterioration and increases in the level of risk (more colloquially those costs 
needed just to ‘tread water’.)  They are influenced by the regulatory requirements for licensed 
nuclear sites 
 for the Legacy Ponds and Silos from other 
hotel costs on site. Nevertheless it is plain that the costs of fully 
decommissioning these facilities starting from the period after 2005 will be 
very much higher than would have been the case if a start had been made in 
1990, almost certainly (in my judgement) by several billions of pounds.   Work 
is now proceeding on the remediation of these legacy facilities without 
financial constraint, indicating that lessons have been learned from this 
experience. 
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The history of liabilities funding 
8.11 The history of funding decommissioning and waste management has 
been poor and far from transparent, reflecting a lack of seriousness in policy 
terms.  Substantial funds collected, and for brief periods managed, explicitly 
for the purpose of funding decommissioning and waste management have 
mostly been used for quite different purposes: often they have been added to 
the Treasury’s Consolidated Fund along with other receipts from Government 
asset sales.  Thus: 
• Funds collected from consumers for back end liabilities between 1976 and 
1988 by the UK utilities, including their share of decommissioning BNFL 
facilities were ‘lost’ at the time of electricity privatisation (some £3.9 billion) 
because the assets in which the funds were invested either went to non-
nuclear companies at privatisation or were unprofitable;  
• The Fossil Fuel Levy (1990-1996) raised over £6 billion for Nuclear 
Electric and while this was not primarily intended for use in liability 
discharge, it allowed BE to generate surplus cash of £2.6 billion which was 
earmarked for liability discharge by a transfer to Magnox Electric and 
thereafter to BNFL’s Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio (NLIP). When 
Government decided to fund the decommissioning of the legacy sites from 
the public purse, the balance of the NLIP was absorbed into the 
Consolidated Fund after the Magnox sites were transferred to the NDA ; 
• A separate Undertaking from Government to Magnox Electric in 1996, 
valued at £3.8 billion for back-end expenses and due to start being paid 
from 2008, was in practice an accounting method designed to allow BNFL 
to trade legally.  It was ‘extinguished’ as BNFL was broken up (though 
Government similarly guarantees future payments to NDA though without 
naming specific numbers). 
8.12 More positively, the UKAEA was funded to undertake substantial 
decommissioning directly by Government from the early 1990s at a rate of 
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£250 million to £300 million annually.132 Since 2005 the picture has 
substantially changed, with Government funding the NDA to the extent of £7.7 
billion from 2005-6 to 2010-11133
Discounting future costs 
, rising to £8.6 billion in the SR2010 period.  
8.13 The rationale and process of discounting nuclear liabilities and 
investment is outlined in Box 8.2 and its possible impact is discussed below. 
Box 8.3 illustrates the effect of discounting on nuclear liability estimates. 
Box 8.2: Discounting and Rates of Return in the Context of  
Nuclear Waste and Decommissioning Costs 
 
An important issue in the economics and accounting for nuclear power is 
establishing an appropriate basis for comparing expenditures and revenues 
over time.  In comparison to other electricity generation technologies the issue 
is particularly relevant for nuclear, given long timescales from the construction 
of new plant to the completion of decommissioning and waste management, 
and in absolute terms, the much higher costs associated with the back-end 
activities.   
 
Since the early 1960s it has been common practice in the public and private 
sectors to use the technique of ‘discounting’ to compare the costs and 
benefits that occur in different time periods by converting them to ‘present 
values’, conventionally expressing discount rates (as throughout this box) net 
of inflation i.e. in the prices of one year. The choice of discount rate therefore 
becomes important as it will determine the balance of weight given to near 
and distant cash flows.  In practice, the rate will be determined by the purpose 
for which the discounting is required.  For example, it is important to 
distinguish between a discount rate for public sector appraisal purposes 
(reflecting social time preference), a discount rate for general accounting 
provisions in the public sector, and a fund accumulation rate, which is 
conceptually and practically quite different, but  important for private sector 
segregated funds.   
 
Discounting for project appraisal purposes 
In the private sector, the theoretically appropriate post-tax real discount rate 
for investment appraisal purposes is the ‘cost of capital’, implied by the costs 
of debt and equity in capital markets.  In studies on the economics of 
investment in nuclear power, an indicative figure of around 10% is often used. 
This rate can be used for example to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) 
of investment in new generating plant or the levelised cost of generation i.e. 
the discounted lifetime cost of operating the plant converted into an equivalent 
unit cost of generation in £/MWh or p/kWh.                                                         
132 UKAEA Annual Report and Accounts, 2002-3, p32, and 2004-5, p. 59. 
133 Figures for 2005-6 to 2009-2010 are the actual outturn numbers, while those for  2010-
2011 are those planned in the Spending Review 2007. 
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In appraising central government policies, programmes or investments by 
nationalised industries, discounting is based on the different principle that 
society attaches more value to the present as opposed to the future, 
commonly referred to as ‘time preference’.  The Social Time Preference Rate 
(STPR) for discounting costs and benefits in public sector appraisals is 
specified in the UK by HM Treasury, most recently in the 2003 Green Book134.  
It is set at 3.5% in real terms, with a schedule of progressively lower rates for 
the longer-term (beyond 30 years) to reflect increasing uncertainty about the 
distant future.135
In government accounting, the term discount rate can therefore also be used 
in a different sense, to describe the interest rate that should be used to value 
‘provisions’ for future liabilities in a department’s balance sheet.  The concept 
is therefore closer to the rate of return on a real or hypothetical fund to pay for 
the expected future commitment. HM Treasury explicitly regards long-term 
nuclear decommissioning liabilities as ‘general provisions’, for which its 
current standard convention is a real discount rate of 2.2%, determined with 
reference to the real return on index-linked Gilts.
  The 3.5% (declining) rate would therefore be appropriate for 
a public sector economic analysis of the costs of decommissioning and waste.    
 
Government accounting: general provisions 
The long term decommissioning and waste management costs of nuclear 
plant are of such a magnitude and potential future duration that it has long 
been recognised that special treatment should be given to them, whether the 
nuclear generator is in the private or public sector.  In principle, this should 
primarily ensure that funding will be available when it is needed, without 
disruptive or commercially unrealistic demands on corporate or government 
budgets.    
 
136
 
 This 2.2% general 
provisions rate is adopted by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority in their 
accounts.   
 
The rate of return on a waste and decommissioning fund  
While the general provisions rate is meant to reflect low-risk returns, the issue 
is slightly different, though related, when the context is a genuine fund that 
accumulates cash to pay for future liabilities. British Energy (BE) in the private 
sector, for which a fund exists (the NLF) has adopted a rate for its liabilities of 
3%.  This should be seen as a ‘fund accumulation’ rate and the value of 3% 
reflects a broad consensus that this is the level of average annual return on 
low-risk investment that can be earned. The great bulk of the NLF must at 
present be invested in the National Loans Fund, currently earns less than 3% 
p.a. and is taxed.  Use of a fund accumulation rate is appropriate in particular 
for calculating the contributions that should be made to the fund by the 
generator during the operational life of the plant.   
                                                        
134 HM Treasury, 2003 The Green Book, Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government,  
135 See Annex 6 of ibid.  
136 HM Treasury, 2004, Guidance on managing the change in the discount rates for pensions 
and other long term liabilities, PES Paper 04  
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8.14 When any future activity involves expenditure but no income, there is 
an obvious incentive to delay the expenditure. In addition, any positive 
discount rate gives a formal incentive to delay future activities as far into the 
future as possible because the present value of that expenditure continuously 
diminishes the further into the future that expenditure is postponed. While the 
discount rates used in the past by the public bodies owning the liabilities were 
used to justify delaying decommissioning in the case of reactors, it is unlikely 
that they were the primary driver in influencing them to delay 
decommissioning programmes. A more significant factor has been broader 
considerations of affordability in the context of competing claims for 
expenditure. Different values of the discount rate in the past would probably 
have made little significant difference to resource allocation decisions on 
liabilities overall, though the exception may be in reactor decommissioning, 
where discounting even at low rates made the present value of the cost 
appear very small when the delay was expected to be 100 or 135 years. 
However, discounted financial analyses can also be used to legitimise 
decisions driven by affordability or other considerations. 
8.15 In practice, policies – deriving initially from utilities and later endorsed 
by government – have been to delay decommissioning plans, often into the 
long distant future. The rationales for such delays, which are much longer 
than those contemplated by most other countries using nuclear power (see 
Box 2.1 in Chapter 2) have often involved the idea that radioactive decay 
would make some tasks easier in the future. Another rationale is that there is 
no point (and possibly added cost and risk) if structures are dismantled and 
resulting wastes packaged when there is no final management route for them, 
such as a deep geological repository. This is in addition to an understandable 
reluctance on the part of Government to sanction public spending on activities 
that bring no future income - unless there are other pressing reasons to 
proceed. While discounted figures are valuable for accounting and financial 
purposes they conceal information about the extent of decommissioning work 
and its progress over time, and in the next chapter observations are made 
about publishing undiscounted numbers as well as the discounted numbers 
currently available.  
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8.16 The current NDA funding settlement protects funding for tackling the 
high hazard facilities – so discounting is clearly not a factor influencing the 
speed of decommissioning on such projects. However, the discount rate 
applied continues to influence the assessment of the business case for other 
projects – this case being framed in terms of net present values. Clearly in 
this respect the discount rate used will influence assessments of value for 
money. 
 
94 
 
A report prepared by SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex 
  
Box 8.3 Illustrative Example of Discounting Nuclear Liability Estimates (NLE) 
The table below provides an illustrative example of the effect of discounting nuclear 
liabilities estimates over a period of 100 years, with an assumed profile of spend in 
which 50% of costs are spent in the first 20 years, 30% in the next 60 years, and 
20% in the final 20 years.  The table also demonstrates the effect of discounting 
£100 billion of nuclear liabilities at different discount rates.         
 
Illustrative example of the effect of discounting NLE at different discount rates 
 Undiscounted 
£bn 
Discounted 
(1%) 
£bn 
Discounted 
(2.2%) 
£bn 
Discounted 
(3.5%) 
£bn 
Nuclear 
Liabilities 
Estimate 
100.0 73.8 57.0 46.8 
 
The NDA ARA 2005/06137
 
outlined the approach used to derive the then discounted 
nuclear provision figure of £30.6 billion in the financial statements of 31 March 2006.  
The starting point for the discounted provision estimate was the undiscounted sum of 
the Life Cycle Baseline (LCBL) estimate for each site, which stood at £62.7 billion as 
at 1 April 2005, as published in March 2006.  After a number of largely technical 
adjustments, the £62.7 bn. number was reduced to an undiscounted total of £53.3 
billion, After discounting and other minor adjustments, the NDA’s discounted 
provision then stood at £30.6 billion.  
Different funding regimes for different liabilities 
8.17 Chapter 7 set out the evolution of the funding regimes for the NDA and 
for British Energy liabilities. If new nuclear power stations are built, there will 
be three different systems for funding liabilities. It is evident from the rescue of 
British Energy that should other arrangements fall through, Government 
ultimately has to take responsibility for paying for nuclear liabilities.                                                         
137 NDA  Annual Report and Accounts 2005/06, Page 71.  
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/upload/nda_annual_report_accounts_2005_06_1.pdf  
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Government has been aware of these lessons in seeking to devise a robust 
funding model for liabilities stemming from new nuclear build. 
8.18 Chapter 7 discussed the various options considered by the 
Government for funding future decommissioning following the Managing the 
Nuclear Legacy White Paper. In practice, the NDA is funded in broadly the 
same way as mainstream Government expenditure, through the Spending 
Review Settlement and annual grants in aid from Government. In this respect 
it follows the model used by the UKAEA in the 1990s. By contrast British 
Energy, when the AGR and PWR power stations were privatized in 1996, 
funded at least some of its liabilities through a genuine segregated fund – the 
Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF), with BE making regular payments, and having 
responsibility for meeting any residual liability. Following the rescue, 
restructuring and sale of British Energy, Government accepted responsibility 
for funding any residual liability, should the NLF prove insufficient. 
Government also effectively became more influential  – it appointed the 
majority of the fund’s trustees and the Office of National Statistics classified 
the fund as a public body. From this point onwards the fund has been 
invested almost entirely (currently to the extent of almost 90%) in the public 
sector.  
8.19 This takes the form of investing the large majority of its capital in the 
National Loans Fund. The average rate of return over the life of the fund is 
one of the key variables that will influence its ability to meet in full the liability it 
was set up to cover. When interest rates are low – as they currently are 
(about 0.5% nominal) – the risk that some portion of the future liability will fall 
to the taxpayer rises. Other key variables, such as the eventual lifetime of the 
reactor fleet, may decrease that risk. 
8.20 The major distinction which remains between the NDA funding regime 
and the NLF is that expenditure can be sanctioned for the duration of 
individual projects. This means that decommissioning funded by the NLF will 
not be subject to annual budget limits and will not need to be negotiated 
through the Spending Review process. Being able to take a longer term view 
on decommissioning – at least as long as the funds last - has potential 
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benefits in that it provides the maximum scope to create contracts with 
incentives to deliver the work in the manner which creates best value for 
money - including bringing the profile of work forward where it makes sense to 
do so. Another important distinction is the nature and age of the respective 
estates. In managing the BE legacy, costs which fall to the NLF should be 
lower per reactor due to more modern designs and less diversity than across 
the NDA estate. These distinctions, taken together, should allow greater 
scope to accelerate work and limit hotel costs.  
8.21 The current valuation of the NLF of £8.6 billion is around double the 
current estimated liability estimate of £4 billion (discounted), though its current 
rate of accumulation is significantly less than the discount rate applied (3%). 
The undiscounted value of the fund is around £12 billion. Whether the fund 
will be able to meet all the BE liabilities will depend on a range of factors (in 
addition to whether the current approach to its investment regime are 
maintained), including the variation in UK interest rates, the extent of any life 
extensions to the AGR fleet, and the degree to which the scale of the liabilities 
can be successfully managed.  
8.22 The risk is that if the fund is insufficient, the advantages of the 
(segregated) funding model would be lost, there would be a reputational 
impact in terms of the nuclear sector having been seen not to have ‘paid its 
way’, and future taxpayers would need to pick up the remaining liability. 
However, Government sees value, particularly in the present macro-economic 
climate, in using the NLF to reduce the amount of borrowing that the public 
sector needs to undertake in the short term, thus somewhat reducing future 
taxpayer liabilities. It is beyond the scope of this report to assess the relative 
merits of these approaches to the NLF’s investment policy. 
8.23 A final issue concerning the fund is that its structure gives EDF no clear 
financial incentive to manage down the level of liabilities.  This is because 
none of the expenditure on BE liabilities will affect BE’s bottom line and 
Government has accepted that it will fund any liabilities which exceed the 
fund’s value. EDF clearly sees a reputational stake in successfully managing 
the liability, and we have been told that it is currently cooperating with the 
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NDA in seeking to exploit synergies with Magnox decommissioning.  As also 
mentioned earlier, NLF NDA and EDF are currently working to improve the 
financial incentives on EDF 
Funding future nuclear liabilities 
8.24 Primary and secondary legislation has already been enacted as a 
framework for the new funding system envisaged for any new-build reactors. 
The approach will be based on new nuclear operators making payments to an 
independent fund, which will be required to maintain a value in line with a 
projection of what is needed to meet the cost of decommissioning and waste 
management. This will be linked to the lifetime plan of the plant – if the 
estimated cost of decommissioning goes up the company would be required 
to top up the fund, whereas if it can show that costs will be lower, it will be 
permitted to withdraw excess funds.  This creates a strong incentive for 
efficient liability management. Government has been consulting over detailed 
plans for eventually transferring title to wastes to Government at prices that 
are intended to protect taxpayers’ interests.  The system is linked to the idea 
that a Deep Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) will in due course become 
available and will take the wastes.   
8.25 It is important to note that even where funding is adequate to cover the 
costs of work to be carried out 100 years or so into the future, the fact that the 
work still needs to be done at later dates means that it is future real 
resources, not present-day resources, that will be deployed to carry out the 
task.  This means that future generations are not protected from the 
consequences of delay – even though the existence of a well-endowed fund 
may help convince future generations that there is an established property 
right to deploy their resources to carry out decommissioning ahead of other 
possible resource uses at that time.  The issue of the legitimacy of lengthy 
and planned delays in decommissioning is beyond the scope of this study, but 
there are both ethical and pragmatic reasons why Government might wish to 
consider whether the lengthy delays represent the right timescales.   
8.26 Ethically, the issue is passing liabilities to future generations (i.e. not 
following the ‘polluter pays’ idea) and pragmatically, the reputation of the 
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nuclear industry in terms of its ability to achieve clean-up, especially in a 
context of new build, may be significant.  Also pragmatically, it is not always 
the case that the discounted value of liabilities will necessarily be higher if 
decommissioning timings are brought forward.  For example ‘hotel costs’ for 
both earlier and later future years will be avoided and in some cases they 
escalate much more rapidly than the discount rate.  On the other hand, some 
work may be more expensive if undertaken earlier because less radioactive 
decay will have taken place.  It is therefore an empirical question whether or 
not earlier decommissioning will have higher or lower discounted costs than 
the currently planned schedule. There is evidence (see below) that in some 
cases earlier decommissioning than possible under current financial 
arrangements would be substantially cheaper, on a discounted basis, than 
postponement.   
The effects of regulation 
8.27 Arguments are sometimes made that the safety regulatory system 
sometimes makes legacy management slower and more expensive than 
would be possible under a different regulatory approach (on the assumption 
always that this alternative approach would maintain necessary safety 
standards).  We have not found significant evidence of this.  The one area 
where there have been concerns is the idea that regulators (in practice the 
NII, now absorbed into the wider ONR) have on occasion been unwilling to 
sanction particular proposals on the grounds that they would lead to a 
temporary increase in risk – followed, it is argued, by a substantial hazard and 
risk reduction, thus minimizing the total risk over time.  However the view of 
the regulators is that policy has changed in a subtler way, so that higher short-
term risk increases may be allowed because the existing risk, in the absence 
of remedial action may be rising, and is held to be unacceptable.  We saw 
evidence that this change has begun to have an impact. If it is consistently 
applied, it should ensure that regulatory action does not unreasonably hamper 
the decommissioning process or lead to poorer value for money than would 
be possible for any given level of safety. 
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The proposed Geological Disposal Facility  
8.28 In the medium term a great deal depends, for the completion of the 
decommissioning and waste management task facing the NDA, on the 
availability of a disposal route for wastes.  NDA now has responsibility for the 
development of a GDF for this purpose.  The expected earliest date for 
readiness of a repository is 2040, reflecting both the time needed to construct 
consent and the technical complexities of a large and unique underground 
construction project. Government has recently challenged NDA to achieve a 
ten year advance on the 2040 date.  Whether this is feasible, and what might 
be the consequences of attempting to achieve it has been outside our terms 
of reference, but is a subject that deserves further work. 
Scotland 
8.29 Whilst the policy for low level radioactive waste is the same across the 
UK, the Scottish Government takes a different policy view on higher activity 
waste from that in England and Wales.  It rejects the idea of deep geological 
disposal as an end-point and expects to accommodate all wastes in storage 
or disposal facilities that are both near-surface and as near to the current 
location as possible.    While the Scottish policy has no immediate effect on 
liability management in the short term, it could prove significant in the longer 
term depending on how the policy is implemented.  For example, the 
development of long-term waste facilities at all Scottish sites would probably 
raise the total UK costs of waste management compared to a more 
centralised approach, given the economies of scale that would be lost.  On 
the other hand, should Scotland develop a two-site strategy, one at Dounreay 
and another for the south of Scotland, this effect would be muted 
Funding issues 
Average and marginal spending 
8.30 The NDA’s primary mission is to achieve decommissioning, including 
the associated waste management activities that follow decommissioning. 
The condition of its estate is such that a substantial portion of its annual 
spend is devoted simply to maintaining the safe and secure condition of 
existing sites.  These are the so-called ‘hotel costs’ which are by far the 
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largest component of overall support costs, though an exact breakdown is not 
currently available within the support cost category.  NDA is also responsible 
for operating a few remaining ‘commercial’ nuclear facilities for the remaining 
years of their life (two Magnox stations plus reprocessing and, until very 
recently, MOX fabrication at Sellafield) and this complicates analysis of its 
budget.   
8.31 NDA divides its expenditure into five broad categories, shown in Table 
8.1 below: 
Table 8.1: NDA expenditure 2010/2011 
Decommissioning and termination   9% 
New construction projects     21% 
Waste and nuclear materials management  19% 
Commercial operations     20% 
Support costs      32% 
 
Source: NDA Annual Report and Accounts 2010/2011, p. 20 
Note: Percentages add up to 101% in original source 
8.32 According to the Public Accounts Committee (2008), NDA spent 31% 
of its budget in 2006/7 on decommissioning project work, though this may not 
have included the ‘new construction’ category shown above.  The table above 
shows that by 2010/11 some 49% of NDA’s costs (the first three categories) 
went on activities that are in principle directly reducing the overall liability.  
There is however some ambiguity in the ‘new construction’ category where 
some projects are primarily in support of commercial operations rather than 
decommissioning and waste management. However the bulk of new 
construction is unambiguously for decommissioning-related purposes, for 
example constructing facilities for retrieving radioactive materials from Legacy 
Ponds and Silos and constructing Intermediate Level Waste stores.  
8.33 Despite this ambiguity in relation to the purposes of some new 
construction, it is still evident that close to only 50% of NDA spending is 
devoted to directly tackling the legacy. In other words, out of the average 
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pound currently spent on the NDA’s primary mission, only around 50p 
advances this mission directly.  
8.34  In the short-term, spending on support and on commercial operations 
– the other half of the NDA budget - are essentially fixed costs.  Therefore 
availability of extra income would not lead to any further spending on these 
activities.  So an extra or marginal pound spent on NDA – if it could be found -
would achieve close to a full pound’s worth of decommissioning. This is 
expenditure which, once undertaken, never recurs. The important corollary is 
that if NDA spending were reduced, the effect would be disproportionately to 
impact on decommissioning projects, as it will not be possible to reduce 
support or commercial costs.   
8.35 It is therefore clear that if it were possible to find additional funds, 
reprioritise spending from elsewhere or generate savings from within the 
existing budget and accelerate current decommissioning plans, there would 
be significant scope for reducing the overall cost of the liability.  Whether or 
not such increases in spending would offer good value for money depends on 
the economics of the projects that could be brought forward, and we return to 
this below.    
Affordability, flexibility and value for money 
8.36 The NDA strives to achieve the best possible value for money.  In order 
to achieve this certain conditions would need to be met in an ideal world: 
• The NDA would be able to spend as much as it can on projects which 
offer to minimize total cost – in other words where immediate spending  
saves a larger amount of (discounted) spending later on (the 
affordability issue); 
• The NDA would be able to spend its budget as flexibly as possible, and 
more efficiently manage volatility between years caused by unexpected 
over- or under-spends on projects, and/or variation in commercial 
income (the flexibility issue); 
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• The NDA would also like to maximize the scope for contracting for 
decommissioning work on a basis as close to fixed prices as possible 
under a competitive contracting regime, because this should in 
principle drive down the costs of specific tasks (the supply chain 
issue); 
8.37 In the real world, there are necessarily constraints on the achievement 
of these ambitions.   
8.38 The Government’s framework sets the parameters for the overall level 
of public spending. This framework is designed to maintain external 
confidence in the UK, support macro-economic stability and enable the UK to 
borrow at low interest rates. To meet its fiscal mandate, the Government must 
balance competing spending demands and manage expenditure through 
spending controls. This will, as a consequence, constrain what is affordable 
and what flexibility is available. Overall annual Government expenditure is 
therefore an important factor in determining the allocation of resources (not 
just the lifetime costs for any given project or policy area).  
8.39 More specific to the nuclear decommissioning industry are regulatory 
drivers and constraints.  Where, for example, regulators require work to be 
done on high hazard facilities, the spending, while essential, will not 
necessarily minimise costs over time, if other work offering good value for 
money must be deferred.  In addition, to expand decommissioning funding on 
a close to fixed price basis need to take account of issues such as the extent 
to which decommissioning tasks are clearly defined and technically known, 
the degree of competition in the supply chain, and the ability of the supply 
chain to respond if further work is offered.   
8.41 The question then is how far, within the parameters of the Spending 
Review settlement over the next three to four years, might the management of 
the funding of decommissioning be improved to enable better value for money 
to be obtained? 
8.42 Considering first the affordability issue, the funding settlements that 
NDA have received since 2005 have represented a substantial increase in 
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funding for decommissioning. This represents a radical change from the lack 
of focus on liabilities under previous management models. The current focus 
and substantial funding demonstrate that lessons have been learnt, and the 
existence of detailed lifetime plans for sites shows that the issues which were 
previously neglected have now been seriously thought through.  
8.43 However, despite the increase in funding and focus, the pace at which 
the NDA can deliver its programme has been constrained by the emerging 
understanding of the scale of the challenge at Sellafield, as the liabilities there 
have become better characterised – both revealing the urgency of the work to 
tackle high hazard facilities, and the scale of the costs involved. NDA 
originally floated the idea that Magnox stations might be completely 
decommissioned within 25 years. However, the extent of the issues in relation 
to the Legacy Ponds and Silos has meant that the NDA has needed to 
dedicate the majority of its funds to Sellafield, where most of the highest 
hazards are.  Funding of these high hazard facilities has therefore been 
protected – and as a result, other work across the estate has had to proceed 
more slowly. 
8.44 Nevertheless, tackling the liability remains subject to a broader 
affordability constraint, and must compete with other calls on Government 
spending. But despite the significant sums currently earmarked,  the NDA is 
able to identify a number of projects which the evidence suggests would 
represent strong value for money should funds become available. In other 
words the total discounted future costs saved would be substantially higher 
than the short term costs of executing relevant projects, primarily because of 
the high hotel costs of treading water.  
8.45 The result is that projects which it would make sense to accelerate in 
value for money terms have needed to be constrained for affordability 
reasons. The clearest (although relatively small-scale) examples are the 
English research sites – Harwell and Winfrith. Neither site represents as high 
a risk as found elsewhere, but the need for continued security and 
maintenance at the sites leads to significant hotel costs and very limited 
current decommissioning work.  The NDA have been clear that they cannot 
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justify spending additional funds on the research sites if the money could 
instead be spent on the higher hazard facilities at Sellafield. Despite this 
position the NDA is keeping the approach to Harwell and Winfrith under 
review, and could move to accelerate them should further funds become 
available (for example through commercial income exceeding expectations).   
8.46 The Magnox sites are a much larger issue relative to the overall NDA 
budget (Magnox represents some 16% of the total discounted liability) than 
Harwell and Winfrith. The medium term goal for the Magnox estate is to move 
each of the facilities into ‘care and maintenance’, in which they can be safely 
maintained, if necessary for a prolonged period, prior to final site clearance. 
The NDA has moved from a broad front approach to moving Magnox sites 
into care and maintenance, to one focussed on accelerating two sites, while 
deferring work on other Magnox sites. The main advantages from accelerating 
two sites are: (i) maximising the opportunity to learn lessons, and develop 
innovations which can then be applied elsewhere; (ii) bench-marking costs 
more accurately, so that the scope of the new PBO contract for the Magnox 
sites is more accurately defined; and (iii) the Magnox SLC is able to 
concentrate its best staff on the two sites being accelerated, who then move 
to apply lessons learned to other sites enabling quicker completion. The two 
site acceleration strategy is therefore expected to deliver substantial benefits, 
relative to spreading resources more thinly. It also delivers significant short 
term savings, relative to the NDA’s previous baseline, by deferring work 
elsewhere on the Magnox estate.  
8.47 However, the approach is also a response to two constraints: (i) of 
what was affordable in the context of the last Spending Review, and 
substantial reductions in Government Expenditure across the board: and (ii) 
some limitations in the supply chain, which limit the ability to accelerate work 
across all sites. 
8.48 The NDA have provided evidence that if sufficient funds could be 
devoted over a prolonged period, more progress could be made across the 
Magnox estate while maintaining the two site acceleration strategy. The result 
would be earlier site closures (with resulting reductions in hotel costs). Any 
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such acceleration would need to be managed gradually – providing a clear 
indication that funding would be increased to allow the supply chain time to 
build up capacity. This approach would need to be managed in parallel with 
rectifying skills gaps in the labour market.  We have been given examples of 
particular sites which have worked with educational institutions to develop 
courses tailored to meet the sector’s needs.  
8.49 On the flexibility question, the NDA receives multi-year Spending 
Review settlements through DECC. We have heard evidence that a multi-year 
spending settlement provides significantly greater stability of funding than is 
the case in some other countries – for example, US Government budgets are 
voted on an annual basis, though their underspends can be carried forward.   
The multi-year settlement also provides some confidence for the supply chain 
that funding levels will be maintained. But in line with all public sector bodies, 
the NDA also needs to manage within an annual budget voted by Parliament, 
with a very marginal capacity to carry unspent funds over from one year to the 
next two. 
8.51 The interviews we have conducted have suggested that the budgetary 
cycle impacts on the NDA in several respects.  
• First, spending totals create significant pressure for the NDA to 
precisely hit an annual budget (and particularly not to overspend, which would 
lead to its accounts being qualified).  This is particularly difficult because of 
the unavoidable variability of the commercial income it relies on and the scale, 
long duration and uncertainty of the decommissioning work involved.  There is 
still substantial technical uncertainty in the decommissioning work and 
unforeseeable delays mean that work can be moved from one financial year 
to the next. This tends to support the need for flexibility within the SR period 
and from year to year.  
• Second, the annual budget cycle can lead to problems where individual 
projects cross the financial year boundary. We were given an example of one 
project where poor weather in March led to expenditure being delayed until 
April. This particular case could proceed because of the NDA's internal 
system of portfolio management, which reserved an internal 'cushion' to move 
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money to pressing needs across the estate during the year - but may have 
meant that expenditure elsewhere was delayed. If NDA had not had this 
system and scope, there would be further impact in terms of delays; 
• Third, lack of flexibility between years, combined with the volatility of 
commercial income, led to a claim on the Reserve in 2007-8. In this case, 
NDA were expecting waste substitution income to come through, but the 
timing was uncertain at the time for bidding for the Supplementary Estimate. 
There was therefore no choice but to ask for £400 million. In the event, this 
was not needed, as the payment came through within the financial year. This 
was not only a bureaucratic process but also led to criticism of the process by 
the Select Committee with recommendations for change.138
8.52 The financial system under which NDA has operated until the new SR 
therefore was one in which risks were asymmetrical, and it was much safer to 
under-spend than over-spend.  The new system still requires NDA to try and 
hit the single value of its agreed annual budget though there is some limited 
flexibility between years. But the instability of the roughly one-third of its 
income that still comes from commercial sources adds to the problem. The 
NDA has now revised its budgeting process and is now aiming to spend 103% 
of its agreed annual budget (‘over-pressuring’) in the expectation of some 
slippage.   While this strategy is a rational response to the incentives on offer, 
it is unlikely to be sufficient of itself to ensure NDA can cope with the 
underlying volatility inherent in managing their overall spending programme 
and commercial revenues.   
 
 
 
8.53 We have also heard that the need to hit an annual budget has had an 
impact on the kinds of contract which SLCs can offer to Tier 2 contractors. 
The best value for money approach could be for the SLC to be able to offer a 
multi-year contract, with the contractor being given full flexibility to innovate to 
deliver the cheapest and quickest approach to delivering a project. However, 
the SLCs also have annual budgets within the overall NDA envelope.  This 
means that offering flexible multi-year contracts entails a risk that were                                                         
138 House of Commons Business and Enterprise Committee, Funding the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority, Fourth Report of Session 2007-08 
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contractors to bring forward their profile of spend (even if the result is to 
deliver the overall project more quickly and cheaper), the SLC might not be 
able to hit its annual  budget. The NDA has been working with SLCs to 
develop approaches to mitigate this issue – with the SLC balancing the risk of 
contracts across its portfolio, enabling project profiles to be adjusted where 
this would deliver a better result. However clearly such an approach is more 
challenging to deliver than one where funding could be allocated to an 
individual project, with the contractor being able to determine the profile of 
spend. 
 
8.54 Finally on the contractual and supply chain issue, the introduction of 
the NDA-PBO/SLC-contractor model has the objective of introducing 
competition.  This should enable the NDA to draw on a wider international 
pool of expertise in decommissioning, innovation and programme/project 
management, and thus achieve better overall value for money.  We have 
heard consistently, both from the NDA and the private sector, that there is 
strong interest in NDA PBO contracts: each PBO competition so far has been 
strongly fought, though the present competition for the Dounreay PBO 
contract has only two bidders.   We have also heard (again both from NDA 
and the private sector139
8.55 We were given the example of one contractor, which had a contract to 
deliver a project at Sellafield for the first time, and found that it was unable to 
) that there have been problems in attracting interest 
from Tier 2 suppliers, below the PBO level. This is significant, given SLCs 
spent £1.8 billion in the supply chain in 2010/11, up from £1 billion in 2005/6. 
Reasons given for such problems include output specified contracts which 
constrain supplier innovation, the complexity and difficulty of the task at 
Sellafield, with restrictive site rules, and a culture that can be hostile to outside 
contractors or different approaches. But we have also heard that bidding 
costs, unpredictability of funding, and annual – rather than multi-year - 
contracts, are negative issues for suppliers and contribute to Tier 2 
contracting problems. 
 
                                                        
139 One interviewee told us that the top 5 global engineering firms were not interested in 
bidding for Tier 2 contracts at Sellafield. 
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get approval from the SLC for the approaches that they had relied upon to 
deliver savings on the project against its performance plan. This led to 
significant losses for the contractor. Clearly there needs to be a balance, and 
it is necessary that the nuclear regulator should ensure that safety is not 
compromised.  However, the evidence from our interviews suggests that 
some of these restrictions result in part from a throw-back to attitudes at 
Sellafield under BNFL – where there was a sense that the site knew best, and 
that its procedures were always the right ones to follow, rather than from a 
fully thought through safety analysis. 
 
8.56 A potentially serious supply chain issue is the extent to which it could 
respond rapidly if the NDA’s funding were to increase.  Clearly a very rapid 
increase would be impossible to service, but we received evidence to suggest 
that at the research sites and at the Magnox sites, a steady and planned 
increase in spending would elicit an effective supply chain response. 
 
8.57 NDA recognise the importance of a healthy, skilled supply chain, and 
that while in most cases the market is responsive, they are competing for 
some niche services in a relatively small pond. This can result in delays or bid 
up costs. NDA consulted in 2008 on proposals to improve the NDA estate’s 
use of the supply chain, and issued a second supply chain development 
strategy in 2010.  The supply chain for decommissioning at national level 
remains largely a sub-set of supply chains serving other industries, and some 
supply chain issues are not related to funding.  Nevertheless, the annual basis 
of funding for most contracts does seem a discouraging factor for Tier 2 
contractors and below, and it seems likely that the ambition to move towards 
fixed price contracts is hampered by the annual constraints on spending that 
sometimes have to be applied.  
 
Alternative funding systems in future? 
8.58 The NDA is now subject to the new spending rules introduced in 
SR2010.  Given the level of ongoing taxpayer support needed to meet 
decommissioning costs and the contingent liabilities that lie with the 
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Government,  the NDA regime will always be subject to Treasury control and 
Parliamentary oversight of public expenditure. However, there are elements in 
the NLF funding system that offer pointers to a potentially more efficient 
structure for the kind of long-term infrastructure programmes that the NDA are 
managing. While the NLF system is subject to financial and technical scrutiny 
(by the fund’s trustees and the NDA respectively) there are no annual or other 
intermediate spending controls, thus allowing contracts for decommissioning 
and waste projects to be let for their full duration, allowing for improved 
efficiency and innovation. In my view, it would be worthwhile to reflect on the 
relative merits of the two systems for 2015 and beyond. 
Conclusion: is decommissioning different? 
8.59 The policy system made a serious attempt to deal with 
decommissioning and waste management liabilities only after a long period of 
virtual inaction. Much more could have been done earlier, at substantially 
lower total cost to taxpayers.  While this delay could appear to be a 
consequence of the process of discounting – at any positive discount rate a  
liability will always be worth postponing for as long as possible – in practice 
discounting served mostly as a legitimating device rather than providing a 
primary cause of delay.   Delay was instead mostly the result of a mixture of 
circumstances, especially the concern of both Government and BNFL to 
maximize the profitability of the UK’s role in providing global nuclear fuel cycle 
services; the divided financial responsibilities (between MoD, utilities and 
BNFL) for the legacy, resulting in a failure of ownership of the problem; and 
the impact of affordability constraints, especially marked where future 
expenditure brings no financial benefit 
8.60 The analysis in this chapter shows clearly that targeting additional 
spending (the “marginal” pound argument) on decommissioning would buy 
about twice as much direct decommissioning work as the average pound, as 
half of NDA’s spending is fixed and does not directly reduce the overall 
liability. It also shows that there is good evidence that increased spending on 
the certain areas of the NDA estate would yield good value for money – 
higher spending on research sites for example would cost substantially less 
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than the discounted cost of currently planned delay.  The primary reason for 
this counter-intuitive result is the avoidance of high hotel costs as a result of 
early action.  Nor do supply chain constraints seem likely to frustrate this 
result, provided it is signalled and planned for appropriately.   
8.61 The analysis also points to the operational and financial challenges 
faced by the NDA (for example, the incentives for the NDA to land exactly on 
a particular annual spending target and from the consequential need, at times, 
for NDA to rein back on individual project spending to ensure it does not 
breach its approved level of spend). 
8.62 But the question might reasonably be asked: so what?  Other public 
agencies are subject to very similar control regimes, which have their own 
logic in terms of macro-economic budgetary management.  Nevertheless, 
there are reasons to suppose that nuclear liability management is a special 
case.  This is because:   
• the extent of the overall task is very large indeed and stretches over 
decades, with individual projects costing in the hundreds of millions of 
pounds.  But NDA spending is also once-for-all. When decommissioning is 
completed, no further spend is needed, so early increases in spending do not 
lead, as in some other fields, to an expectation that high levels of spend will 
continue: rather the reverse is true;  
• the poor condition of much of the NDA estate means that it is 
exceptionally difficult to be sure how much some of the most expensive and 
high-priority tasks will cost, and over what timescale.  Essentially the great 
bulk of NDA projects are unique and one-off and this hugely raises uncertainty 
levels, while at the same time the NDA has no explicit allowance for 
contingency in its financial system;  
• the instability of NDA commercial income, as the plants operated are 
either old and/or  unreliable, makes the planning of spending more difficult for 
the NDA than most other public agencies receiving grant-in-aid moneys;  
• building a national supply chain (a task at least as important as 
attracting high-level knowhow from international firms) is made more difficult 
as a consequence of the above factors;  
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• every extra pound spent on the NDA would yield double the amount of 
direct decommissioning than the average pound, because of high fixed costs. 
 
8.63 It is also arguable that the case for dealing with the nuclear legacy is 
both ethically sound - a good thing per se - but also important in its effect on 
the climate in which it would be possible to build the new nuclear power 
stations. For these reasons, higher spending in a context of a more flexible 
financial regime would pay real dividends.  However it is also important to 
acknowledge that these claims for decommissioning will need to be balanced 
against other ‘special case’ claims for public spending and more flexible 
financial regimes. 
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CHAPTER 9: LESSONS 
9.1 Until the last few years UK policy for nuclear clean-up was 
characterised by low priority, and delay, as well as funding schemes that have 
very little effect on discharging liabilities.  More recently there has been 
recognition of the need to focus clearly, and in a unified way, on the clean-up 
task.  Setting up the NDA was a clear step forward as was the large 
accompanying increase in public liability funding.  The principal lessons from 
this study are set out below. 
Past funding regimes and the private sector 
9.2 Past funding regimes, notably those established by the utilities prior to 
1990 and later and more soundly by BNFL have in the end turned out to pay 
little or nothing for liability discharge before being abandoned and their 
proceeds dissipated.  Having a robust segregated fund to cover 
decommissioning costs is designed to ensure that the funds are available 
when needed, and should enhance public trust. Government’s approach to 
new nuclear stations embodies this approach. 
Funding 
9.3 It is clear that a marginal pound spent on the NDA will produce around 
twice as much direct liability discharge as the average pound currently spent. 
Any possible increases in NDA spend will therefore speed up completing the 
overall decommissioning task. The most important reason for this is that there 
are high ‘hotel costs’ – the costs of simply maintaining sites safely and 
securely. 
9.4 There is evidence that in some areas, accelerating decommissioning 
through increased funding would be beneficial in net present value terms, by 
enabling hotel costs to be eliminated earlier.  The saved (and discounted) 
future hotel costs would – e.g. for research sites – substantially outweigh the 
costs of early action.   
9.5 The NDA face a number of operational and financial challenges. While 
departments and agencies like the NDA have some limited flexibility to carry 
forward marginal under-spends between years, both the NDA and its 
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contractors still have powerful incentives not to over-spend, even by very 
small sums. It also appears that the current arrangements impact on the 
ability of SLCs to provide incentives to contractors to complete projects more 
quickly (which may also be cheaper) due to the need to match an annual 
funding profile for each SLC. If in future greater flexibility could be considered 
,in the over-spend direction as well as under-spend, this would almost 
certainly offer good value for money.  This is because the need to rein back or 
accelerate some projects late in the financial year could be reduced, and all 
funding could be allocated to the projects that represent the best value for 
money, rather than in part to those which can be turned on or off quickly. 
There would also be beneficial impacts on the supply chain, including the 
likelihood that the competitive regime could be sharpened and further value 
delivered. However, the benefits of increased flexibility need to be considered 
against the Government’s wider fiscal plans. . 
9.6 The effect of discounting has been seen to influence delays to the 
decommissioning of reactors. However we do not consider that, overall, 
discounting has been the primary driver in leading to decisions to postpone 
activity – this has more often been a result of general affordability constraints 
applied in a situation where future expenditure yields no financial benefit. The 
high hazard facilities currently receive protected funding so discounting is not 
an issue where they are concerned, although it remains significant in 
assessing the business case for other projects. 
9.7 In addition to the value for money case for accelerating the tackling of 
the legacy, there is also the ethical case for not leaving a large liability for 
future generations. A pragmatic reason would be to assist in legitimising new 
nuclear build. However, these are highly constrained times for public 
spending, and the case for further acceleration will need to be balanced 
against other competing demands, even though there are powerful reasons 
for regarding public sector decommissioning as a special case. 
Reprocessing 
9.8 The continued commitment to reprocessing spent fuel has led to much 
higher costs of spent fuel and waste management than would have been the 
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case if spent fuel storage had been introduced when it became apparent that 
its costs would be much lower.  Nothing has changed in terms of the 
economics of reprocessing: uranium remains plentiful, while the relative costs 
of reprocessing and storing spent fuel overwhelmingly favour storage. 
Commitment to extensions to THORP’s lifetime is very unlikely to offer good 
value for money and the economics of any new reprocessing plant would be 
exceptionally unfavourable.  Extensions to currently contracted domestic 
reprocessing would add greatly to the cost of future decommissioning and 
waste management, and would therefore be uneconomic for any new build 
programme. This means that Government’s expectation that any new-build 
programme will be based on a once-through fuel cycle (spent fuel storage) is 
right. However the issue of the desirability of developing a new MOX plant as 
a potentially effective waste management option for plutonium already 
separated is a quite different issue. 
Setting out the nuclear liability more clearly 
9.9 The presentation of the total costs of NDA’s future clean-up work could 
be enhanced, and the scale of task made clearer, by adding to the financial 
data currently made public.  At present only the discounted value of liabilities 
is published.  This is necessary and valuable information but does not show 
the magnitude of the task, nor the progress made to date.  Presentation of the 
undiscounted value of the liability, expressed net of general inflation, would 
show both magnitude and (over time) progress much more clearly.  The 
current presentation of the liability only in discounted form, without correcting 
for inflation, tends to show annual increases in liabilities for artificial reasons.  
These are the effect of general inflation and the unwinding of a year’s 
discounting, the latter raising, for purely technical reasons, the apparent value 
of future work.  Changes in the applicable discount rate can also lead to 
changes in the apparent size of the liability, again for essentially technical 
reasons.  As the 2010/11 ARA of the NDA makes clear, a shift in the 
approved discount rate by 0.5% point would change the discounted value of 
the liabilities by £5.5 bn.  Presentation in undiscounted form would avoid 
these problems and allow the NDA more easily to show progress made in 
each year’s liability discharge. 
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9.10 Another lesson concerning the information available on the future 
scope of clean-up work has already been introduced in the most recent ARA 
of the NDA.  This is the presentation of the future liability cost in the form of a 
range of possible values around a ‘most likely’ estimate.  The 2010/11 
accounts show a range of £46.1 billion to £57.5 billion in discounted liability, 
around a most likely value of £49.2 billion, thus showing a higher risk of the 
eventual bill being higher than the ‘most likely’ estimate than lower.  Greater 
transparency around a most likely undiscounted value might help broaden 
public understanding of the scale of the legacy.  
 
9.11 However, fully transparent accounting is difficult for the NDA because it 
retains responsibility for commercial activity which it is sometimes difficult to 
separate wholly from liability management, especially at Sellafield which is a 
complex and highly interdependent site.  Nevertheless there would be value in 
having some finer-grained information available. In general, a better 
separation of commercial from liability management costs would be valuable, 
wherever this is feasible. Two more specific examples are: it would be useful 
if support and overhead costs, currently running at over £500 million annually 
(and subject to an initially successful campaign of reduction), could be 
attributed to specific sites,- where site-related - as well as to other functions. 
We understand that NDA is already working on this area; and more detail on 
new construction costs, especially as between commercial and liability 
management projects, would also help. 
The Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) and new nuclear 
9.12 The current regime controlling the investment policy of the NLF, where 
funds are placed in the currently low-yielding National Loans Fund provides 
the short-term national benefit of reducing short-term borrowing but increases 
the long-term risk that the fund may not cover all the liabilities.  Segregated 
funds are a necessary but not always sufficient basis for financial robustness. 
Current Government work on establishing a liability funding regime for any 
nuclear new-build seems to have learned relevant lessons from past funding 
regimes.  
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9.13 The funding of UK nuclear liabilities is currently subject to two distinct 
regimes, the NDA for the legacy, and the NLF for BE liabilities.  A third is in 
process of being added as Government moves towards a new system for 
new-build nuclear power.  There are already connections between the two 
existing systems in relation to decommissioning facilities, especially the role of 
the NDA in both. It is also the case that there are several reactor sites where 
the NDA and BE are ‘over the fence’ from each other.  There are already 
some elements of co-operation between the two organisations (beyond NDA’s 
statutory role in assessing BE’s decommissioning plans) and further 
consideration should be given to extensions of co-operation as a route to 
better value for money, for example in considering shared waste facilities. The 
Government’s current plans include an incentive structure which supports 
such cooperation, as well as active management of the legacy by any new 
nuclear operators. 
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MACKERRON EVALUATION – ANNEXES TO REPORT 
A1 Glossary of abbreviations 
A2 Note on scope of the evaluation and terminology 
A3 Chronology of key events  
A4 Table and chart of accounting provisions for decommissioning   
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ANNEX 1 
Glossary of Abbreviations 
ADL  Arthur D Little 
AGR  Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors 
APC  Atomic Power Construction 
ARA  Annual Report and Accounts  
BE   British Energy 
BNFL   British Nuclear Fuels Limited 
BNG  British Nuclear Group (in BNFL) 
BWR  Boiling Water Reactor 
CEGB  Central Electricity Generating Board 
CoRWM  Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
CSR  Comprehensive Spending Review 
DECC  Department of Energy and Climate Change 
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry 
EARP  Enhanced Actinide Removal Plant 
EDF  Electricite de France 
EYF  End Year Flexibility  
FBR  Fast Breeder Reactor 
FFL  Fossil Fuel Levy 
GDF  Geological Disposal Facility 
HLW  High Level Waste 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
ILW  Intermediate Level Waste 
kW  Kilowatt-hour 
LLW  Low Level Waste 
LMA  Liabilities Management Authority 
ME  Magnox Electric 
MOX  Mixed Oxide  
MW   Megawatt 
NAO  National Audit Office 
NDA  Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 
NEA  Nuclear Energy Agency (of the OECD) 
NII  Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
NFFO  Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation 
NLF  Nuclear Liabilities Fund 
NLIP  Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ONR  Office of Nuclear Regulation 
PBO  Parent Body Organisation 
PWR  Pressurised Water Reactor 
QQR  Quinquennial review 
R&D  Research and Development 
RCEP  Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
REC  Regional Electricity Company 
RWM  Radioactive Waste Management 
SIXEP Site Ion Exchange Effluent Plant 
SLC  Site Licence Company 
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SN  Scottish Nuclear Limited 
SoS  Secretary of State 
SR  Spending Review 
SSEB  South of Scotland Electricity Board 
THORP Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant 
UKAEA United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
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ANNEX 2 
Scope of the evaluation and terminology 
 
1. The title of the lead agency in this area, the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority, can give an impression that the main issue is the return of 
nuclear sites to alternative uses via the removal of the radioactive and 
other structures they contain. While this is a central part of the NDA remit, 
the NDA has a wider responsibility than decommissioning in this narrow 
sense, as it is also charged with responsibilities for radioactive waste 
management.  It is worth noting that the original title of this body was the 
Liabilities Management Authority, embracing the idea that all long-term 
nuclear liabilities would be managed in a unified way. 
2. The terms of reference for this study start by saying that coverage is to be 
of:  
“….the history of the UK approach to funding nuclear decommissioning, 
waste management and clean-up.”  
It is worth looking at the various terms that are used in this broad area, 
getting some working definition of them, and locating where this study falls 
within them. 
 
3. Starting with broader and least technical, the first term is clean-up, an 
idea which refers to work designed to remediate the potentially damaging 
side-effects (broadly negative externalities, in economics language) of 
nuclear activities.  It is a term close to the spirit of the present project.  
Clean-up refers not only to the processes of decommissioning and 
management of solid wastes, but also to operational issues in the 
management of wastes.  In the 1980s for example, BNFL invested large 
sums in plants (SIXEP and EARP) to reduce the radioactive content of 
liquid waste streams which it discharged into the Irish Sea.  This is an 
important part of the management of wastes.  Expenditures of this kind, 
whether historic or prospective, are part of the clean-up and the funding of 
them is in principle included in this study. 
4. Second, reference is often made to the nuclear legacy, clearly a time-
related idea.  This term is frequently used in the area of radioactive waste 
management (RWM) where the distinction is made between legacy waste, 
meaning the waste which either currently exists or which is more or less 
inevitably to be created in the near future as a consequence of past 
decisions, and new build waste – where the reference is to wastes that will 
arise if and when new nuclear power stations are built.  Generally, if 
implicitly, the idea of the legacy refers to solid forms of waste, or at least to 
forms of waste that may currently be liquid but which may be solidified 
(e.g. by vitrification) at some future point.. 
5. The third term is liabilities, which is an accounting term that may refer to 
many types of cost generated in any kind of economic activity. The 
distinction between a liability and a routine cost is that a liability is a 
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financial consequence of past activity.  Most liabilities are ‘long-term’ 
(strictly falling due to be met in more than one year’s time) and are 
therefore not expected to be met in the course of normal operational 
activity.  In the nuclear area, it is often argued that substantial liabilities 
can only be met (‘discharged’) a very long time into the future, often during 
periods when there will be no corresponding operating income to pay for 
them, or assets that can be sold for the same reason.  The conclusion is 
then that a long-term funding arrangement needs to be put in place in the 
short term to guarantee that the liability costs will be covered when they 
fall due.  This is sometimes related to the broad environmental ‘polluter 
pays’ principle that the generation responsible for creating a liability should 
also be responsible, at least financially, though not always physically, for 
its discharge.   
6. It is sometimes argued (and sometimes implicit) that nuclear liabilities are 
inevitably going to be of a long-term nature for broadly technical reasons.  
The timing of the liability discharge process is however not necessarily 
technically fixed or always very long-term.   In UK usage, there are three 
main categories of nuclear liability: decommissioning, waste, and 
spent fuel management (usually in the latter case including 
reprocessing).  Decommissioning is often expected to take 100 years or 
more to complete, wastes may need to be managed over even longer 
periods and spent fuel may need to take decades to be reprocessed and 
the resultant wastes managed.  However:  
• the delay to decommissioning is a policy decision (the NDA have 
suggested the possibility  of truncation from 100 to 25 years in the 
past);  
• the issue of long-term management  of higher activity wastes was 
officially postponed for 50 years back in 1982, largely because of the 
political difficulty of securing agreement on a long-term management 
strategy; and  
• spent fuel costs are often postponed because of technical difficulties in 
getting reprocessing plants to keep up with spent fuel volumes.   
However, some spent fuel costs are managed in the relatively short term 
(for some reprocessing and for storage of wastes and spent fuel) and 
some further waste costs are met out of revenue in the short term, as in 
the case of low level wastes sent for burial near Drigg.   
 
7. So what is included in ‘liabilities’ is not always clear-cut - even with the 
expectation of delays, not all waste and spent fuel management costs are 
‘liabilities’ and their scope depends on policy decisions.  The scope of 
liabilities is generally somewhat larger in the UK than in most other nuclear 
countries, and there has been evidence that the nuclear industry and 
Government have been in favour of postponement of costs and their 
placement in the ‘liability’ category for reasons of minimizing shorter term 
costs and accounting provisions.  We are interested for this study in a 
wider idea than liabilities – for example we include SIXEP/EARP and low 
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level RWM costs, both of which are in the clean-up, but not the liability 
category.   
8. Wastes, an apparently (but not actually) unambiguous physical category, 
are clearly of major interest to this study.   They are a more limited idea 
than liabilities in some respects (they do not include the process of 
decommissioning nuclear sites).  There is a variety of classification 
schemes for waste.  In the UK the categories are low level, intermediate 
level and high level wastes (LLW, ILW and HLW), depending on the level 
of radioactivity and (in the case of HLW) its characteristic of continuing to 
generate heat for many years.    
9. Materials are classified as wastes when there is agreement that they have 
no potential future economic uses at current or expected level of costs and 
state of technology. Examples of low level waste are clothing and glove 
boxes used by operators at plants like Sellafield and some of the concrete 
from decommissioning reactors and such material – large in volume but 
low in radioactivity – is buried in a shallow disposal site near Drigg.  
Examples of intermediate level wastes are materials routinely arising in 
reactor operations (e.g. fuel cladding) and some that result from the 
reprocessing of spent fuel.  These are substantially smaller in volume but 
sufficiently radiotoxic that they require careful, shielded storage and are 
expected to be disposed in deep geological repositories, other than waste 
in Scotland – the Scottish Government does not support this option and 
therefore ILW in Scotland will not, on current policies, be disposed of in a 
GDF.  High level, heat generating wastes, are very small in volume but 
both highly radiotoxic and often very long-lasting in terms of potential for 
harm.  In the UK the main category of HLW has been the liquid nitric acid-
based material resulting from reprocessing (highly active liquors or HAL).   
10. All the examples above are regarded more or less universally as wastes.  
However there are other categories of radioactive materials about which 
there is controversy, and differences in classification in different countries, 
and potentially over time.  In the UK, the separated plutonium and 
uranium extracted as a result of spent fuel reprocessing has traditionally 
not been classified as a waste, in recognition of the possibility that these 
materials could be used in the manufacture of future nuclear fuel – though 
to date no such use has been made of the the UK-owned stocks .  Equally, 
spent fuel, some of which (from AGR reactors) is currently stored pending 
long-term management decisions, has also not been classified as waste.  
The terms of reference for CoRWM did, however, require consideration of 
the management of plutonium, uranium and spent fuel as potential future 
wastes.   
11. In most nuclear-using countries, reprocessing of spent fuel is not 
undertaken, which means that spent fuel (containing plutonium and 
unfissioned uranium) is classified and treated as waste.  The classification 
makes a significant difference to the expected liability costs – classifying 
plutonium as waste, with an expectation of some kind of disposal, would 
add several billion pounds to the overall liability bill in the UK.  Current 
possibilities, such as using the plutonium stockpile to make mixed oxide 
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fuel (MOX, involving a combination of plutonium and natural uranium) 
might reduce this bill but MOX fuel will be more expensive to make and 
use than uranium only fuel.    
12. This study is clearly interested in principle in the cost and funding of all 
three categories (LLW, ILW and HLW), though LLW is relatively 
inexpensive to manage and the great bulk of it has generally not been 
treated as a liability.  We are also interested in principle in the funding of 
storage of reprocessed plutonium and uranium, as well as spent fuel, 
because they all carry some level of future liability.   
13. So far the discussion has implicitly treated all wastes as if they were 
solids.  However many wastes arise in the first instance as gases or 
liquids.  Routine gaseous discharges tend to be small in radioactivity 
terms and are closely regulated.  Generally it is not believed that they pose 
hazards to human health as presently regulated and they are not 
considered in this study.  However many radioactive waste streams arise 
in liquid form.  In general, radioactive wastes are more easily managed 
when in solid rather than liquid form and several liquid wastes are routinely 
turned into solids, for example the liquid nitric acid from reprocessing is 
eventually vitrified (turned into glass blocks).  But some liquid wastes are 
discharged into the environment, usually the sea.  In the late 1970s and 
1980s the radioactivity in liquid discharges from Sellafield into the Irish 
Sea rose and the result was substantial expenditure on plants designed to 
reduce this level of radioactivity substantially prior to discharge.  This study 
is therefore interested in the funding of these treatments to liquid wastes.    
14. The final term, already referred to, is discharges, which are generally 
gaseous or liquid.  A radioactive discharge is by definition a waste form of 
some kind.  The funding associated with it may be trivial or non-existent, 
as in the case of routine gaseous discharges, but there may often be a 
cost associated with discharges, especially with liquid wastes, either prior 
to their release into the environment or in the course of turning them into 
more tractable solids.  As a category of wastes, this study is clearly 
interested in the funding associated with discharge management.  
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ANNEX 3 
Chronology of significant dates 
 
1954 Establishment of the UKAEA 
Construction of first Dounreay Fast reactor 
1956 Calder Hall opened by Queen  
1959  Licensing of Dounreay waste shaft 
1965 Decision to opt for the AGR in second reactor 
programme 
1971 BNFL created  
1976 Flowers Report raises the issue of waste 
management 
1977 Windscale Enquiry  
1982/3 Sea dumping suspended, following international 
pressure 
1982/5 Sizewell Enquiry  
1988 Fast Reactor Programme scaled back 
1989 -
1990 
Privatisation of electricity supply industry, 
announcement of withdrawal of Magnox (July 
1989) and AGRs and PWR (November 1989) 
from privatisation. 
1990 Fossil Fuel Levy established 
1994 UKAEA becomes effectively a legacy 
management organisation 
1996 Privatisation of British Energy, and 
establishment of NDF,  
1997 Nirex Enquiry 
1998 Magnox Electric transferred to BNFL. £2.6 billion 
from fossil fuel levy used to endow Nuclear 
Liabilities Investment Portfolio (NLIP) 
1999 BNFL purchase of Westinghouse 
1999- Review of liabilities establishes that they are 
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2000 major barrier to sale of BNFL – estimated at £34 
billion. NLIP now exceeds £4 billion 
2001 Quinquennial Review of the UKAEA proposes 
the establishment of an LMA to manage nuclear 
liabilities. 
2001 Patricia Hewitt Commons Statement announced 
Government will create LMA 
2002 Publication of White Paper Managing the 
Nuclear Legacy 
2004 Passing of the Energy Act 
2004 Rescue of British Energy, following collapse in 
the electricity price.  
2005 Establishment of the NDA 
2005 -
9 
Wind down of BNFL, with assets sold off piece 
by piece. The sale of Westinghouse raises £4 
billion. 
2006 Nirex absorbed into the NDA 
2007 Letting of the Sellafield contract 
2008 Restructured British Energy sold to EDF, with 
most of proceeds used to endow NLF 
2010 Spending Review 
 
Now 
 
Next 2  
years 
End of Magnox generation (currently Wylfa and 
one Oldbury reactor remain operational) 
Next 
10 
years 
End of Magnox reprocessing (current plan 2016) 
and THORP reprocessing (current plan 2020) 
2023 All AGR stations will have ceased operations 
under current plans (EDF expected to apply for 
lifetime extensions) 
2034 All Magnox sites in care and maintenance 
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2040 Deep Geological Disposal Facility available 
2101 All Magnox sites cleared 
2120 Final Sellafield site clearance (under current 
lifetime plan) – will depend on future 
development of nuclear industry  
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Annex 4: Decommissioning Provisions 
 
The table and chart below set out the provisions made by each of the 
organisations involved in the UK nuclear industry for decommissioning. The 
figures used are those provided in each company’s annual reports. These are 
not fully comparable, as the discount rates used are not consistent, many of 
the companies did not publish an undiscounted figure, and the rates of 
discounting, and profile of intended expenditure are not all now available. 
Nevertheless, the chart and table below do summate the collective provisions 
made, to provide the best general indication which can now be made of 
increase in nuclear provisions from 1970 to the present – and the overall 
profile presented by the chart is a realistic picture. 
 
Aggregate Nuclear Liabilities (discounted)
-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
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£m
SSEB CEGB SN NE ME BE NLF BNFL UKAEA NDA  
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Cumulative provisions for decommissioning costs by organisation (discounted) 
£ m SSEB CEGB SN NE  ME BE NLF BNFL UKAEA NDA Total 
1970 2                   2  
1971 3                   3  
1972 3                 -        3  
1973 3                   3  
1974 3              7      9  
1975 3  34            9      45  
1976 4  67            11      83  
1977 10  149            13      172  
1978 26  233            47      306  
1979 37  367            55      459  
1980 65  333            73      472  
1981 99  464            76      640  
1982 158  658            85      902  
1983 233  791            153      1,177  
1984 296  1,432            194      1,921  
1985 357  1,791            250      2,398  
1986 407  2,038            314      2,759  
1987 645  2,635            375      3,656  
1988 755  3,993            466      5,214  
1989 1,818  8,454            552      10,824  
1990      8,831        675      9,506  
1991      8,529        800      9,329  
1992      8,314        902      9,216  
1993      8,033        967      9,000  
1994      7,825        1,000      8,825  
1995        8,423      1,014      9,437  
1996         7,888  3,889    1,120  2,294    15,191  
1997         8,470  3,733    1,196  2,355    15,754  
1998           3,786    9,153  2,402    15,341  
1999           3,790    14,418  2,650    20,858  
2000           3,762    15,786  2,967    22,515  
2001           3,770    16,106  3,288    23,164  
2002           3,728    19,676  3,647    27,051  
2003           3,719    20,736  3,880    28,335  
2004           4,223   20,758  5,071    30,052  
2005             2,000    139  24,093  26,232*  
2006             3,200   160  30,575  33,935  
2007             3,389    153  37,036  40,578  
2008             3,841    166  44,100  47,762  
2009             3,561    154  44,504  48,219  
2010             3,934   164  45,083  49,181  
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* £5bn of 'consolidation adjustment' (when BNFL, UKAEA and MoD assets were merged into NDA)                                                URN 12D/002/ 
University of Sussex
